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ABSTRACT 
From Tin to Pewter: Craft and Statecraft in China, 1700 to 1844 
Yijun Wang 
 
This dissertation examines the transmissions of technology and changes in the culture of 
statecraft by tracing the itinerary of tin from ore in mines to everyday objects. From the 
eighteenth century, with the expansion of the Qing empire and global trade, miners migrated 
from the east coast of China to the southwest frontiers of the Qing empire (1644-1912) and into 
Southeast Asia, bringing their mining technology with them. The tin from Southeast Asia, in 
return, inspired Chinese pewter artisans to invent new styles and techniques of metalworking. 
Furthermore, the knowledge of mining, metalworking, and trade was transferred from miners, 
artisans, and merchants into the knowledge system of scholar-officials, gradually changing the 
culture of statecraft in the Qing dynasty. This dissertation explores how imperial expansion and 
the intensive material exchange brought by global trade affected knowledge production and 
transmission, gradually changing the culture of statecraft in China. 
In the Qing dynasty, people used tin, the component of two common alloys, pewter and 
bronze, to produce objects of daily use as well as copper coins. Thus, tin was not only important 
to people’s everyday lives, but also to the policy-making of the Qing state. In this way, tin offers 
an exceptional opportunity to investigate artisans and intellectuals’ approach to technology, 
while it also provides a vantage point from which to examine how Qing bureaucrats managed the 
world, a world of human and non-human resources. 
My dissertation stands at the intersection of the history of science and technology, art 
history, intellectual history, and the history of global trade. It broadens the scope of the history of 
science in China by demonstrating how artisans’ practice was crucial to the production of mining 
treatises. It contributes to the study of science, technology, and society by showing that the 
transmission of and innovations in technology should be situated in the context of social, cultural, 
trade, and ecological networks. Finally, I argue that mid-Qing scholars’ efforts to collect 
practical knowledge changed the culture of governance from Confucian moral didacticism to 
technocratic epistemology. Qing bureaucrats, Manchu and Han alike, utilized practical 
knowledge from artisans and merchants in their policy-making process. By emphasizing the 
entanglement of technology and statecraft, my project contributes to intellectual history and 
enhances our understanding of the logic of bureaucracy of the Qing empire. 
My dissertation consists of five chapters. Each chapter uses different methodologies and 
covers different geographical regions. Chapter One engages with the history of science by 
demonstrating how scholars translated and codified miners’ vernacular knowledge of mining into 
mining treatises. Chapter Two examines the semi-autonomous mining community in Yunnan to 
illustrate that the social organization of miners, which I define as the “social technology” of 
mining, contributed to the formation of the capital- and labor- intensive mining industry. Chapter 
Three moves to the island of Bangka (in present-day Indonesia) and focuses on the transmission 
of mining technology from China to Southeast Asia. Through comparison, I show that the miners 
in Yunnan and Bangka formed similar (semi-)autonomous social organizations. I argue that it 
was this social technology that enabled the transmission of Chinese mining technology across 
geographical regions and laid the foundation for the Chinese dominance of the mining industry 
in Bangka. The cases of Chinese mining technology in Yunnan and Bangka challenge the 
modern understanding of technology by showing that technology was not just about tools and 
machines. Before the 1850s, both Qing bureaucrats and European colonizers considered the 
social organization of mining to be critical to technological progress. 
Chapter Four moves back to China to study the formation of Guangdong style pewter. 
Utilizing visual and material sources, I examine how the introduction of tin from Southeast Asia 
led to innovations in metallurgy, and how European silver and porcelain inspired stylistic 
changes. I argue that technology and innovations should be understood in the context of social, 
economic, material and ecological networks. The final chapter moves to Beijing and Jiangnan 
area to engage with the institutional history of the Qing empire. Through a case study of 
monetary reform undertaken in 1740, this chapter reveals that Qing bureaucrats acquired and 
applied practical expertise to their administrative work. Through their close interactions with 
artisans and merchants, Qing bureaucrats developed a distinctive vision of statecraft (jingshi). 
Before the late nineteenth century, the sovereignty of the Qing state was not exercised in the 
extraction and monopoly over natural resources. Instead, the Qing state relied on the market to 
acquire most of natural resources they needed. By focusing on tin, this dissertation shows that 
the Qing state exercised its political power through material production and paid more attention 





TABLE OF CONTENTS 
LIST OF MAP……………………………………………………………………………………ii 
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS……………………………………………………………………..ii 
DATES, WEIGHTS, AND MEASUREMENTS……………………………………...….…….v 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS……………………………………………………………………….vi 
INTRODUCTION………………………………………………………...………………………1 
CHAPTER ONE  
Translating and Transcribing Tin Mining Technology in Southwest China……….…………….23 
 
CHAPTER TWO 
Ecology and the Migrating Miners’ Community……………………………………………...…66 
 
CHAPTER THREE 
Foreign Tin from Bangka……………………………………………………………………….104 
CHAPTER FOUR 
Crafting Guangdong Style………………………………………….…………………………...146 
CHAPTER FIVE 
Thinking like Artisans, Thinking like Merchants…………………….…………………...…….174 
CONCLUSION………………………………………………..……………………………….216 
BIBLIOGRAPHY…………………………………………………………….………………..222 





LIST OF MAP 
1. Location of Bangka Island………………………………………………………………105 
 
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS 
1.1  Map of Lin’an Prefecture with location of mines..................................................................239  
1.2  Tin ore (cassiterite-sulfide) from Laochang Mine, Gejiu, Yunnan, China...........................239  
1.3  Illustration of underground adits and shafts...........................................................................240  
1.4  Illustration of Yi-barbarian style ladders, air duct, and air fan..............................................240  
1.5  Hammer, chisel (with handle), and mattocks (no handle)......................................................241  
1.6  The oil lamp...........................................................................................................................241  
1.7  The piston “dragon” pump made of bamboo or wood..........................................................241  
1.8  Pumping water out of the tunnels...........................................................................................242  
1.9  Pumping water out of the tunnel in a Japanese copper mine...................................................242  
1.10  Illustration of ore dressing...................................................................................................242  
1.11  Rubbing ore in the ore dressing process, early 20th century................................................243  
1.12  Pan method in1990..............................................................................................................243  
1.13  Assaying the tin concentrate................................................................................................243  
1.14  Tin smelter’s furnace in the seventeenthcentury..................................................................243  
1.15  A model of tin furnace in early 20th century..........................................................................243  
1.16  Tools of Smelters.................................................................................................................244  
2.1 The structure of the Seven Chief System...............................................................................244  
2.2  Yunnan Temple in Gejiu.......................................................................................................245  
2.3  “Gejiu gongyi changbei ji”....................................................................................................245  
 iii 
3.1  Contract between the VOC company and the Hong merchant...............................................245  
3.2  Pewter tea caddy in a lacquer box.........................................................................................245  
3.3  The tin belt in South China and Southeast Asia....................................................................245  
3.4  Schematic plan of a kolong mine...........................................................................................245  
3.5  Epp’s sketch of a kolong mine...............................................................................................246  
3.6  Illustration of water wheel and square-pallet chain pump.....................................................246 
3.7  Instruments used by Chinese smelters...................................................................................247 
3.8  The structure of the double acting piston bellow...................................................................247  
3.9  The smelters on Bangka.........................................................................................................247  
3.10  The kongsi system before the colonial rule..........................................................................248  
3.11  The shareholding system in Chinese kongsi........................................................................248  
3.12  The structure of kongsi under colonial rule.........................................................................249  
4.1  Pewter teapot with Gui Fuchu’s mark...................................................................................249  
4.2  Pewter teapot with Yixing clay lining and the inscribed signature of Zhu Jian....................249  
4.3  Pewter teapot with Yixing clay lining and seal mark “Yang Pengnian zhi”.........................249  
4.4  Creating a round-shaped Yixing clay teapot..........................................................................249  
4.5  Creating a square-shaped Yixing clay teapot.........................................................................249  
4.6  Pewter teapot with the poem and the inscription by Guaerjia Zhengliang............................249  
4.7  Pewter tureen with workshop mark “Yan Yihe”...................................................................250  
4.8  Pewter box with six tea caddies.............................................................................................250  
4.9  Artisans in Lukang casting pewter sheet. .............................................................................250  
4.10  ArtisansinLukanghammeringthepewtersheet......................................................................250 
4.11  A pewter artisan in Yan Laiqin’s workshop........................................................................250 
 iv 
4.12  Interior of a Pewter Shop, c. 1830.......................................................................................250  
4.13  Agarwood bead bracelet (with pewter storage container)...................................................250  
4.14. Pewter dining set with the workshop name “Chaoyang Yanhuiji”.....................................251  
4.15  Pewter tureen with workshop name “Zhaocheng Sanxing”.................................................251  
4.16  Porcelain tureen in the form of a hen...................................................................................251  
4.17  Porcelain tureen and lid, in the form of a duck....................................................................251  
4.18  Hexagonal teapot with repoussé battle scene, figures in garden design and poets..............251  
4.19  Reverse side of the lid of the pewter tureen on figure 4.7...................................................251 
4.20  Pewter box in the form of a butterfly...................................................................................251  
4.21  Silver filigree box in butterfly form.....................................................................................251  
4.22  Pewter teapot with brass inlay.............................................................................................251  
4.23  Tools of Chen Wanneng......................................................................................................251  
4.24  A stone mold made from Shoushan stone...........................................................................252  
4.25. A mold made from duralumin.............................................................................................252  
5.1  The silver shop.......................................................................................................................252  
5.2  Location of mints in Beijing during the Qianlong period......................................................253  
5.3  Location of mints during the Qianlong reign.........................................................................253 
5.4  Illustration of casting coins in Tiangong kaiwu......................................................................253  
5.5  Two rows of cash trees from Guangxu period (1875-1908)..................................................253 
5.6  Filing the coins in Tiangong kaiwu.......................................................................................254  
 v 
DATES, WEIGHTS, AND MEASUREMENTS 
 
Dates 
Abbreviation Emperor Reign 
KX Kangxi 1661-1722 
YX Yongzheng 1723-1735 
QL Qianlong 1736-1795 
JQ Jiaqing 1796-1820 
DG Daoguang 1821-1850 
XF Xianfeng 1851-1861 
TZ Tongzhi 1862-1875 
GX Guangxu 1876-1908 
 
The abbreviation of a complete date in the footnote is followed by a three-number sequence that 
indicates reign year, lunar month, and day. 
 






1 dan (picul) 	  100jin (catty) 
  ≈ 59.7 kg 
1 jin (catty) 
  16 liang (tael)    ≈ 597 g 
1 liang (tael)   10 qian (mace)    ≈ 37 g 
1 qian (mace)   = 10 fen (candareen)  ≈ 3.7 g  
1 fen (candareen)  = 10 li (cash)   ≈ 0.37 g  
Measurements 
 
1 li   =180 zhang   ≈ 576 meters 
1 zhang   = 10 chi    ≈ 3.2 meters 
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  1 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1757, Yu Qingchang Jůϓ (1724-1800), a native of Hubei ȟ Province, was 
appointed to the position of county magistrate of Tonghai ΚȚ. In the twelfth lunar month, Yu 
went on a journey to investigate the Mansuo ŭǡ gold mines at the west border of Yunnan 
Province (in today’s Tengchong ˹w).1 In this journey, Yu visited silver, gold, copper, and tin 
mines in Yunnan, including the tin mines in Gejiu Ŷ, a town where the largest tin deposit in 
China is located. In his travelogue, Yu wrote:  
With three horses and seven footmen…[I] rode south to enter the border of 
Mengzi ̥˼ County, and traveled another forty li to arrive at Gejiu. Merchants 
and traders congregated [here], smokes and fires (of smelters) were dense and 
blooming. [I] inspected until it got darker before I went back. This famous place 
produced silver, tin, and lead. The white tin was of the best quality under heaven.2 
In the eighteenth century, as the Qing empire expanded to Yunnan province, Gejiu became 
the primary origin of domestic tin supply in China. As Yu Qingchang’s travelogue demonstrates, 
the flourishing mining industry attracted miners, traders, and merchants to this remote frontier of 
the empire, making tin from Gejiu a well-known product in the Qing empire. 
Meanwhile, in Guangdong Province on the east coast, “foreign tin” (yangxi Ȑο) supplied 
the local metal market. According to court memorials of the governor-general of Guangdong 
Province, local artisans used the foreign tin to produce pewter objects, and traders from other 
                                               
1 Yu Qingchang Jůϓ, Jinchang xingji ΰł̯͈, in Xiaofanghuzhai yudi congchao ęƪæДЄÓ§β 
(Shanghai: Zhuyitang, 1877-1897), 39a. 
2 “i̥˼ɩ.¡ÊέƁŶłÅͲΈ·.ȾȰ˘ʩ̻ƑАËÓɤεοδɵο͵̉ɧ-
ë”Yu Qingchang, Jinchang xingji, 39a. 
  2 
provinces gathered in Guangdong to purchase tin from foreign traders.3 The role of foreign tin 
was so crucial that the Qing court procured foreign tin from the market for coinage from the 
second half of the eighteenth century.4 The Qing officials were fully aware of the price and the 
trade of foreign tin in the Guangdong market. What they did not know was the majority of the 
so-called foreign tin came from a small island in today’s Indonesia called Bangka, and was 
excavated by Chinese migrants who illegally sailed there to make a living. 
These two anecdotes show the characteristics of the mining, trading, and the consumption 
of tin and tin alloys in the eighteenth century. Chinese people have been familiar with tin and its 
alloys since the bronze age. But in the eighteenth century, the imperial expansion and the fast-
growing global trade brought changes to the crafting and consumption of this metal. In 1681, the 
Kangxi emperor expanded the Qing empire to the Southwestern border of China, Yunnan 
province. In around fifty years, the Qing empire gradually removed the indirect rule of local 
chiefs, bringing the land of the most abundant mineral resources under direct administration. 
People migrated from the east coast of China to engage in mining, and the bureaucrats started to 
gain knowledge about mining through administration over mining. In his travelogue, Yu 
Qingchang mentioned that he had several meetings with the bureaucrats who oversaw mining 
administration. Later in his career, he compiled an eight-volume manuscript Tongzheng kao ζƚ
˫ (A research on copper administration), which became the first monograph on mining 
                                               
3 Wang Mo ɔ͚, court memorial to the Qianlong emperor, QL 5/7/2, The First Historical Archives, Beijing, No. 
04-01-35-1231-015. 
4 Wang Anguo ɔąÐ and Ma’ertai ЈɈȎ, court memorial to the Qianlong emperor, QL 6/3/1, The First 
Historical Archives, Beijing, No. 04-01-35-1231-026. 
  3 
administration.5  
When the Chinese miners, merchants, and bureaucrats were expanding their mining 
industry to the southwest borders of the empire, another group of Chinese migrants sailed to 
Southeast Asia. As European traders found the tin from Southeast Asia an ideal substitute for 
silver in the China Trade, their demand for tin further motivated the Guangdong miners to 
migrate to Southeast Asia to engage in mining, bringing their mining technology with them. The 
Southeast Asian tin and the European style commodities that arrived in China through global 
trade inspired Chinese pewter artisans to invent new styles and new alloying fomula in their 
craft. This dissertation explores how imperial expansion and the intensive material exchange 
brought by global trade affected knowledge production and transmission, gradually changing the 
culture of statecraft in China. 
Two intertwined themes, craft and statecraft, are the double helix that forms the DNA of 
this dissertation. Here I use statecraft as a shorthanded translation of jingshi ˑ, literally means 
managing the world. In the Qing dynasty (1644-1912), tin was used as the component of two 
common alloys: pewter (xi ο or xila  οϒ), an alloy of tin, copper, and lead, with tin made up 
the majority of the composite, and bronze, an alloy of copper and tin. Chinese people cherished 
the silver-like color of pewter and used a large amount of pewter to produce objects and 
ornaments of daily and religious use, including dowry goods, tableware, and luxurious tea 
vessels. At the same time, the Qing court used bronze to issue its currency—the copper coins that 
circulated in the Chinese market. Therefore, the Qing court and the bureaucrats had to gain 
tremendous knowledge and skills regarding the sourcing, procurement, and the alloying 
                                               
5 Fang Guoyu ƪÐɚ, Yunnan shiliao mulu gaishuo ϰ®ƧɿμǨ͓, (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1984) 654, 
728-730. 
  4 
technique of this metal. As tin linked mining, metalworking to the policy-making of the Qing 
court, it connected the craft of artisans to the statecraft of bureaucrats. In this way, tin offers an 
exceptional opportunity to investigate the eighteenth-century artisans as well as intellectuals’ 
approach to technology and innovation, while it also provides a vantage point from which I can 
examine the culture of statecraft and the logic of Qing bureaucracy. 
This dissertation starts from the 1700s, a period when the Qing empire felt the opportunies 
and challenges brought by imperial expansion and global trade. In the 1700s, as the Qing empire 
finally established direct administration over its southwest frontier of Yunnan, the migration 
from the east coast and the development in mining industry transformed the local community, 
landscape, as well as the knowledge-scape of Qing bureaucrats. At the same time, the miners 
from Guangdong started to migrate to Bangka, the tin island of the Dutch East Indies, turning 
themselves to be labor forces that contributed to the globalization of capitalism. Back in China, 
the global trade affected the operation of private workshops as well as the Qing state. Artisans 
and bureaucrats alike responded to the internal and external changes by changing the technology 
and cultures of their craft.  
My study ends in 1844, a period before the Chinese intellectuals learned the languages and 
concepts about science and technology from European imperial powers. As Shellen Wu has 
pointed out, from the late nineteenth century, the Chinese views of natural resources changed 
“irrevocably as a result of the late Qing engagement with imperialism and science.” 6 As the 
ability to control and to extract mineral resources became a symbol of sovereignty, science and 
                                               
6 Shellen Xiao Wu, Empires of Coal: Fueling China’s Entry into the Modern World Order, 1860-1920 (Stanford, 
California: Stanford University Press, 2015), 2. 
  5 
technology started to entangle with imperialism, wealth and power, and modernity.7 Through an 
investigation of technology and statecraft from the 1700s to 1844, this dissertation analyzes the 
concept of craft and statecraft before the introduction of the western discourse of science and 
technology. 
 
Methodology and Materials 
This dissertation stands at the intersection of the history of science and technology, 
material culture, art history, economic history, and institutional history. First, this research 
engages with the history of science and technology in China through the examination of 
knowledge production and technology transmission. This study discusses the production of 
scholarly knowledge about mining in China based on the research of the compilation of a mining 
treatise. It emphasizes the role of artisans and their interaction with the matter in knowledge 
formation process. Furthermore, I follow a Latourian approach to contextualize technology and 
innovation in the context of social, ecological, and trade networks.8 Besides, this research 
follows the recent trend of mobility or traveling technology.9 It examines the movement of 
mining technology from China to Southeast Asia to demonstrate the social and ecological factors 
that enabled or smoothened the mobility of technology.  
                                               
7 Wu, Empires of Coal. 
8 Bruno Latour, Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2005). 
9 Pamela H. Smith, ed., Entangled Itineraries: Materials, Practices, and Knowledges across Eurasia, 1 edition 
(University of Pittsburgh Press, 2019). Daniel Rogers, Bhavani Raman, Helmut Reimitz, eds, Cultures in 
Motion (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014). Mimi Sheller and John Urry, “The New Mobilities 
Paradigm,” Environment and Planning A: Economy and Space 38, no. 2 (February 2006): 207–26. 
 
  6 
The research also engages with the history of technology by analyzing how social 
organizations contributed to the development and transmission of technology. Jacob Eyferth’s 
research on Jiajiang paper makers shows that the secret of papermaking technology was 
embedded in social networks.10 Following his approach, I extend my study of technology from 
equipments and skills to the social organization of the mining community. I use analytical 
frameworks of economic historians to examine the shareholding system and labor organization 
of Chinese mining corporations.11 I demonstrate that the miners’ social organization, such as the 
Seven-Chiefs system in Yunnan and the Kongsi system in Bangka, provided means to raise 
funds, organize labor, and maintain the local order. Therefore, I define the miners’ social 
organization as the social technology of mining, and argue that the success of Chinese mining 
corporations in Southeast Asia was not based on advanced tools or machines, but was due to 
their “social technology” of organizing labor and the capital. In this way, I broaden the concept 
of technology by showing that technology was not just about skills and tools, but was also about 
social relations and organizations. Social relations not only affect technological innovations, they 
are a part of technology.  
Thirdly, this research contributes current scholarship on global trade and knowledge 
production. Previous study on global trade and knowledge exchange mainly focus on luxurious 
goods such as porcelain, silk, clocks, or silver, while my research investigates the trade of tin, a 
bulk commodity that was important to everyday life as well as state’s economy. Art historians 
                                               
10 Jacob Eyferth, Eating Rice from Bamboo Roots: The Social History of a Community of Handicraft Papermakers 
in Rural Sichuan, 1920-2000 (Harvard University Asia Center, 2009). 
11 Madeleine Zelin, “The Firm in Early Modern China,” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, The 
Economic Performance of Civilizations: Roles of Culture, Religion and the Law, 71, no. 3 (September 1, 2009): 
623–37. Madeleine Zelin, The Merchants of Zigong: Industrial Entrepreneurship in Early Modern China (Columbia 
University Press, 2006). 
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have shown the changes in artistic styles, tastes, and techniques brought by cross-cultural 
exchange.12 Through visual analysis of museum collections of pewter, this research reveals how 
intensive material exchange invoked innovations in decorative styles and metallurgy. Following 
the actor-network theory proposed by Bruno Latour, I address the social, trade, cultural and 
ecological networks that contributed to the making of Guangdong style pewter.13 
Finally, this dissertation engages with institutional history of the Qing empire. Building 
upon the study on the innovative institutions that Manchu rulers created to rule the vast empire, 
this dissertation expands our understanding of bureaucracy in the Qing empire.14 It shows that 
the de facto operation of the empire blurred the distinction between the imperial household and 
the state, and was a combination of both personal and impersonal rules. Through an in-depth 
study of how Qing bureaucrats acquired practical knowledge in their daily administration and 
utilized their technocratic knowledge in policy-making, this research echoes with Dorothy Ko 
and Kaijun Chen’s scholarship on the “technocratic epistemology” to show the emerging 
                                               
12 Barry Finbarr Flood, Objects of Translation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009). Rogers eds, Cultures in 
Motion. Petra ten-Doesschate Chu, Ning Ding and Lidy Jane Chu eds., Qing Encounters: Artistic Exchanges 
between China and the West, (Los Angeles, California: Getty Research Institute, 2015). Catherine Pagani, Eastern 
Magnificence & European Ingenuity: Clocks of Late Imperial China (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 
2001). Anna Grasskamp and Monica Juneja, eds., EurAsian Matters: China, Europe, and the Transcultural Object, 
1600-1800, Transcultural Research – Heidelberg Studies on Asia and Europe in a Global Context (Springer 
International Publishing, 2018). 
13 Latour, Reassembling the Social. 
14 Evelyn Sakakida Rawski, The Last Emperors: A Social History of Qing Imperial Institutions (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1998). Jonathan D. Spence, Ts’ao Yin and the K’ang-Hsi Emperor; Bondservant and 
Master (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966). Palace Museum and Max-Planck Society for the History of 
Science, Gongting yu difang: shiqi zhi shiba shiji de jishu jiaoliu čŅ̀Óƪ˽l，ɷŽ̰3Ȗ 
(Beijing: Zijincheng chubanshe, 2010). Preston M. Torbert, The Chʻing Imperial Household Department: A Study of 
Its Organization and Principal Functions, 1662-1796 (Cambridge, Mass: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard 
University: distributed by Harvard University Press, 1977). 
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technocratic culture among Qing bureaucrats.15  
This study utilizes a wide array of materials to support the interdisciplinary approach and 
to cover the vast geographical regions. I use mining treatises, administrative manuals, and local 
gazetteers to study the mining technology and the mining organizations in Yunnan. The research 
on the Chinese mining organizations in Bangka is based on archival documents of the Dutch East 
India Company (VOC) and the British East India Company (EIC), as well as reports from 
European natural philosophers and colonial officers. Moreover, through textual analysis, I 
demonstrate the knowledge systems of the authors of these texts. This study also uses court 
memorials to analyze the practical knowledge that bureaucrats acquired and applied in 
administrative work in order to exemplify the technocratic epistemology of Qing bureaucrats. 
Besides textual sources, this dissertation uses museum collections in the United States, Europe, 
and China to show the stylistic and technical changes in the making of pewter objects. In 
addition to textual and visual sources, I also use ethnographical research in pewter workshops in 
Guangdong and Taiwan to supplement the analysis of crafting technology. In the following 
section, I am going to elaborate on some of the major theoretical and historiographical issues that 
this dissertation addresses. 
 
Knowledge Production in Early Modern China 
Sixty years after Joseph Needham’s grand project Science and Civilization in China, many 
scholars have made tremendous efforts in providing evidence for the existence of scientific 
                                               
15 Dorothy Ko, The Social Life of Inkstones: Artisans and Scholars in Early Qing China (Seattle: University of 
Washington Press, 2017). Kaijun Chen, “The Rise of Technocratic Culture in High-Qing China: A Case Study of 
Bondservant (Booi) Tang Ying (1682-1756)” (New York: Ph.D. Dissertation, Columbia University, 2014).  
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knowledge and technology in China. Meanwhile, in recent decades, more and more scholars 
abandoned the search for empirical evidences of modern science in Chinese history and shifted 
their focus to study Chinese science and technology as knowledge systems. They pay attention to 
the production of knowledge in their full cultural and historical contexts.16 For example, instead 
of merely taking Tiankong kaiwu as an encyclopedia of craftsmanship, Dagmar Schäfer 
contextualizes the social and economic changes in the late Ming and argues that Song’s search 
for cosmological order to rule the chaos of his era motivated his enquiry on craft knowledge.17 
Carla Nappi’s research on Compendium of Materia Medica also focuses on the ways of knowing 
about nature. Her study on the collecting, evaluating, and compiling process shows that Li 
Shizhen had a different mode of rationality from European botanists, and the Chinese way of 
understanding nature was plural and manifold.18 Benjamin Elman’s study shows how Chinese 
scholars adapted western science to their knowledge system and developed modern science on 
their own terms.19 However, these scholars focused on bureaucrats’ writings and overlooked the 
source of scientific knowledge—the craft practice. By focusing on the production of craftsman’s 
knowledge in the actual process of making and its subsequent transmission to technological 
texts, I hope to contribute to the current scholarship in the history of science and technology in 
China. 
                                               
16 Dagmar Schäfer, Cultures of Knowledge: Technology in Chinese History (Leiden: BRILL, 2011), 1. 
17 Dagmar Schäfer, The Crafting of the 10,000 Things: Knowledge and Technology in Seventeenth-Century China 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011). 
18 Carla Suzan Nappi, The Monkey and the Inkpot: Natural History and Its Transformations in Early Modern China 
(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2009). 
19 Benjamin A. Elman, On Their Own Terms: Science in China, 1550-1900 (Harvard University Press, 2005). 
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Scholars in European history have acknowledged that modern science owes its existence to 
the collaboration between non-elite artisans and elite natural philosophers.20 Historians and 
anthropologists further argue that artisans gained knowledge about the natural world through 
their bodily engagement with the matter, and the production of knowledge is a result of the 
cooperation and negotiation between matter, hand, tools, and the environment.21  In her study of 
the knowledge about mining and metalworking, Pamela Smith demonstrates that the structures of 
practical knowledge emerged from the practice of mining, and was shaped by a complex of 
activities and interests. The codification of vernacular knowledge gave rise to the growing 
discourse of experimental philosophy, which led to modern science.22 Following Smith’s 
approach, this study investigates how miners gained knowledge about geology through their 
mining practice, and how the knowledge of mining was codified and systemized by scholars and 
bureaucrats.  
 Chapter One examines the compilation of An Illustrated Account of the Tools of the 
Mines and Smelters of Yunnan (Diannan kuangchang gongqi tu lue ȣʕłĬÈÑɬ, 
                                               
20 Pamela H. Smith, The Business of Alchemy: Science and Culture in the Holy Roman Empire, Reprint edition 
(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2016). Lissa Roberts, Simon Schaffer, and Peter Dear, eds., The 
Mindful Hand: Inquiry and Invention from the Late Renaissance to Early Industrialisation, History of Science and 
Scholarship in the Netherlands, v. 9 (Amsterdam: Koninkliijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen, 2007).  
21 Pamela H. Smith, The Body of the Artisan: Art and Experience in the Scientific Revolution (University Of 
Chicago Press, 2006); Raymond Tallis, The Hand: A Philosophical Inquiry into Human Being (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 2003); Tim Ingold, “On Weaving a Basket,” in The Perception of the Environment: 
Essays in Livehood, Dwelling and Skill (London: Routledge, 2000), 339–48. Xu, Yiyi, “The Knowledge System of 
the Traditional Chinese Craftsman,” in West 86th: A Journal of Decorative Arts, Design History, and Material 
Culture 20.2 (2013): 155-172. 
22 Pamela H. Smith, “The Codification of Vernacular Theories of Metallic Generation in Sixteenth-Century 
European Mining and Metalworking,” in The Structures of Practical Knowledge, ed. Matteo Valleriani (Cham: 
Springer International Publishing, 2017), 371–92. 
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hereafter Tools of Mines).23 Wu Qijun ¸qȭ (1789-1847), the governor-general of Yunnan 
Province as well as a botanist, published Tools of Mines in 1844. Peter Golas, one of the 
pioneering scholars in Chinese history of science considered Tools of Mines “the single most 
useful account of mining practice in the nineteenth century.”24 It recorded the mining technology 
in Yunnan from excavation and smelting to labor organizations and the shipping routes, offering 
historians detailed information to study the mining and smelting technology in late imperial 
China.25 Although it was published in the mid-nineteenth century, the Tools of Mines reflects the 
accumulated knowledge about mining and mining administration from the lowest level of 
bureaucrats and administrators from 1700 to 1844. In Chapter One, I first contextualize the 
political, social, and economical situations and motivations for scholars and bureaucrats to 
acquire knowledge about mining. Then, through linguistic and textual analysis, I analyze how 
miners understood the nature and named the mining process through their engagement with tools 
and ores, how scholars translated the miners’ vernacular language into scholarly language, and 
how they tried to transfer and codify local knowledge about mining to the systemized knowledge 
system of scholars. Furthermore, the codification process demonstrates the formation of 
scholarly knowledge through everyday administrative practice of grass-root bureaucrats and their 
interactions with artisans and merchants, therefore offering a different perspective to approach 
                                               
23 Wu Qijun ¸qȭ, Diannan kuangchang gongqi tu lue ȣʕłĬÈÑɬ (Yunnan: Publisher not identified, 
1844). 
24 Peter J. Golas, Chemistry and Chemical Technology Part: 13, Mining, Science and Civilization in China 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 35. 
25 For example, in her recently published monograph, Chen Hailian heavily relied on Tools of Mines to study the 
mining and smelting technology of zinc in Qing dynasty. See Hailian Chen, Zinc for Coin and Brass: Bureaucrats, 
Merchants, Artisans, and Mining Laborers in Qing China, ca. 1680s–1830s (BRILL, 2018). 
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technology and science in early modern China beyond the intellectual exchanges between 
Confucian scholars and Jesuit missionaries.26 
  
Knowledge and Technology in Motion  
The movement of knowledge and technology is one of the most important methodological 
approaches of this dissertation. In recent decades, academia has witnessed the emergence of what 
Mimi Sheller called “The New Mobility Paradigm.”27 Scholars investigate knowledge formation 
and relations of power through the lens of translation, motion, and exchange.28 By focusing on 
the movement and the itineraries, scholars demonstrate that terrain for knowledge transmission 
was not smooth, but with frictions and blockages. They emphasize on the entanglement of 
itineraries and negotiations between cultures and knowledge systems.29 Furthermore, by 
emphasizing the movement of materials and technologies across cultural boundaries, scholars 
have shown that the cultural boundaries were remapped and the social relations were 
reconstructed during the transmission process.30  
Following this trend, I treat the codification of the practical knowledge about mining as a 
movement of knowledge across different social groups and investigate how the incorporation of 
                                               
26 Benjamin A. Elman, On Their Own Terms. Florence C. Hsia, Sojourners in a Strange Land: Jesuits and Their 
Scientific Missions in Late Imperial China (University of Chicago Press, 2009). Benjamin A. Elman, A Cultural 
History of Modern Science in China (Harvard University Press, 2009). David Emil Mungello, The Great Encounter 
of China and the West, 1500–1800 (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2012). 
27 Sheller and Urry, “The New Mobilities Paradigm.” 
28 For example, see Kapil Raj, Relocating Modern Science: Circulation and the Construction of Knowledge in South 
Asia and Europe, 1650–1900 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). Harold Cook, Matters of Exchange: 
Commerce, Medicine, and Science in the Dutch Golden Age (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007).  
29 Smith, ed., Entangled Itineraries. 
30 Flood, Objects of Translation. 
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practical knowledge affected the structure of the knowledge system of scholars. Moreover, in 
Chapter Two and Three, I shift from social space to geographical space to study the transmission 
of mining technology from the east coast of China to the southwest frontier of the Qing empire 
and into Southeast Asia. I will demonstrate that the movement of mining technology was not a 
simple transplant of mere tools and machines; neither was it a simple circulation of knowledge 
and information. I argue that the mining technology had to move with the mining community. 
The transmission of technology produced not only new knowledge but also new social relations 
and new ecological landscape in frontier areas and borderlands.  
In addition to the mobilities, I will also investigate the immobility of technology 
transmission. Chapters Two and three show that labor and capital intensive, large scale mining 
corporations were limited to Chinese migrants in Bankga. The local ethnic communities in 
Yunnan only participated in peripheral activities such as food and charcoal supply, while the 
local Malays did not develop intensive, large-scale mining industry even though the Chinese 
machinery and tools were not hard to replicate. The Chinese mining technology was mobile in 
terms of geography, but immobile when it came to social and cultural boundaries. The mobility 
and the immobility of mining technology lead to an important concept in Chapter Two and 
Three, the “social technology of mining.”  
Jacob Eyferth’s research on Jiajiang paper makers shows the “secret” of papermaking was 
embedded in social networks.31 Francesca Bray, based on her study of agriculture technology in 
China, further urges us to change the standard view of science and technology. Bray extends the 
meaning of technology to social-material networks including techniques, equipment, trained 
                                               
31 Eyferth, Eating Rice from Bamboo Roots. 
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personnel and institutions that generate material goods as well as social relations.32 In this study, 
I define the social technology of mining to be organizations and institutions that organized the 
labor and the capital. I argue that the social technology of mining ensured the success of Chinese 
miners in establishing capital- and labor-intensive mining industry and enabled the Chinese 
migrants to reproduce their mining community in different cultural contexts. Meanwhile, the 
highly exploitative nature of the Chinese mining organization also prevented the local Malays 
from establishing similar mining organizations, thus contributing to the immobility of Chinese 
mining technology (Chapter Three). 
 
Re-visiting the Relationship between the Industrial Revolution, Capitalism, and Modernity 
Technological progress, the industrial revolution, and capitalism are crucial thermometers 
for historians to assess modernity.33 The history of science and technology in China has always 
been tightly intertwined with the narrative of modernity since from its inception. The paradox of 
Joseph Needham’s project was the famous Needham Question: why scientific or industrial 
revolution did not take place in China?34 Mark Elvin tried to explain why the industrial 
revolution did not happen in China through his theory of “High-Level Equilibrium Trap.” He 
argues that the abundance of cheap labor obviated the stimulus for the investments of capital in 
                                               
32 Francesca Bray, "Science, technique, technology: passages between matter and knowledge in imperial Chinese 
agriculture," in The British Journal for the History of Science 41.3 (2008): 319-344. 
33 Immanuel Wallerstein, "The Rise and Future Demise of the World Capitalist System: Concepts for Comparative 
Analysis," Comparative Studies in Society and History 16, no. 4 (1974): 387-415. Roy Bin Wong, China 
Transformed: Historical Change and the Limits of European Experience (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
2000). Kenneth Pomeranz, The Great Divergence: China, Europe, and the Making of the Modern World Economy 
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2000). 
34 Joseph Needham, Gwei-Djen Lu, and Peng Yoke Ho, Clerks and Craftsmen in China and the West: Lectures and 
Addresses on the History of Science and Technology (Cambridge University Press, 1970). 
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technological innovation.35 Following the same thread, a huge amount of scholarship has been 
devoted to explaining why China did not follow the same path as Europe to experience the 
industrial revolution to develop industrial capitalism.36  
On the other hand, more and more historians challenged the Eurocentric narrative about 
modernity. Their research on the proto-industry and capitalist economy shows that Chinese 
manufacturing, market, and economy grew steadily and remained dominant in the world until the 
1800s when China and Europe (or Britain, to be more precise) experienced the Great 
Divergence.37 The Great Divergence, according to Kenneth Pomeranz, was a contingent 
convergence of forces: the product of coal and colonies led to the invention of steam engines and 
the emergence of industrial capitalism. 
Although these scholars have challenged the Eurocentric teleological narrative of 
modernity, as Bray has pointed out, they fail to offer “a critique to the historiography of 
technology.”38 Their evaluation standards and analytical categories are based on the modern 
mindset of technology progress. Their analysis of modernity is based on the assumption that 
                                               
35 Mark Elvin, The Pattern of the Chinese Past, 1 edition (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 1973). 
36 Li Bozhong offers a review of the eurocentrism in Chinese economic history, especially the research conducted by 
Marxist historians in China. See Bozhong Li, “Chinese Economic History in a New Perspective: Focusing on the 
Late Imperial Rural Economy in Jiangnan,” in Pacific Economic Review 13, no. 3 (2008): 308–19. Some historians 
try to find institutional obstacles for industrialization, for example, see Dwight Perkins, "Government as an Obstacle 
to Industrialization: The Case of Nineteenth-Century China," in The Journal of Economic History 27, no. 4 (1967): 
478-92. Another influential argument is the “involution” theory by Philip Huang, who argues that the over-
populated agricultural economy prevented China from developing industrial capitalism. However, it should be noted 
that the main purpose of Huang’s argument is to abandon the paradigms from Western experience. Philip C. Huang, 
The Peasant Family and Rural Development in the Yangzi Delta, 1350-1988 (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University 
Press, 1990). Philip C. Huang, The Peasant Economy and Social Change in North China (Stanford, Calif: Stanford 
University Press, 1985). 
37 Wong, China Transformed. Pomeranz, The Great Divergence. 
38 Francesca Bray, Technology, Gender and History in Imperial China: Great Transformations Reconsidered (New 
York: Routledge, 2013), 27. 
 
  16 
capitalism and technological progress, especially machinery production, which characterized the 
industrial revolution, are inseparable necessities on the path to modernity. The social technology 
of mining expanded the meaning of technology from machinery to fundraising and labor 
management techniques—technology that produced both material goods as well as social 
relations.  
The mining technology of Chinese miners in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries 
provides a curious example that urges us to rethink the relationship between industrial 
capitalism, machinery, and the industrial revolution. The Chinese miners developed capital-
intensive, profit-seeking, and highly-exploitative mining organizations, but they barely changed 
their equipment. The stagnancy of tools and the development in institutions show that the 
development of capitalism and the industrial revolution do not necessarily related to each other. 
Moreover, this was by no means a Chinese phenomenon. The Chinese miners in Southeast Asia 
participated in the global expansion of capitalism. Before the 1850s, the Dutch colonizers did not 
think about improving the tools even though steam engines were already adapted in mining in 
Europe. Like their Chinese colleague, the Dutch focused on the reform of social technology—
they improved the fundraising and bookkeeping techniques. The Chinese and Dutch’s emphasis 
on the social technology challenges our modern association of capitalism, the industrial 
revolution, and modernity. 
 
Innovations in Craft in the Context of Global Exchange 
The circulation and the exchange of material objects brought by international trade in the 
early modern period provide scholars opportunities to explore knowledge production, remapping 
of cultural boundaries and social changes. Previous scholarship on early modern international 
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trade tends to either focus on luxury goods or the globalization of the silver economy. Scholars 
focusing on Europe treated luxurious Asian commodities as a stimulus that transformed the 
consumer culture,39 inspired new fashion and a hybrid system of taste such as chinoiserie, and 
stimulated the development of chemistry and metallurgy in Europe.40 Recently, scholars working 
on China also started to pay attention to the receptions and changes on the China side. Arts and 
luxurious commodities brought by Jesuit missionaries and traders, such as oil paintings, clocks, 
enamels, European silver, hardwood, and ivory, brought new materials for Chinese artisans to 
work with and led to intensive artistic and technical exchanges and in workshops in China.41 
Moreover, the communications in art and technology gave rise to a hybrid system that Jonathan 
Hay called “euroserie.”42 Euroserie was essentially a Qing court phenomenon, the stylistic play 
and innovations in technology mainly happened in the imperial workshops in Beijing or Canton, 
the contact zone between China and Europe.  
                                               
39 John Brewer and Roy Porter, Consumption and the World of Goods (London; New York: Routledge, 1993); Paul 
Arthur Van Dyke, The Canton Trade: Life and Enterprise on the China Coast: 1700-1845 (Hong Kong: Hong Kong 
University Press, 2005). Carl L. Crossman, The China Trade: Export Paintings, Furniture, Silver & Other Objects, 
1st ed. (Princeton: Pyne Press, 1972); Carl L. Crossman, The Decorative Arts of the China Trade: Paintings, 
Furnishings, and Exotic Curiosities (Woodbridge, Suffolk: Antique Collectors’ Club, 1991). 
40 A more famous example is how Chinese porcelain stimulated the invention of hard-paste porcelain in Meissen and 
bone china in the UK. Another famous example is the trade of Chinese nickel brass to Europe stimulated the 
European discovery of nickel. Keith Pinn, Paktong: The Chinese Alloy in Europe, 1680-1820 (Woodbridge: Antique 
Collectors’ Club, 1999). Jianjun Mei, “The History, Metallurgy, and Spread of Paktong,” Bulletin of the Metals 
Museum, no. 24 (1995): 42–55. Brian Gilmour and Eldon Worrall, “Paktong: The Trade in Chinese Nickel Brass to 
Europe,” in Trade and Discovery: The Scientific Study of Artefacts from Post-Medieval Europe and Beyon, ed. 
Duncan R. Hook, British Museum Occasional Paper 109 (London: Dept. of Scientific Research, British Museum, 
1995). 
41 Petra ten-Doesschate Chu and Ning Ding, eds., Qing Encounters. Catherine Pagani, Eastern Magnificence & 
European Ingenuity. Kyoungjin Bae, “Joints of Utility, Crafts of Knowledge: The Material Culture of the Sino-
British Furniture Trade during the Long Eighteenth Century,” (New York: Columbia University, Ph. D. Dissertation, 
2016). Anna Grasskamp and Monica Juneja, eds., EurAsian Matters. 
42 Jonathan Hay, “Foreword,” in Petra ten-Doesschate Chu and Ning Ding, eds., Qing Encounters: Artistic 
Exchanges between China and the West, x. 
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Tin and pewter offer me a perspective to examine the stylistic and technical innovations 
brought by the maritime trade beyond the imperial court and the luxuries. Since pewter were 
everyday objects made from cheap metal, the craft of pewter was so internalized that people 
hardly associate it with intercultural exchanges. In Chapter Four, I explore the creation of 
Guangdong style pewter to show how the introduction of tin from southeast Asia led to 
innovations in metallurgy, and how European commodities inspired stylistic changes and 
technical innovations. I contextualize the innovation of pewter artisans in the trade networks, 
local craft traditions, and local ecology to show that technology should be embedded in social, 
economic, material and ecological networks. 
Another approach to global trade is to examine the impact of the circulation of silver on the 
local economy. Richard von Glahn and Lin Man-houng have shown that the global silver 
economy had caused inflations and deflations in Chinese economy, which led to challenges and 
reforms in economic policies in China.43 Different from silver, tin was a cheap metal that was 
treated as a ballast good rather than bullion. Unlike copper, which formed the main content of the 
currency issued by the Qing state, tin was not under state monopoly. However, this does not 
mean that tin was not crucial to the state economy. In the eighteenth century, tin, especially 
imported tin, played an essential role in the monetary reform in the Qing court. The value of tin 
to the state’s economy was not from the economic value of the metal, but from its metallurgical 
value as an alloying component that changed the physical property of copper coins. In Chapter 
Five, I examine the monetary reform of 1740 and its implications. In this reform, the Qing 
                                               
43 Richard von Glahn, Fountain of Fortune: Money and Monetary Policy in China, 1000-1700 (Berkeley, Calif: 
University of California Press, 1996). Man-houng Lin, China Upside Down: Currency, Society, and Ideologies, 
1808-1856 (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Asia Center, 2007). 
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bureaucrats changed the alloying content of copper coins through observations and experiments 
in the mints. In this way, the Qing bureaucrats turned craft to an approach to statecraft, a way of 
managing the world. 
 
From Craft to Statecraft: The Technocratic Culture in Qing Bureaucracy 
Scholars studying Chinese craft and technology have successfully shown that the Chinese 
respect of technological knowledge has always been closely associated with the way in which 
people order the world, usually translated as statecraft. Francesca Bray’s research shows 
gynotechnics and agriculture were meant to produce social order and gender relations in late 
imperial China.44 Dagmar Schäfer further points out that Song Yingxing’s account of artisanal 
knowledge was a political inquiry into the cosmological principles and social order.45 As 
Dorothy Ko points out, technology in late imperial China “did not exist as a field demarcated 
from politics, art, or culture.”46 
Many scholars have studied the Chinese state’s interference with the production of 
materials that were crucial to the governance of the empire, such as fine silk, porcelain, and 
bronze.47 The rulers of the Ming dynasty (1368-1644), as Dagmar Schäfer has demonstrated, 
                                               
44 Francesca Bray, Technology and Gender: Fabrics of Power in Late Imperial China (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1997). 
45 Schäfer, Crafting of the 10,000 Things. 
46 Ko, Social Life of Inkstones, 11. 
47 Anthony Jerome Barbieri-Low, Artisans in Early Imperial China (Seattle: Published with the assistance of the 
Getty Foundation, 2007). Dieter Kuhn, The Age of Confucian Rule: The Song Transformation of China (Cambridge, 
Mass: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2009). 
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initiated spatially distributed networks of state-owned workshops, and consequently 
institutionalized complex channels and networks of technical transmission and communication.48  
The Manchu rulers of the Qing dynasty (1644-1912) followed the Ming tradition and 
creatively invented more institutions to meet the challenge of ruling such a vast empire. As an 
ethnic minority group originated from the northeast frontier of China, the Manchu rulers were 
much more serious than their Ming predecessors regarding the acquirement, transmission, and 
systemization of artisanal knowledge. To the Manchu rulers, the power of technology coexisted 
with political power.49 The Qing emperors innovatively established institutions to control and 
manage the resources and personnel of material production. Through models, sketches, and 
artifacts, the Qing court established nation-wide networks of knowledge transmission and 
collaborative production, which created bonds between distant territories, different ethnicities, 
and heterogeneous cultures of the Qing empire.50 
The Imperial Household Department and its affiliated workshops played the critical role in 
constituting the material empire of the Qing. As an institution that was unseen in previous 
dynasties, the Imperial Household Department mirrored the Six Boards of the traditional Chinese 
government and functioned in parallel with the actual government of the Qing state. Ideally, the 
Imperial Household Department worked as the emperors’ private purse, personal business 
manager, and personal manufacturer.51 When it comes to practice, the subtle line between the 
                                               
48 Dagmar Schäfer, “Silken Strands: Making Technology Work in China,” in Dagmar Schäfer ed., Cultures of 
Konwledge, 45-73. 
49 Ko, Social Life of Inkstones, 11. 
50 Palace Museum and Max-Planck Society for the History of Science, Gongting Yu Difang. 
51 Torbert, The Chʻing Imperial Household Department. Lai Hui-min ͶũƜ, Qianlong Huangdi de hebao +Ϩɹ
ĳɷ̛, (Taibei: Zhonghua shuju, 2016). 
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Qing state and emperor’s private affairs became hardly exist. The Imperial Household 
Department extended its power to financial and manufactory issues that were crucial to the Qing 
empire. It took care of the taxation at important customs, intervened salt monopoly, and was in 
the charge of sourcing materials such as fur, pearl, and hardwood from different edges of the 
empire.52 The bondservants such as Tang Ying and Cao Yin supervised the state-owned 
industries.53 Merchants associated with the Imperial Household Department worked as the right-
hand men of the state bureaucrats to take care of the procurement of monetary metals, tributary 
goods, and financial management. The operation of Imperial Household Department, which 
required close collaborations with artisans, merchants, western missionaries, and scholar-
officials, gave rise to what Chen Kaijun called “technocratic epistemology” among the Manchus, 
especially among the bondservants.54 
The technocratic epistemology, however, was by no means limited to the Manchus. In the 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the increasing complexity of economic activities and 
the pressure from social and environmental crisis urged the bureaucrats of the Qing state, 
Manchu and Han alike, to develop new expertise in governance to deal with famine 
administration, hydraulic management, bureaucratic corruption, and so on. As William Rowe’s 
study on Chen Hongmou has demonstrated, the scholar-officials in the eighteenth century have 
moved away from the “amateur ideal” of the late imperial Confucian elite and developed 
expertise in “diverse technical areas as hydraulic engineering, agronomy, fiscal administration, 
                                               
52 Jonathan Schlesinger, A World Trimmed with Fur: Wild Things, Pristine Places, and the Natural Fringes of Qing 
(Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2017). Yulian Wu, Luxurious Networks: Salt Merchants, Status, 
and Statecraft in Eighteenth-Century China (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2017). Kyoungjin Bae, “Joints of 
Utility, Crafts of Knowledge.” 
53 Spence, Tsʻao Yin and the Kʻang-Hsi Emperor. Wu, Luxurious Networks.  
54 Chen, “Rise of Technocratic Culture in High-Qing China.” 
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and military logistics.”55 In addition to the normative Confucian style of administration, which 
was based on moral exhortation and personal example, the Qing officials also had to work with 
private shipping organizations to solve the canal crisis, and they had to learn to appreciate the 
expertise of salt merchants in financial administration.56 In addition, working under Manchu 
supervisors and colleagues, the Han scholar-officials either voluntarily or passively acquired the 
technocratic epistemology from the Manchus.  
Chapter Five discusses the rise of technocratic epistemology among Qing scholar-officials 
through a study on the monetary reform in 1740. It shows that Qing officials, Manchu and Han 
alike, acquired practical knowledge from artisans and merchants and demonstrated artisanal 
epistemology, such as empirical observation, experiments, and cost control in their policy-
making process. They showed their expertise in metallurgy and accounting in their 
administrative management, and consequently turned monetary administration into a process of 
material production, which involved the procurement of materials, cost control, metallurgical 
experiments, mass production, accounting, and auditing. In this way, the so-called statecraft 
became the management of human and non-human resources, skilled labor, and capital, which 
could be interpreted as sovereignty, politics, and economy in the modern world. 
                                               
55 William T. Rowe, Saving the World: Chen Hongmou and Elite Consciousness in Eighteenth-Century China 
(Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 2001). 
56 Wu, Luxurious Networks. Jane Kate Leonard, Controlling from Afar: The Daoguang Emperor’s Management of 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Translating and Transcribing Tin Mining Technology in Southwest China, from the 1700s 
to the 1840s 
In 1682, one year after the Kangxi emperor (r. 1661-1722) suppressed the Revolt of the 
Three Feudatories and extended the territory of the Qing empire to Yunnan province, Cai Yurong 
̧とǩ (?-1699), the Governor-General of Yunnan and Guizhou Provinces, submitted a 
memorial, “Ten Recommendations to Prepare for the Development of Yunnan Province” 
(Choudian shi shu ˃ȣɱ) to Kangxi emperor. In this court memorial, Cai offered ten 
recommendations for the central court to enhance its governance over the southwest frontier and 
to restore the local economy after years of war. One recommendation that the emperor accepted 
was to revive the mining industry.1  Subsequently, Gejiu Ŷ, a small town located at the 
Southwest corner of the empire close to the border of Vietnam, became the biggest center of tin 
supply within the territory of the Qing empire.  
The development of mining in Yunnan was accompanied by a series of compilation and 
publication projects in which local bureaucrats and their assistants started to collect knowledge 
about mining from smelters, merchants and miners themselves. In so doing, knowledge about 
mining and mining administration entered the rubric of eighteenth-century “statecraft” and gave 
rise to a structural change in its knowledge system. Mining was no longer a subdivision of 
taxation and monetary policy; it became an independent body of knowledge within the rubric of 
statecraft. At the same time, the development of mining in Yunnan was inseparable from the 
                                               
1 Cai Yurong ̧とǩ, “Chou dian shi shu” ˃ȣɱ, in Shi Fan Ĵʿ ed. Dianxi ȣ˙ (Kunming: Yunnan tongzhi 
ju, 1887), juan 8, 48a-b. 
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“Gaitu guiliu” ƗÒǹȖ policy, which transformed the indirect rule of local chieftainships 
(tuguan ÒĈ) into the direct rule under Qing state administration. As a result, there was a large 
migration of Han Chinese migrants from China proper to the Southwest borderland to engage in 
mining and peripheral industries. The Han migrants brought their mining tools and technology to 
Gejiu and formed a semi-autonomous society characterized by a “Seven Chiefs” system (qizhang 
zhi ϓ).  
In this chapter, I will discuss the tin mining technology and local mining community from 
the 1700s to the 1840s based on the information recorded in local gazetteers, steles, technology 
manuscripts, and court memorials—all textual products of the state interests in “development.” I 
will start with an introduction to mining policy in early Qing to show how it became a concern in 
statecraft in the eighteenth century and why Qing bureaucrats wanted to collect knowledge about 
mining.  
Many scholars have discussed the concept of statecraft, or specifically, the concept of 
managing the world (jingshi ˑ) in late Imperial China.2 William Rowe noted that Qing elites 
considered statecraft a combination of moral dictates of Song neo-Confucian orthodoxy and 
technocratic skills.3 Modern Chinese historians, in contrast, considered the statecraft movement 
as a political movement responding to the crisis of the Qing empire, which laid the foundation 
                                               
2 Robert Hymes and Conrade Schirokauer translated jingshi as “ordering the world,” this translation was adopted by 
William Rowe in his book on Chen Hongmou. Here I translated jingshi as “managing the world,” because in the 
Qing context, it emphasized on the management of resources. At the same time, I used the shorthanded translation 
statecraft in this dissertation. See Robert Hymes and Conrad Schirokauer, eds., Ordering the World: Approaches to 
State and Society in Sung Dynasty China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993). 
3 Rowe, Saving the World. 
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for the industrialization and modernization of China in the twentieth century.4 The example of 
mining shows that mining administration had entered the realm of statecraft well before the 
nineteenth century. As I will show, the words that bureaucrats used to describe statecraft, such as 
chou ˃ (prepare to develop), zheng ƚ (administration), and wu  (management affairs), reflect 
different dimensions of statecraft. They also show that the concept of statecraft expanded from 
ordering the human world to an active engagement in the development of industry and economy, 
and to the efficient management of resources and personnel. A close examination of mining 
policies will demonstrate the changing nature of statecraft throughout the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries.  
Then I will trace the collection and systemization of mining knowledge by Yunnan local 
bureaucrats. Sixty years after Joseph Needham’s project “Science and Civilization in China,” 
many scholars have debated Needham’s claim that China did not develop modern science 
because the bureaucrats in late imperial China were hostile to the pursuit of science and 
technology.5 Recent scholars have shown that in late imperial China, state bureaucrats still 
played an important role in producing and circulating scientific knowledge, especially in the 
fields of agriculture, hydraulics, and astronomy.6 These scholars, however, focused on 
bureaucrats’ writings and overlooked the source of scientific knowledge—the craftsmen’s 
practice. The collection of mining knowledge from the eighteenth century is a perfect example of 
                                               
4 Randall A. Dodgen, Controlling the Dragon: Confucian Engineers and the Yellow River in Late Imperial China 
(Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2001). Lin, China Upside Down. 
5 Needham, Clerks and Craftsmen in China and the West. 
6 Elman, On Their Own Terms; Benjamin A. Elman, “Jesuit Scientia and Natural Studies in Late Imperial China, 
1600-1800,” Journal of Early Modern History 6, no. 3 (2002): 209–232; Bray, Technology and Gender; Bray, 
“Science, Technique, Technology.". 
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the way in which bureaucrats gathered information about mining from miners, traders, and 
smelters.  
European historians, by contrast, have acknowledged that modern science owes its 
existence to non-elite artisans, and the production of knowledge is a result of the cooperation and 
negotiation among matter, hands, tools, and the environment.7  Pamela Smith’s research on 
mining in early modern Europe demonstrates that the theories of the origin and genesis of metal 
emerged from miners’ physical interaction with the matter.8  A close reading of the mining 
treatise offers me an opportunity to show how scholar-officials in the Qing dynasty selectively 
transcribed and translated miners’ vernacular knowledge into texts. This chapter describes 
miners’ and smelters’ working experience and their physical engagement with matter, especially 
how their senses contributed to the formation of vernacular knowledge about mining.  
 
Mining Policy in Early Qing and the Changing Nature of Statecraft  
The mining policy of the Qing court went through a series of changes from the seventeenth 
to eighteenth centuries. At the beginning of the Qing dynasty (1644-1911), the court banned 
mining in most areas of China proper until the mid-eighteenth century. The ban on mining was 
partially political, and partially a safety concern. The rulers of the Qing Empire proclaimed the 
mining policy of the previous dynasty, the Ming dynasty (1368–1644), which had viewed 
extracting natural resources to increase the state’s wealth as harmful to the welfare of the people. 
Furthermore, the Qing court considered the miners a threat to local security and social stability, 
                                               
7 See Tallis, The Hand; Roberts eds., Mindful Hand; Smith, Body of the Artisan. 
8 Pamela Smith, “The Matter of Ideas in the Working of Metals,” in Christy Anderson et al., eds., The Matter of Art: 
Materials, Practices, Cultural Logics, 1250-1750, 1st edition (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2015), 42-
67. 
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since the mining industry was frequently at the center of land disputes with local farmers, and the 
itinerant miners resorted to thievery when they had exhausted the ore deposits in a locale.9 As a 
result, traditional mining sites in China proper were closed between the late seventeenth and 
early eighteenth centuries.  
The mining ban in China proper reflects the concept of statecraft in early Qing, which 
prioritized the social stability of an agricultural society. The mining ban also contributed to the 
development of mining in Yunnan Province, as Yunnan was exempted from the mining ban due 
to its remote location and sparse population. Gejiu became the most important site for tin mining 
in the Qing empire. 
Tin mining in Gejiu started from the Han dynasty (202 BC-AD 220) and the industry 
experienced fast development during the sixteenth century.10 However, because of its location, it 
did not become the biggest center for tin mining until the beginning of the Qing dynasty.11 The 
development of tin mining in Gejiu was partially due to the “Gaitu guiliu” policy in Yunnan. 
After the Qing court seized control over Yunnan, the central court gradually abolished the 
indirect rule of the territories of native tribes through local chieftains and replaced them with 
direct administration. Gejiu, which belonged to the County of Mengzi, had been ruled by local 
                                               
9 Zhao Erxun ΀Ɉİ, Qing shi gao ȝ®ʫ (Beijing: Qingshi guan, 1928), juan 124, zhi 106, shihuo 5, 15a-16b. 
10  Zhao Xiaoping ͽęķ and Shi Junjie ʉTǒ, “Mingmo zhi minguo shiqi gejiu xiye shengchan guanxi bianqian 
yanjiu” Ƴ」˽ǿÏƱǉ"ưϏɣ5pˇ¦Αʌʭ, Xueshu tansuo, 5 (2008): 99-103. 
11 Before the seventeenth century, the centers for tin production were in China proper. Important mining sites 
included Nandan $ and Hechi ȈȆ County in Guangxi Ń̷ Province, Chenzhou ΨĪ in Hunan ȟ Province, 
Huizhou ũĪ and Chaozhou  ȫĪ in Guangdong ŃǓ Province. The tin supply in Guangdong Province was not 
sufficient to supply the coinage in the imperial mint during the Qianlong period (r. 1735-1795). See the court 
memorial on the sixth month of the twelfth year under Qianlong reign (1747) by the minister of the Board of 
Revenue Liu Yuyi, The First Historical Archives of China, No. 2-01-04-14119. About the decrease of tin mining in 
Hunan province, see Lin Rongqin ǖ̚ɘ, Hunan de kuangye: Fenbu, bianqian, difang shehui ȟɷʊ: }Ĳ, 
¦Α, ÓƪʖD (Beijing: Shangwu yinshuguan, 2014), 115, 120. 
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chieftains of the Yi ō minority. After the last local chief Li Shiping Ǐğ passed away in 
1704, the Qing court established direct administration in Mengzi County. Three years later in 
1707, the Qing court started to levy taxes on silver and tin mining in Gejiu district.  
The expansion of the Qing empire to the southwest border enabled the Qing state to 
strengthen the local economy and extract local resources to cover military and administrative 
expenses. That is why the Viceroy of Yunnan and Guizhou Province Cai Yurong drafted the court 
memorial. Therefore, although the Qing court opposed mining in general, it started to enter the 
realm of statecraft at the southwest borderland. In his report, Cai Yurong elucidated the economic 
and financial importance of mining to the Qing Empire.12 The taxation of mining could increase 
income of local government. In Yunnan’s case, the income from mining tax could support the 
military expenses used for expanding the territories and solidifying the direct administration.13 In 
addition, mining, especially copper mining in Yunnan, was the key to the monetary policy of the 
Qing Empire.14 Copper was the major component of coins, and Japan was the main source of 
China’s copper. However, from 1715, the depletion of Japan’s copper mines led to a “money 
dearth” in the Qing empire.15 To resolve this crisis, the Qing court began using copper from 
Yunnan for its currency. Hence mining was not just one part of monetary policy, but central to 
the financial security of the Qing empire.  
In the eighteenth century, the recognition that mining administration was an important part 
of statecraft spread from the borderland to the center. Rhetoric in court memorials shows a 
                                               
12 Cai, “Chou dian shi shu”, 46-7. 
13 Ibid, 46-7. 
14 Ibid, 47. 
15 Hans Ulrich Vogel, “Chinese Central Monetary Policy, 1644-1800,” Late Imperial China 8, no. 2 (July 6, 2011): 
7-8. 
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transformation in the concept of statecraft among bureaucrats. In the late seventeenth century, 
bureaucrats proposed a ban on mining. They argued that mining industry frequently led to land 
disputes, and the high profit in mining would encourage farmers to abandon agriculture.16  This 
rhetoric, which defined mining as an industry that “abandoned the root to pursue the trifles” (she 
ben zhu mo ̃ǍΘ」), was based on the assumption that agriculture was the “root” of the state 
economy while profit from mining was the “trifle.” 
In the first half of the eighteenth century, this rhetoric started to change. In court 
memorials,  bureaucrats in China proper started to describe mining as a “benefit generated by 
heaven, earth, and nature” (tian di ziran zhi li ëÓ˼Ȼ)), and argued that the state should 
encourage mining to increase the welfare of local people.17 This rhetoric, which shows up in 
many court memorials after the second half of the eighteenth century, suggests that Qing 
bureaucrats started to consider mine deposits as fountain of fortune created by nature to increase 
the welfare of people. Bureaucrats from mountainous areas especially liked this rhetoric, as they 
considered mining an effective supplement to local agriculture which suffered from a lack of 
arable land.18 This changing rhetoric demonstrates that the statecraft has expanded from a moral 
didactic focused on the self-sustaining agricultural economy to something similar to oeconomia 
in seventeenth-century Europe, which encompassed all theoretical and practical knowledge 
                                               
16 Wei Qingyuan ϹĹΕ and Lu Su Ќˍ, “Qingdai qianqi kuangye zhengce de yanbian (shang)” ȝ>ǉʊƚ
ʸɷȥ¦(), in Zhongguo shehui jingjishi yanjiu, 1983 (3), 10. 
17 Ibid, 13-14. 
18 Ibid, 6. 
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related to acquiring wealth and managing the realm.19 In China, statecraft emphasized taxation, 
monetary policy, and finance. 
To encourage mining in Yunnan, the Qing government adopted a laissez-faire policy and 
welcomed investments from merchants. More importantly, the taxation of local mines became 
central to the promotion of local bureaucrats in Yunnan province.20 Therefore, the productivity 
and taxation of mines were closely connected to their career paths. They were motivated to 
collect vernacular knowledge about mining and to record mining technology in gazetteers, court 
memorials, and mining manuscripts, thus bringing the vernacular knowledge about mining from 
the hands of miners and merchants into the knowledge system of intellectuals. From the 
eighteenth century on, the number of records about mining technology far exceeded that from 
previous periods in Chinese history, and scholars and bureaucrats in Yunnan province produced 
most of the textual records. 
 
The Independence of Mining Knowledge 
Qing scholars, especially bureaucrats of the Qing dynasty, started to collect, systemize, and 
theorize knowledge about mining by transmitting indigenous knowledge from the body of miners 
to written technical manuscripts. This collection and compilation not only expanded what 
bureacrats knew about mining, it also brought the independence of mining knowledge from the 
knowledge of taxation and monetary policy in the knowledge system of “statecraft.” As the Qing 
empire expanded to Yunnan, the court and scholars exponentially increased their knowledge of 
                                               
19 Smith, Business of Alchemy, 64–66. 
20 Cai, “Chou dian shi shu,” in Shi Fan ed. Dianxi, juan 8, 49b. 
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this southwest frontier.21 The court eagerly collected geographical and ethnographical 
information of this new frontier.  
The project started with the collection of geographic and ethnographic information from 
the borderlands. In 1751, Qianlong +Ϩ emperor (1711-1799) commissioned The Portraits of 
Periodical Offering to the Qing Empire (Huang qing zhigongtu ɹȝ˲ͫÑ) which included 
portraits of ethnographic groups living in the borderland of the Qing Empire. His son, Jiaqing Ç
ů emperor (1760-1820), then commissioned the governor-general of Yunnan, Huxihali Bolin ə
ο¾ÁEЍ, to produce an illustrated court memorial which recorded the ethnographic groups 
and the geographic maps of Yunnan Province.  
In 1818, Bolin completed the whole project, which consisted of two albums. The first 
album, An Illustrated Introduction to Yi People in Yunnan (Diansheng yiren tushuo ȣʁî:Ñ
͓) included 108 colored illustrations of ethnographic groups in Yunnan; the second album, An 
Illustrated Geography of Yunnan Province (Diansheng yudi tushuo ȣʁΉÓÑ͓) had 22 maps 
of Yunnan, including the location of mining sites, with introductions by Bolin (figure 1.1).22  
Without direct orders from the court, scholar-officials and their assistants collected 
knowledge about mining. A good example was Yu Qingchang’s journey to mining sites and his 
publication of mining administration. Yu Qingchang was just one of the many Qing bureaucrats 
who produced a series of manuscripts on copper mining administration since the late eighteenth 
                                               
21 A similar proliferation of knowledge also happened in literature. Literati formed a bulk of literature under the 
theme of Southwest narrative, in which they used the ethnographic writings and descriptions of geographic frontiers 
to imagine self and others. See Hu Xiaozhen ˵ƾʃ, Ming Qing wenxue zhong de xi’nan xushi ƳȝƤ”#ɷ̷
ƞ, (Taipei: Taida chuban zhongxin, 2017). 
22 Chuai Zhenyu Əƅă, Diansheng Yi ren tushuo, Diansheng yudi tushuo ȣʁî:Ñ͓ ȣʁΉÓÑ͓, (Beijing: 
Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 2009), 1-3. 
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century. Important treatises include Tongzheng quanshu ϰζƚkƿ (A Comprehensive 
Manual on Copper Administration), Yunnan tong zhi ϰζŜ (A History of Copper [mining] in 
Yunnan), and Tongzheng bianlan ζƚR̽ (A Convenient Guide to Copper Administration).23 
These treatises recorded the taxation on mining, location of mining sites, shipping routes to 
Beijing, monetary policy, and state loans to the copper mining factories. Copper mining attracted 
the attention of Qing bureaucrats as it was central to Qing dynasty’s monetary policy. The Qing 
state offered state loans to copper mining sites, sent bureaucrats to mining factories to monitor 
the productivity, and carefully controlled the cost of shipping.  
Mining also caught the attention of the authors of Yunnan local gazetteers as one of the 
most important sources of revenue for the local government. Its changing status in local 
gazetteers shows that mining had become a form of extracting natural resources that required an 
independent body of knowledge. Local gazetteers originated from the practice of keeping basic 
information of local conditions, population, local worthies, and revenues. The format of local 
gazetteers, especially the way that the materials was classified, became standardized in the late 
imperial period.24 Mining was under the chapter of “Local Produce” (wuchan ɍɤ), which 
recorded information about local flora and fauna, but in 1712, Han Sanyi ϸɮ, the chief editor 
of the local gazetteer of Mengzi County (Mengzi xianzhi ̥˼˗Ŝ), abandoned the traditional 
format and created an independent chapter for tin and silver mining, titled “Management of 
                                               
23 See Fang, Yunnan shiliao mulu gaishuo, 728-730. 
24 Local gazetteers are usually organized in the following sequence: the changing administrative units, the landscape 
and geography, flora and fauna, temples and schools, officials and celebrities, local culture and customs, 
bibliographies and choice excerpits. For a more comprehensive example of how materials were arranged and 
classified in local gazetteers in the Qing dynasty, see Endymion Wilkinson, Chinese History: A Manual (Revised 
and Enlarged), (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Asia Center for the Harvard-Yenching Institute, 2000), 
155. 
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Mining Affairs” (changwu ł), making mining an independent category that paralleled natural 
produce.25 Subsequently, authors of local gazetteers of Mengzi County, Dongchuan prefecture Ǔ
ĩļ, and even Yunnan Province all designated chapters for mining.26 The independence of 
chapters about mining from chapters on local produce demonstrates both that mining had 
become increasingly important to economy and administration, and that there had been a change 
in the knowledge system of the authors of local gazetteers, most of whom were scholars and 
bureaucrats. In other words, mining was no longer subordinate to agricultural resources like flora 
and fauna. 
The changing status of mining in local gazetteers also reflects a change in the knowledge 
system under the rubric of statecraft. Mining was important to taxation and monetary policy, so 
in the Yunnan provincial gazetteer published in 1736, mining taxation was recorded in the 
chapter “Taxation.”27 When it comes to the nineteenth century, in Ruan Yuan’s ϝc (1764-1894) 
local gazetteer project in 1836, a whole chapter was dedicated to “Mining” (kuangchang ʕł). 
The “Mining” chapter shares equal status with the chapters on “Local Produce,” “Land 
Revenue,” and “Government Expenses.”28  
The changes in the knowledge system about mining are more obvious in the Statecraft 
Compendium (Huangchao jingshiwen bian  ɹǈˑƤ˕), the canon of the statecraft reformist 
                                               
25 Han Sanyi ϸɮ, Mengzi xianzhi ̥˼˗Ŝ, 1712, reprint in Nanjing tushuguan cang xijian fangzhi congkan 
8ÑƿЅ̪ʦ̹ƪŜ§~, (Beijing: Guojia tushuguan shubanshe, 2012). 
26 See Fang Gui ƪǛ ed., Dongchuan fu zhi ǓĩļŜ, 1761; Li Kun Ǐȹ ed., Mengzi xianzhi ̥˼˗Ŝ, 1791; 
Ruan Yuan ϝc ed. Yunnan tongzhi gao  ϰΚŜʫ, 1836. 
27 O-er-t’ai ΩɈȎ and Jin Daomo ϶Ο͙, Yunnan tong zhi ϰΚŜ, 1736, SKQS edition, juan 11. 
28 Ruan ed. Yunnan tongzhi gao, 1836.  
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movement. In the first edition, published in 1826, knowledge of mining was still dispersed 
between the chapters on “Monetary Policy” and “Finance.” In the second edition, published in 
1888, mining policy and administration began to have its own chapter “Developing Mining 
(kaikuang ϖʕ),” separate from the chapters on monetary policy, finance, and taxation. 
The independence of mining knowledge from monetary policy and taxation shows that in 
the first half of the nineteenth century there was a change in the categorization or the taxonomy 
of knowledge under the rubric of statecraft. In addition to a tremendous expansion of knowledge, 
the knowledge system of statecraft became specialized, with the administration of mining 
becoming a new body of knowledge that was as important as “traditional” genres of statecraft 
like taxation, finance, and monetary policy. Furthermore, the characters that scholars and 
bureaucrats used to describe statecraft and mining administration show how the meaning of 
statecraft became broader and more nuanced throughout the eighteenth century. In the 1682 court 
memorial, Cai Yurong used chou ʺ to describe his plan to develop Yunnan. Chou originally 
means to fundraise and was often used in the commercial context to mean preparing to develop a 
trade or industry.  Cai’s use of chou shows that the meaning of statecraft has expanded from 
ordering an agricultural society to active engagement in industrial and economic development. In 
the series of manuals composed by provincial administrative assistants on copper mining, “tong 
zheng” (copper administration) was used to describe the knowledge of copper administration. 
The word “zheng” (administration) emphasized top-down administrative routines and 
regulations, which constituted most works of provincial administration. By the same token, in the 
1712 and 1791 local gazetteers of Mengzi County, the authors used the word “chang wu ł” 
(Management of Mining Affairs) to describe mining and its administration. Wu refers to the 
management of affairs. This word choice shows that to local bureaucrats, mining was more about 
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the management of resources and technology than regulations and routines. The nuances between 
“chou,” “zheng,” and “wu” are three angles under the rubric of statecraft: by the eighteenth 
century, statecraft was more than top-down administration; it also encompassed the state’s active 
engagement economic development and the correct management of resources and expertise.  
Previous scholarship on mining focuses on copper mining and its relationship to taxation, 
finance, and monetary policy.29 Tin mining, however, offers a promising perspective to 
investigate mining technology and mining community without being distracted by state fiscal 
concerns. The Qing court’s intervention into tin mining started and ended with taxation—the 
court imposed an annual 20 percent tax on total tin production.30 Unlike copper mines, tin mines 
did not receive loans from the state and were not closely regulated by state bureaucrats. The most 
important players in tin mining were private actors like merchants, smelters, and miners. 
Therefore, there was little documentation of the logistics and the direct administration in tin 
mining. However, bureaucrats’ growing interest in collecting mining knowledge left ample 
records on tin mining technology in local gazetteers and most importantly, Tools of Mines.  
 
Tools of Mines: Theorizing Mining Knowledge 
                                               
29  Important research includes Wei Qingyuan and Lu Su, “Qingdai qianqi kuangye zhengce de yanbian (shang),” 
and Wei Qingyuan and Lu Su, “Qingdai qianqi kuangye zhengce de yanbian (xia)” ȝ>ǉʊƚʸɷȥ¦ (), 
in Zhongguo shehui jingjishi yanjiu, 4 (1983): 5-20. James Lee, “State and Economy in Southwest China, 1250-
1850,” Phd. Diss. University of Chicago 1987. Yan Zhongping É#ķ, Qingdai yunnan tongzheng kao ȝ>ϰζ
ƚ˫ (Taipei: Wenhai chubanshe, 1970). Chiu Pengsheng ΦȬɣ, “Shiba shiji diantong shichang zhong de 
guanshang guanxi he liyi guannian” l，ȣζıá#ɷĈÅϚS¼ɼ̾ŝ, in Bulletin of IHP, Volume 72 
(2002): 49-121. Wang Detai ɔŘȎ, “Qingdai Yunnan tongkuang kaicai zhong ‘dibenyin’ zhidu kao” ȝ>.ω
ʊŇά#“ĻǍϊ”Ľ˫, in Researches in Chinese Economic History, 3 (2011), 38-40. Ma Qi Љɗ, “Kuangye 
jianguan yu zhengfu tiaokong: Qingdai kuangchang zouxiao zhidu shulun” ʊɽʽƚļͤƋ: ȝ>ʊðώ
ĽΖ͡, Researches in Chinese Economic History, 3 (2011): 28-37. Chang Ling ĵɕ, “Qingdai Yunnan ‘fangben 
shoutong’ zhengce” ȝ>.ƙǍƖɳƚʸ, Thinking Editorial, 2 (1988): 89-93. 
30 Qinding huangchao wenxian tongkao ǴĉɹǈƤɒΚ˫, SKQS edition, juan 30, 23a-24b. 
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Covering silver, copper, and tin, Tools of Mines is the most comprehensive mining treatise 
of the Qing dynasty. It was published by Wu Qijun, governor-general of Yunnan Province from 
1843 to 1844. The actual authors may have been his assistants, but Wu Qijun definitely directed 
the organization and the format of this treatise. Wu was eager to gather knowledge about nature 
and was an amateur botanist himself. His encyclopedic Zhiwu mingshi tukao Ǥɍ³đÑ˫ (An 
evidential study of plants’ names with illustrations), in which he studied the names and 
taxonomy of plants based on direct observations and philological study of classics, shares many 
similarities with Tools of Mines in terms of format and organization.31 
The content of this treatise shows how scholars and the Qing court collected and 
systemized vernacular knowledge about mining from the eighteenth century, and the structure of 
this treatise shows the knowledge system about mining among literati and scholars in China. The 
treatise is divided into two parts. Part I is An Illustrated Account of the Tools of the Mines and 
Smelters of Yunnan (Yunnan kuangchang gongqi tulue ϰʕłĬÈÑɬ), which documented 
the tools for mining and smelting, prospecting techniques, division of labor in mining and 
smelting, and mining customs. In Part I, scholars used illustrations to visualize tools used in 
mining and smelting, and they used texts to record and to transcribe mining knowledge that had 
been orally transmitted. Part II is titled An Illustrated Account of the Areas and Roads of the 
Mines and Smelters of Yunnan (Diannan kuangchang yucheng tulue ȣʕł˿ʧÑɬ), which 
recorded the location of mines, transportation methods, and coinage policies. Part II shows that 
nineteenth-century scholar-officials considered logistics and monetary policy as inseparable from 
mining technology. However, transportation, cost control, and monetary policy were related only 
                                               
31 Wu Qijun, Zhiwu mingshi tukao Ǥɍ³đÑ˫, (Beijing: Zhonghua shu zhu, 1963). 
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to the administration of copper mining; tin did not receive as much attention from bureaucrats. 
Since logistics and monetary policy was less related to tin mining, I focus on Part I.  
Tools of Mines is a technological manual which started with twenty pages of illustrations of 
tools and mining sites, followed by sixteen chapters that defined the technical terms used in 
mining. The technical terms are recorded in a form that combines a dictionary and an 
encyclopedia: each term is followed by a brief explanation, and some entries record the 
pronunciation of the technical term in miners’ local dialect. This genre of writing is determined 
by the nature of Chinese language and the source of mining knowledge. Before the twentieth 
century, Chinese scholars wrote in classical Chinese, while everyone else used regional dialects. 
To record the miners’ vernacular knowledge about mining, which existed only in oral dialects, 
scholars created new characters to transcribe miners’ language and added pronunciation to help 
readers understand the terminology. 
Following the sixteen chapters are four essays by scholars from earlier periods. The first 
essay is on the smelting of silver from the famous scientific treatise Tiangong kaiwu ëĬϖɍ 
(The Works of Heaven and the Inception of Things) by Song Yingxing ĆųƵ (1587-1666?). It 
is followed by “An Essay on Mining and Smelting” (Kuangchang cailian pian ʕłάȼˀ) by 
Wang Song ɔĦ. In this essay, Wang Song describes the rise and decline of a fictional mining 
enterprise. The third essay is “The Record on Copper Mining and Smelting” (Caitong liantong ji 
άζȼζ͈) by Ni Shenshu [Ŭǰ, which describes the copper mining sites and the smelting 
process. The last essay is an excerpt from Tongzheng quanshu edited by Wang Chang ɔƸ 
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(1724-1789), the administrative commissioner of Yunnan Province, titled “Responses to the 
Consultation about Each Mine” (Zixun gechang dui ½͍±łĘ).32 
The content of Tools of the Mines demonstrates that the book was built on the collective 
efforts of previous scholars. Parts of the maps were simplified versions of An Illustrated 
geography of Yunnan Province, the illustrated report that Bolin had sent to the Jiaqing emperor. 
The identities of the authors of the four essays gives us a hint of what and how the miners taught 
the scholars. “Responses to the Consultation about Each Mines” is written in a question-and-
answer format, in which officials who administered mining factories answered questions about 
the shape and properties of copper ore, mining tools and methods, and the smelting process. This 
shows that low-level local officials who administered local mines learned about mining in the 
course of their administrative work.  
The other two authors, Wang Song and Ni Shenshu, were scholars who were natives of 
Yunnan. They both participated in the Yunnan Province gazetteer project sponsored by Ruan 
Yuan from 1826. Wang Song, author of “An Essay on Mining and Smelting,” was the major 
contributor to the chapters on mining and geography.33  
The identity of Ni Shenshu is more interesting. Ni Shenshu came from a literati family 
from Songjiang Prefecture (today’s Shanghai) which had a tradition of being personal assistants 
to high officials. Ni Shenshu’s great-grandfather, Ni Tui [̮ (1668-1748) moved to Yunnan in 
                                               
32 Li Yuandu ǏcĽ, Guochao xian zheng shi lue ÐǈdǶ®ɬ (Changsha: Yuelu shushe, 2008), juan 20, 579.  
33 Wang Song acquired his Jinshi title in 1799 and served as a country magistrate in Shanxi Province. After his 
retirement, he went back to Yunnan to compose the local gazetteers. See Zhao, Qing shi gao, liezhuan 269, 30b. 
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1715 as the personal assistant for Gan Guobi ɡÐɝ (?-1747), the Provincial Governor of 
Yunnan and settled his family in Yunnan.34 
No historical record shows that Ni Shenshu had direct contact with mining administration, 
but his family tradition of being personal assistants must have contributed to Ni’s knowledge 
about mining. Personal assistants were essential in mining administration and in collecting 
knowledge about mining. High officials often relied on their personal assistants, and two copper 
administration treatises, A History of Copper [Mining] in Yunnan and A Convenient Guide to 
Copper Administration, were composed by the personal assistants of provincial commissioners.35 
Mining administration provided a channel for personal assistants to join state officials. For 
example, Dai Ruizheng Ŷɛŗ, the author of A History of Copper [mining] in Yunnan, started 
his career as an administrative assistant (͝ƞĈ yixuguan) in the provincial government of 
Yunnan and was promoted to police chief of Gaoyao Ћ̸ county after thirty years of copper 
mining administration.36 Furthermore, in addition to mining administration, personal assistants 
were the agents of state officials who were investors in the mines. In the early seventeenth 
century, Ni Shenshu’s great-grandfather Ni Tui pointed out that officials often sent their 
                                               
34 Ni Tui [̮, “Preface,” in Ni Tui eds., Dian yun li nian zhuan ȣϰǸĸ^ (Kunming: Yunnan daxue chubanshe, 
1992), 6. Ni Shenshu participated in the Yunnan Local Gazetteer project from 1826 before he received appointment 
as a county magistrate in Shanxi Province. See Long Yun Жϰ ed., Xinzuan yunnan tong zhi Ʃ˚ϰΚŜ 
(Kunming: Yunnan tongzhi guan, 1949), juan 15, 14a. From 1830 to 1832, he served as the magistrate for Hejin Ȉ
Ȕ County and then as the magistrate of Xiangyuan ̶ǝ County from 1839 to 1842. See Mao Pixi ̔ɂ, 
(Guangxu) Hejin Xianzhi (e˓) ȈȔ˗Ŝ (1880), juan 5, 7a. See Li Tingfang ǏŅ̍, (Guangxu) Xianyuan 
xianzhi (e˓)̶Ù˗Ŝ (1880), juan 9, 13b. 
35 Yunnan tong zhi was stored in the office of the administrative commissioner as the “classics” of mining 
administration. Based on Dai’s manuscript, an anonymous administration assistant from the office of the 
administrative commissioner composed A Convenient Guide to Copper Administration, which is a simplified 
version of Dai’s manuscript. 
36 Ruan ed. Yunnan tongzhi gao, 192. 
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assistants with large amounts of money to invest in large mining enterprises in Yunnan.37 As a 
result, personal assistants not only gained knowledge of mining administration, but also learned 
how to run a mining enterprise as investors.   
In conclusion, the literati learned about mining technology both from their service as state 
officials, and from their private participation in the mining business as merchants and investors. 
Sometimes the two roles overlapped.38 The official mandate to serve the state and the local 
community, the personal interest in career promotion, and the private interest in return on 
investment intertwined to motivate these scholars to collect knowledge about mining and to 
transcribe the miners’ own words. Their interests in gathering and collecting technological 
knowledge from miners and merchants were very similar to that of sixteenth-century European 
natural philosophers who studied the plants, animals, and geography of a colony. However, 
unlike European natural philosophers who studied the nature to search for the true principle of 
God, Qing bureaucrats collected indigenous knowledge to enrich their knowledge of statecraft 
and to satisfy their personal interests. 
We can conclude that Tools of the Mines is based on more than 150 years of work by local 
bureaucrats who collected and recorded knowledge about mining acquired through their 
professional and private engagement in mining. However, Wu Qijun’s manual is different from 
all of the previous mining administration manuals because it is more than just a simple 
compilation of mining knowledge. Wu Qijun was the first to focus on mining tools and record 
                                               
37 Ni Tui, “Fu dang shi lun changwu shu” Ŗɯ,͔łɱ, in Shi, Dianxi, juan 2, 120-1.  
38 For examples of scholar-officials’ families that engaged mining, see Wu Chichang ·ɄƲ, Kechuang xianhua Č
ʮϗ͐, Biji xiaoshuo daguan ʶ͈ę͓ê̾ (Yangzhou: Jiangsu guangling guji chubanshe, 1983), juan 1, 10. 
“Zhaoshi zongci bei zhi” ΀ǾćʛʑŜ, in Zhongguo renmin daxue Qing shi yanjiusuo #Ï:ǿêĀȝ®ʌʭ
Ÿ, Qingdai de kuangye ȝ>ɷʊ (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1983), 103-4. 
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technological details. Before Wu Qijun, most scholars only recorded information about mining 
administration and mining organizations. The few who did mention mining tools, limited the 
technological information to brief footnotes to entries on mining administration.39 In contrast, 
Wu’s mining treatise prioritized the tools and techniques applied in mining and discussed the 
mining organization and administration in a later section. 
In addition, Wu systemized the knowledge about mining and classified mining knowledge 
into sixteen categories. Under each category, the author listed and defined technical terms. In the 
preface, the author explained the rationale behind his categorization, which showed Qing 
scholars’ knowledge system about mining: 
[Mining starts with] the trace of gold and silver that shows up in the 
mountains, therefore [this manual] starts with the vein. Once the vein is 
identified, the excavation follows, so the next is the tunnel (of the underground 
mining). Tunnels cannot be dug without the tools, therefore follows the tools. 
Ore is excavated with the aid of tools, so the next is the ore. Ore needs fire to 
make silver, copper, tin, and lead, so furnace is the next. The furnace is operated 
using tools, so the next is the tools for smelters. Smelting silver requires the 
furnace for silver, thus follows the smelters for silver. Although equipped with 
tools, [one] cannot gather the labor without the capital, thus the next [chapter] is 
on the cost.  Once there is capital, there is labor, so the next [chapter] is on 
labor. Managers manage labor, so the next [chapter] is on the managers. The 
managers follow the regulations, so regulations are the next. Once the 
regulations are set, if [someone] overstep the authority, prohibit it, so the next 
are prohibitions. The regulations must relieve disasters and prevent dangers, so 
the following [chapter] is about danger. Danger might be due to the ignorance of 
taboos, and the words are the most important part of taboos, so the next is the 
word taboos. What cannot be prohibited by taboos are supernatural 
phenomenon, so the next [chapter] is on supernatural phenomenon. What causes 
the supernatural phenomenon is the spirit, so [the manual] ends with rituals.40 
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The first chapter is “The Vein” (yin ň), which introduces the prospecting of mine deposits. 
The second chapter, “The Tunnel” (dong ʍ) talks about underground mining and the 
construction of declines, shafts, and adits. The third chapter, “Tools for Underground Mining” 
(dong zhi qi ʍ)È), introduces tools. The fourth chapter, “Ore”  (kuang ʕ) discusses different 
kinds of ore and their appearance. The fifth chapter, “Smelters” (lu Ɇ) introduces the size and 
the structure of furnaces, while the sixth chapter is “Tools for Smelters” (lu zhi qi Ɇ)È). The 
seventh chapter “Smelters for Silver” (zhao ˠ) is explains that the smelting of silver required a 
specific kind of furnace that could be heated to a higher temperature. The eighth chapter, “Cost” 
(yong ɥ) discusses the cost of money and resources in mining. “Labor” (ding ) introduces the 
division of labor in mining. Chapter ten, “Managers” (yi ő) introduces the managers who 
organized mining and the bureaucrats who administered the mining community. The eleventh 
chapter “Regulations” (gui ̺) cites the customary laws that to regulate mining practice. The 
twelfth chapter, “Prohibitions” (jin ʞ) lists the circumstances and practices that have to be 
prohibited because they can lead to disputes. The thirteenth chapter, “Dangers” (huan ť) warns 
of the risks in mining production, and “Word Taboos” (yu ji ͑ś) records the taboos to prevent 
the dangers. The fifteenth chapter is devoted to “Supernatural Phenomena (wuyi ɍɮ)” , and the 
last chapter, “Rituals” (ji ʝ) examines popular religion in the mining community.  
These sixteen chapters are organized sequentially, according to the order of mining 
process. The author first follows the life of ore from the underground deposit to the smelting 
process, then turns to the human aspects of mining. He starts with the division of labor and 
extends his discussion to the social organization and culture of the mining community. The 
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dictionary- like style represents Wu’s intellectual background in evidential philosophy, since he 
tries to explain the mining process as a philologist would. Meanwhile, the deductive order of the 
chapters, which started from material production and ended with social construction, distance 
Wu from a typical Confucian scholar and make him sound more like a materialist scholar.  
The content of the chapters shows that by the mid-nineteenth century, scholars had started 
to pay more attention to technological details in mining to addition to their long-standing interest 
in mining administration. Moreover, in the knowledge system of nineteenth-century scholars, the 
knowledge about mining had two aspects: the first was directly related to the physical production 
process, and included the technology of prospecting, mining, and smelting; the second pertained 
to the production of the mining enterprise and the mining community, including knowledge 
about fundraising, the division of labor, and the management of the mining community. The first 
body of knowledge was embodied in miners and smelters themselves, who passed down the 
knowledge through their practice and word of mouth. The second body of knowledge was 
mastered by merchants who invested in mining and by local leaders who administered the 
mining community. The nineteenth-century understanding of mining technology was 
tremendously different from our own, which emphasizes the machines and methodologies used 
to manufacture physical artifacts.  
 
Translating and Transcribing Vernacular Knowledge 
Mining starts with the discovery of the ore, by prospecting and defining its location and 
value. The content of Gejiu tin-polymetallic ore deposits is cassiterite-sulphide, which is gray or 
light grey in color (figure 1.2).41 Miners in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries located the 
                                               
41 Cao Xiangguang, “Integrated Geophysical and Geochemical Indicators of the Gejiu Tin Mine and Its Neighboing 
Areas,” in Charles S. Hutchison ed., Geology of Tin Deposits in Asia and the Pacific: Selected Papers from the 
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deposit by searching for the indications of the presence of mineral deposits: outcrops on 
hillsides.42 The author of Tools of Mines faithfully recorded the miners’ understanding of the 
formation and the shape of mines. Miners compared deposits to plants: the outcrops were 
compared to sprouts (miao ̏), that grew out of the earth; the large ore deposits were compared 
to melons; the veins were understood as vines, and the sparsely located small deposits were the 
leaves. Once they had identified the “sprouts,” miners would excavate in the direction of the 
vein, hoping to find large ore deposits.43  
According to the record in Wu’s treatise, miners estimated the size and grade of the mine 
deposit based on the shape of the vein. The author of the treatise tried his best to translate the 
embodied knowledge and judgments of miners through a transcription and transliteration of the 
miners’ vernacular. The terminology used to describe the veins is all in vernacular language. The 
term “grass cover deposits” (caopi kuang ̘ɺʕ), mine deposits close to the surface, was shared 
by miners in Hunan while other terms were more likely to be local dialects. The character used to 
represent “vein” (shuan ) originally means door latch and has nothing to do with mining. The 
author borrowed it to transliterate the pronunciation of local dialect since the standard expression 
of vein in classical Chinese was mai ˸. The character for the rock (xia ʏ) was also created by 
the author to transliterate the dialect used by the miners. The author explained, in “Word 
Taboos”: “[miners] called rock as xia because the pronunciation of rock shi ʉ [in mandarin] was 
                                               
International Symposium on the Geology of Tin Deposits held in Nanning, China, October 26–30, 1984, jointly 
sponsored by ESCAP/RMRDC and the Ministry of Geology, People’s Republic of China (Berlin: Springer Berlin, 
2013), 449. 
42 Golas, Chemistry and Chemical Technology, 213. 
43 Wu Qijun, Diannan kuangchang gongqi tulue, 2a. 
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the same as the pronunciation of lost shi í.”44 To explain the vernacular knowledge, which was 
orally expressed by miners, the author used standard written language to describe the shapes and 
colors of the veins.  
If the ore in the vein was light in color and in weight, the author explained, it was called 
“dull vein” (hen shuan Ű), meaning that there was no deposit. If the vein extended in all 
directions a few feet below the surface, it was called “mountain-covering vein” (pushan shuan 
όĢ). Mountain-covering vein could only lead to grass cover deposits (caopi kuang ̘ɺʕ 
or caopi jian ̘ɺĚ). Grass cover deposit was small and only had a short life. The “vertical 
vein” (shusheng shuan ͦɣ) intruded straight down to the earth without shoots; the deposit 
wouldn’t be large. If the vein twisted and coiled downwards, it was called “grindstone vein” 
(mopan shuan ʔɾ). The deposit must be deep underneath the surface and would be flooded 
by underground water after a few years of mining.45 If the vein entered the mountain rock at an 
angle, disappeared and re-appeared as a relatively large ore body, it was called “suspended sword 
vein” (kuadao shuan ΂|). This vein could lead to massive deposits. If the vein was wide and 
long, and surrounded by hard rock walls (xia ʏ), then it was called “grand vein” (da shuan ê
). Grand vein would certainly lead to a series of large ore deposits, which could last for a long 
time of excavation.46  
This way of estimation is very practical and is corroborated by modern geographical 
research on Gejiu tin deposits. Modern geography shows the tin ore deposits in Gejiu frequently 
                                               
44 Wu Qijun, Diannan kuangchang gongqi tulue, 22a. 
45 Ibid, 2a. 
46 Ibid, 2b. 
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occur around the protuberances of granite masses that are 200 to 1,000 meters beneath the 
surface, so the deposit close to the surface must be small. The ore deposits frequently occur 
around the granite masses and are surrounded by hard rock walls, so hard rocks often indicate 
large deposits.47 However, although the author of the treatise carefully recorded the description 
of different shapes of veins, he still reminded the reader that “only experienced miners could 
recognize (the characters of veins) Ä˪ͻłˬ˶Ύ).”48 Therefore we can infer that words and 
texts cannot transmit all the information about prospecting technology. There was still some tacit 
knowledge that could be gained only through experience and practice.  
Tin mining in Gejiu in the Qing dynasty could be open pit or underground. Miners in 
Guangdong, Hunan, and Southeast Asia preferred the former, and used it to excavate grass cover 
deposits in Gejiu.49 This technique was simple and not labor- or capital-intensive. In a court 
report in 1743, the Minister of the Board of Revenue Xu Ben ŔǍ told Qianlong emperor, “even 
women and children could excavate ore [through pit mining] ûñʨüX¬ϩƄϩŕ.”50 
However, pit mining was subject to weather. During the rainy season, the open pits would be 
flooded, so excavation had to stop and mineral processing would resume.51 
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As the grass cover deposits in Gejiu is usually small, most miners with large amounts of 
capital tended to participate in underground mining (figure 1.3). After identifying the vein, 
miners worked their way into the mountain to create shafts and adits to reach the ore body. The 
shafts and adits were called dong ʍ. The entrances to the shafts were called cao . The ore 
were called huang â. Here, although the terminology of dong ʍ (shafts and adits) and cao  
(entrance)  were shared by miners all around China, the two characters were not standardized 
until mid-nineteenth century. In local gazetteers and court memorials in the eighteenth century, 
they were sometimes written as dong ȓ and cao ǭ.52 The lack of standardization shows these 
mining terms entered the language and the knowledge system of the literati after the eighteenth 
century. The name of the earth that contains the ore, huang â, is another example of 
transliteration. The ore was called sha ʋ and the earth was called tu Ò in classical Chinese. 
Once again, the author of the mining treatise used “word taboo” to explain the different naming 
system of miners: the pronunciation of earthy in mandarin, tu, was similar to the word “vomit” tu 
µ, a symptom of hypoxia—a danger faced by miners in underground mining. Therefore, the 
miners used huang to refer to the ore to avoid bad luck. 
Chinese miners did not have the concept of shafts and adits (all underground tunnels were 
called wolu ʯ΃) but they had a more complicated naming system for tunnels of different angles 
of inclination. The complicated naming system was due to the mining practice in China. Peter 
Golas has pointed out that true vertical drafts and horizontal audits were seldom used in 
premodern Chinese mining practice.53 This is because Chinese miners followed the natural 
                                               
52 For example, see Han, Mengzi xianzhi, juan 2, 12b.  
53 Peter J. Golas, Chemistry and Chemical Technology, 282. 
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direction of veins from the surface to the ground, and the direction of the galleries was 
determined by the natural shape of the ore deposits.  
The direction of mining was decided by experts called “timbering headsmen” xiangtou φ
Ͼ.54 The timbering headsman was like the chief engineer in underground mining. In each shaft, 
one timbering headsman would stand at the front of the line of excavation to oversee the 
excavation, and the installation of the support system. 55 Miners used timbers to support the wall 
and the roof of the tunnel as the mining proceeds underground. Where the earth and the rocks 
were weak, miners would install a rectangular timbering support system, which used four 
timbers to support the walls, the roof, and the bottom of the gallery.56 The installation of the 
timbering support system was called jia xiang ǘφ; the timbers were called xiang mu φǊ.57 
Successful timbering required special expertise gained through long experience.  
The names for different kinds of tunnels were all recorded in dialects. The horizontal adit 
was called pingtui ķƌ (horizontal pushing); the slightly inclined adit was called niu chi shui ɋ
°ȁ (cattles drinking water); the inclined shaft was called doutui ϡ˺ (steep legs); the vertical 
shaft was called diaojing α1 (fishing well), and the tunnel that went upwards during the 
exploitation was called zuan peng υˁ (drill to the ceiling). In steep tunnels, baiyi louti Ɣîǯ
Ǣ (Yi-barbarian style ladders), made of notched tree trunks, were used as ladders (figure 1.4).58 
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This terminology indicates that the technology of building trunk ladders came from the Yi-ethnic 
group, and the mining technology in Yunnan was inseparable from the local cultural-ecological 
network.   
We can see that the author of the mining treatise used transliteration to transcribe the 
mining terminology. In this transcription process, the authors borrowed or even created new 
characters to record terms shared by miners in dialects and used the detailed descriptions to 
visualize them. The explanations about the naming of the rock (jia) and ore (huang) indicate that 
the author, as a Confucian scholar who distances himself from superstition, was trying to 
rationalize the naming system of the miners by attributing local terminologies to “word taboo”—
a superstition shared by miners. This transcription process shows that the author of this mining 
treatise was not writing for the miners, who already knew these terms. Instead, he was trying to 
translate and transmit the miners’ vernacular knowledge to an audience who shared his cultural 
background and language—state bureaucrats and literati who could not speak the language of the 
miners but who could read classical Chinese. 
 
Understanding the Underground World through Practice 
Although miners did not write, a close reading of this mining treatise can still show us how 
miners acquired knowledge about the underground world through their mining practice. The 
miners’ sense of direction, for example, came from how they used their tools in underground 
mining. The tools for excavation included hammers chui ϐ, chisels jian Ě, and mattocks zao χ 
(figure 1.5). A hammer was seven to eight cun long. The head was made of iron and the handle 
was made of wood. The chisel was four to five cun long and made of iron. The head was sharp 
while the end was wrapped by cane for easier handling. The mattocks was a pointed iron wedge 
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mounted on a wooden handle.59 It was over one chi long and looked more like a handled wedge 
used in Jiangxi coal mines.60 The tools could be used either by a single miner or by a team of 
two. The single miner held the hammer in the right hand and the chisel in the left. During 
excavation, the miner hit the chisel with the hammer. The mattock was either used as a chisel 
that had a longer handle, or as a sharp scraper to excavate the ore body.61  
The team of two was used in the tunneling process. The team was made up of strong young 
men, one held the chisel or the mattock and stood on the right side, while the other held the 
hammer and stood on the left. They took turns striking the chisel.62 This working combination 
determined how miners understood the directions in the tunnels. In miners’ epistemology, there 
was no left or right in the underground world--the left was “the hammer man’s side” chuishou 
bian νŹΣ, and the right was called “mattock man’s side” zhuanshoubian χŹΣ.63  
Naming conventions affected the way that miners named different parts of the underground 
tunnels. The chisel was called jian, therefore the surface of excavation, the site where the chisel 
worked, was also called jian. Jian was also used to describe sub-shafts and sub-adits in a main 
shaft. This is because as the excavation proceeded, as the ore body naturally spread in different 
directions; one shaft could split into several sub-shafts and sub-adits. Since these sub-shafts and 
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62 Wu Qijun, Diannan kuangchang gongqi tulue, 3-4, 14. 
63 Ibid, 3a-b. 
  51 
sub-adits were also worked by the chisel, they were called jian. One main shaft (dong) could 
have thousands of sub-shafts (jian).64 
The dangers and difficulties that the underground miner faced, such as the lack of oxygen 
and the problem of underground water, were also part of miners’ understanding of the 
underground world. As the excavation went deeper, ventilation became a serious and potentially 
deadly problem. Miners used the oil lamp to indicate the level of oxygen in underground mining. 
The oil lamps, made of iron, were also used to light the dark underground galleries. They were 
plate-shaped and one was shared by four to five miners (Figure 1.6).65  The oil lamp was called 
liangzi 9ü, and the lack of oxygen was called “menliang” Ŧ9, which means “smothering the 
flame of the oil lamp.”66 According to Golas, air at the surface of the earth is 21 percent oxygen 
by volume, and it is hard for a man to continue to do hard labor if the oxygen drops to 15 
percent. To keep an oil or candle flame burning, 17 percent of oxygen is required.67 Therefore a 
smothering of the flame was a warning of a low oxygen level in the tunnel. Here, the miners not 
only used the oil lamp to monitor the supply of oxygen, but also incorporated its name into their 
epistemology as a signal of possible danger.  
The lack of fresh air underground could also lead to extreme heat during hot seasons and 
extreme humidity during rainy seasons. As a result, miners would install ventilation pumps when 
menliang happened. The timbering headsman oversaw the installation of ventilation pumps. The 
illustrations in Wu’s treatise showed that miners in Yunnan used two types of ventilation pumps . 
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One type was called fenggui ЂǱ (air duct), a cylinder-and-piston ventilation pump that looked 
like the ventilation pumps used in granaries (figure 1.4).68 The other type was called fengxiang 
Ђʾ (air fan), which looked like a circular fan (figure 1.4). According to the illustration in Wu’s 
treatise, the air fan was installed at the entrance of a shaft, and several cylinder-and-piston 
ventilation pumps were installed at intervals further into the shaft. 
Another problem that miners faced was drainage. In open-pit mining in Bangka 
(Indonesia), Malaya, and Gejiu, square-pallet chain-pumps were used by Chinese miners.  The 
structure and the construction of the chain-pump might come from water wheels that were 
widely used on Chinese farms.69 Underground miners divided the flood into two kinds using the 
Daoist system of yin and yang. The first kind was called yangshui ϧȁ (yang water), surface 
water from nearby rivers and brooks. The second kind was called yinshui Ϥȁ (yin water), 
which meant groundwater from the aquifer. Miners’ work convinced them that the groundwater 
was an indicator of high quality and large ore deposits. They used the theory of Five Phases to 
explain the association between the location of the metal deposit and groundwater. The theory of 
Five Phases, which came to maturity in the first century BCE, was used to explain the cosmic 
cycles and the transformation of matters. The Five Phases are wood, fire, earth, metal, and water. 
They feed or overpower each other. The theory was adopted in many fields including geomancy, 
political discourse, and traditional Chinese medicine.70 Therefore it was widely spread among the 
Chinese people. The miners explained the association between water and ore by saying: “metal 
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and water mutually generating each other means metal and water are of the relationship between 
the son and the mother, therefore mines with groundwater are of higher quality.”71 The miners’ 
belief that the metal was the son of water, was clearly a vernacular distortion of the Confucian 
classics. Because in Confucian classics, it was metal that creates water.72  
Although groundwater indicated the potential of high quality ore, it also hindered 
underground mining. Miners used piston pumps called long ʲ (dragon), which resembled the 
famous box-bellows used in Chinese furnaces.73  The timbering headsman directed the 
installation of piston pumps. According to the description in Wu’s treatise, the “dragon” pump 
was made of bamboo or wood and was eight chi to one zhang in length. It was hollow inside, 
with a diameter of four to five cun. There was a wooden or iron stick that was of the same length 
as the pump, and a leather attached to the end to work as the piston (figure 1.7).74 The number 
and installation of pumps depended on the amount of water that had to be drained. If there was a 
large amount of water, miners might use 13 to 14 pumps in a row at the same level zha Ϝ (figure 
1.8). Depending on the depth of the shaft, there could be up to 50 to 60 levels of pumps installed 
in a shaft.75 The miners counted the numbers of levels to estimate the cost of drainage. Although 
similar water drainage systems could also be found in copper mines in Japan in the eighteenth 
century, where the water was pumped through 130 levels, mining in Yunnan informed the miners 
that a drainage system that had more than ten levels of pumps would make mining less profitable 
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(figure 1.9).76 The only way to sustain long-term excavation was to open a new tunnel to drain 
the groundwater.77 
Ore was carried out of the mining using human labor. To minimize the labor in excavation, 
the galleries of mines were usually very narrow and low, so miners had to carry the ore over their 
shoulders and crawl out of the shaft.78  These carriers were called “ore haulers” beihuang ˴â.79 
Double sacks made of hemp were used to make the haulage easier. One double sack had two 
pockets, one on each side. One side was carried on the shoulder in front of the chest and the 
other rested on the hip. When the miner hauled the ore out of the mine, he could balance the ore 
on the two sides so that the miner could use his hands and feet to crawl out of the shaft.80  
In sum, the miners formed their vernacular knowledge of the underground world through 
their engagement with the tools and the earth. They understood the mining space when they hit 
the ore surface with hammers and chisels, they monitored the oxygen supply using oil lamps, and 
they conceptualized the formation of the metal through their encounters with groundwater. 
Although the miners tried to theorize the formation of the metal by referring to classical texts, 
the explanation was rather distorted based on their mining experience. The formation of 
vernacular knowledge shows that miners’ epistemology of the underground world was neither a 
faithful reflection of their observation of the natural world, nor a transmission of knowledge 
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from the texts from the ancient past. It was co-constituted by miners’ bodies, their tools, and the 
natural environment. Moreover, the natural environment that miners worked with was in fact not 
completely natural at all—it was constituted by artificial constructions: the tunnels were an 
artificial construction supported by the timbering system, the air that miners breathed was 
brought in by ventilation system, and the groundwater was removed by water pumps. Therefore, 
tools like hammers, chisels, oil lamps, and water pumps mediated between miners’ bodies and 




After the excavation, the next step was ore dressing (xuankuang Ρʕ). The goal was to 
separate the ore from the waste materials. The miners used water and gravity to separate the 
waste and the ore: the light waste would be washed away, and the ore would sink. Ore dressing 
was widely used among Chinese tin miners in Yunnan and Hunan, but was seldom mentioned in 
mining treatises and local gazetteers.81 Wu Qijun did not mention ore dressing in the text; Xu 
Jinsheng Ŕΰɣ, the Prefect of Dongchuan Prefecture (Ǔĩļ), only provided a simplified 
illustration of ore dressing in Tools of Mines (figure 1.10). Similarly, the author of the local 
gazetteer of Mengzi county in the early eighteenth century only briefly introduced the dressing of 
silver ore, and mentioned that the dressing of tin ore was similar to silver ore.82 The 
disappearance of detailed descriptions of ore dressing in mining treatise and local gazetteers 
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shows the extent of local bureaucrats’ penetration into the mining sites. The local bureaucrats in 
Mengzi County knew more about silver ore dressing than tin because the Qing state only sent 
bureaucrats to oversee silver mines. The disappearance of ore dressing from Wu’s text suggests 
that most local bureaucrats who oversaw the taxation did not stay in mining sites year round. 
Therefore, although they were not completely ignorant of this process, they did not know the 
complete ore dressing process.83 This might be because the taxation was done after the smelting.  
In Gejiu, ore dressing was conducted during the rainy season--usually starting around the 
fourth lunar month and ending around the eighth. As the approach of the rainy season, miners 
would dig ponds connected by canals on steep hillside. When rain filled the ponds, the miners 
would throw the ore in and let the water pass down the canal to wash the ore. Several parallel 
walls were built alongside the canal and the ponds so that the ore would sink and stay in the pond 
while the light waste was washed off. This method was called chong huang jian ȇâĚ (rinsing 
the ore).84 The remaining tin ore left was then crushed and ground into fine granules by stone 
mills.85 
Miners then threw the granules into buddle pits for rouhuang ƍâ (rubbing ore). One 
miner would push a wooden rake back and forth to mix the water and the refined ore as if he was 
giving ore a massage (figure 1.11). The ore with higher concentration would settle at the bottom 
of the buddle.86 The pan method, called qiao daguo Ƣêπ (hitting big woks), was also used to 
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produce a higher concentrate. The pan was made of iron and looked like a wok (figure 1.12).87 
Very similar to American placer miners, tin miners put the mixture of ore and water in the large 
pan and agitated the mixture, the higher concentrate would form on the bottom. The rubbing ore 
and the pan method required manual dexterity: the subtle movements of the wooden rake and the 
agitation of the pan determined the quality and the purity of the ore concentrate. As the social life 
of tin ore proceeds to smelting, the senses of the hands and eyes started to become increasingly 
important in constructing knowledge about the matter. 
 
The Hands and the Eyes: Senses and Tacit Knowledge 
The embodied skills, especially the senses of vision and touch, were central to smelting 
technology in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. To begin with, the purity of the 
concentrate was evaluated by hands and eyes. After ore dressing, the processed tin concentrate, 
hongsha ʎʋ, would be traded on the mining site and shipped to Gejiu the smelting.88 There 
were around ten smelters in Gejiu in the eighteenth century, all of them in Gejiu village, (today’s 
old town of Gejiu city).89 As early as late eighteenth century, the smelters hired shangqianren 
: (forward men) to assay and to purchase the tin concentrated at the mining site.90  
There was no historical record about how the agent assayed the quality of the concentrate, 
but according to the interviews conducted by twentieth-century ethnographers, the agent was 
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extremely skilled in assaying the quality of the concentrate by touching and looking at it. He 
would put the concentrate in an unglazed earthenware bowl, mix the concentrate with water, stir 
the mixture and allowed the lighter huifen ȱ} (dust) to run off. After several rounds of 
washing, he would rub the remaining concentrate with his finger and pour clear water into the 
bowl again. If the mixture was white and looked like rice porridge, then the concentrate 
contained a high percentage of lead instead of tin. Then the agent would assay the tin content in 
the ore concentrate by comparing the remaining concentrate in the bowl with the concentrate that 
had not been washed (figure 1.13).91 This method was conducted through the subtle movements 
of hands and experienced eyes. The agent judged the quality of the ore through embodied skills 
gained through experience.  The tacit nature of this kind of embodied skill prevent the literati 
from putting the knowledge of judgement into texts.  
Similar to the judgement of the ore concentrate, smelting, which depended on the visual 
judgement and experience of the smelters, remained unknown until mid-nineteenth century. The 
authors of mining treatises and local gazetteers knew only that the smelting of tin was similar to 
the smelting of silver and copper.92 They pointed out that the “secret” of successful smelting 
depended on experienced smelter headsmen (lutou ɆϾ) who were “familiar with the property 
of ore and conversant with the blend of the ore” (shushi kuangxing, anlian peijian Ƀ͛ʕŠ.
͖：ΫȽ).93 Before the smelting began, the smelter headman had to blend the ore based on its 
different qualities. According to Ni Shenshu, the smelters used the binary of thick (chou ʩ) and 
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watery (xi ʦ) to describe the property of ore. This binary was based on the visual observation of 
the fluidity of the ore during smelting. Smelters associated the fluidity with the property of ore, 
and theorized the blending principle based on the binary of fluidity: thick ore should be blended 
with watery ore to reach a certain consistency.94 However, although Ni had recorded the 
principle of blending among smelters, a successful smelting process still relied on the smelter 
headsman’s eyes to predict the fluidity of the ore before smelting, and on the smelter headsman’s 
experience to blend the ore. Before the introduction of the thermometer, the temperature was 
estimated through the color of the flame. Therefore, a good smelter headsman must “keep a 
watchful eye on the fire” (shoushi huohou Ą̻ȰZ) and control the temperature by directing 
the operation of the box bellow and the adjusting the amount of charcoal added into the 
furnace.95 
Wu Qijun’s treatise did not have a specific description of tin smelting technology in 
Yunnan so the shape and size of the tin furnace in Yunnan before the mid-nineteenth century 
remained unknown. In the local gazetteer published in 1712, Han Sanyi recorded that the tin 
furnace was different from silver furnace.96  A silver furnace, according to Wu’s treatise, looked 
like a tomb and was almost completely sealed (zhao ˠ), and had only a few holes on the top to 
take in oxygen.97 In contrast, a tin furnace was not sealed.98 According to the narrative of Liang 
Dingheng ǞВ6, the manager of a large smelter in Gejiu in 1930s, the tin furnace used in Gejiu 
                                               
94 Ni Shenshu, “Caitong liantong ji,” in Wu, Diannan kuangchang gongqi tulue, 34b. 
95 Wu, Diannan kuangchang gongqi tulue, 11a-b. 
96 Han, Mengzi xianzhi,  juan 2, 13b. 
97 Wu, Diannan kuangchang gongqi tulue, 11a-b. 
98 Han Sanyi, Mengzi xianzhi, 1712, juan 2, 15a. 
  60 
in the eighteenth century was very similar to the illustration in Song Yingxing’s Tiangong kaiwu 
(Figure 1.14).99 The furnace was made from mud and salt. It was three chi tall and shaped like an 
oak wine barrel. The crucible was in the shape of an iron wok. The bottom of the iron wok was 
connected to an opening at the bottom of the furnace to let the molten tin run out of the furnace. 
On the opposite side of the tin exit, a large bellow was built to provide more oxygen.100 
According to Liang, the widely used dalu êɆ (grand furnace) in the early twentieth 
century was invented after eighteenth century (figure 1.15). Records in the local gazetteer 
published in 1712 shows that the history of the grand furnace may be traced to the beginning of 
the eighteenth century.101 The grand furnace was built using mudbricks made from soil and salt. 
Salt was used as the binder to harden the texture and to increase the density of the brick so that 
the molten tin would not leak.102 The exterior of the grand furnace was a cuboid 1.7 meters long, 
1.2 meters wide, and 1.2 meters tall. The inside was a crucible called zeng ɠ or zengzi ɠü. 
Zeng usually refers to grain steamers that could be dated to the bronze age of China. The upper 
part of the bronze zeng looks like a wok with small holes at the bottom. The lower part was a 
hollow space for water. When heated at the bottom, the steam will go through the holes and cook 
the grain. The crucible got its name because its hopper-like shape just looked like a bronze zeng. 
The large wok-shaped crucible was the container for ore and charcoal. A small exit called 
huomen Ȱϕ (fire gate) or jinmen ΰϕ (metal gate) was built at the bottom of the crucible to 
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release the molten tin. Below the exit was a rectangular basin to store the molten tin. A large box 
bellow, 2.2-meter-long and 60 centimeters in diameter, was installed at the back of the 
furnace.103  
After the smelter headsman finished blending the ore, a smelter would use a shovel to load 
the charcoal into the bottom of the crucible to heat the furnace. When the furnace reached the 
right temperature, the smelters would start to add ore. After the ore had been loaded, the smelters 
would add a thick layer of charcoal. The ratio of charcoal and ore in the early twentieth century 
was around 2 to 1.104 
Once started, the smelters worked nonstop day and night. The bellow worked continuously 
to provide air. The box bellow was made of a whole timber.105 Its size required three men to 
operate. Three men worked for six hours as one shift.106 In every shift, one man pushed and 
pulled the box bellow three times and then switched to the next man. Four six-hour shifts were 
needed for a day of smelting. The smelter head monitored the temperature of the furnace and 
controlled the speed of the blower and the amount of charcoal added based on his observation of 
the flame.107 We don’t have many records about the how long it took to smelt one furnace of tin. 
Early 20th century records show that it took around three hours.108 A smelter used a wooden or 
iron pike called botiao ƒǠ or tiaozi Ǡü to poke the metal gate to clear up the exit for the 
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molten tin (figure 1.16).109 The molten tin was mixed with scum and slag when it flowed out of 
the metal gate. One smelter would use tongs and pikes to collect the scum and slag and put them 
back to the furnace for the second round of smelting. 110 After the basin attached to the furnace 
was filled with molten tin, a smelter used an iron ladle to scoop the tin into small molds for 
ingots.  
In sum, the smelting process involved two types of labor: the first kind was repetitive labor 
like shoveling ore and charcoals into the furnace and operating the box bellow, which could be 
conducted by smelters with little skill. The second kind of labor, which was key to the success of 
the smelting process, required highly specialized skills and experience. The agent of the smelters 
had to use the movement of his finger, his touch, and his eyes to evaluate the purity of the ore. 
The smelter headsman had to use his eyes to judge the property of the ore and the temperature of 
the furnace. Senses played the key role in understanding the transformation of matter. 
Furthermore, the senses used in the smelting process were not inherently embodied, they were 
acquired through years of practice. The tacit nature of these trained senses prevents the author of 
the nineteenth-century mining treatise from recording every detail and every trick of the smelter 
and this somewhat explains the lack of information about smelting there.  
The same applies to underground mining. Although underground mining was not a secret, 
and most miners were conducting less skilled and repetitive physical labor, the success of 
underground mining depended on the embodied skills and expertise of the timber headsman, who 
guaranteed the miners’ safety. During excavation, he directed the miners to construct the 
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timbering support, ventilation, and drainage systems. Although the structures of these systems 
were not a secret, the timbering headsman had to use his experience to decide the location of 
installation. Furthermore, an experienced timber headsman could predict the location of the ore 
deposit and determine the direction of the underground mining.  
The knowledge and skills of the timber headsman and the smelting headsman were tacit 
knowledge that could not be transmitted through texts, illustrations, or even through word-of-
mouth. Wu Qijun noticed the limit of textual transformation of knowledge about mining and 
emphasized several times the importance of experienced (lao ˪) and skilled (shu Ƀ) miners and 
smelters. In his mining treatise, he reminds the bureaucrats and merchants who planned to 
engage in mining to “hire a timber headsman. [If you] get the right person, the underground 
mining would be a success.”111 When it comes to smelting, the smelting headsman “determined 
the profit of a smelter.”112 An experienced smelting headsman could a make an excellent ore 
blend and set the best temperature to produce the highest quality of tin ingots. Therefore, Wu 
Qijun concludes, the “the key to underground mining was a good timbering headsman, the key to 
smelting was a good smelter headsman.”113 
Wu’s emphasis on skilled and experienced timbering and smelter headsmen shows that 
technology is about people, their skills, and tools. This challenges the modern concept of 
technology, which considers the tools and the machines as the core of technology and the most 
important factors to increase productivity. The tools used in mining were not a secret. They were 
used by miners in different mines and in many geographical locations. The mattocks, for 
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example, were used by miners in Yunnan and in Jiangxi.114 The water pump in China could find 
its twin in Japanese copper mines.115 Furthermore, most of the tools used in mining were not 
foreign to Chinese farmers. Spikes, chain-pump water wheels, mattocks, and shovels used in 
mining and smelting were widely used in farming. The building of ponds and canals used in the 
ore dressing process was a common technique in agricultural irrigation. The piston water pumps 
shared the similar structure with the box bellow in every Chinese kitchen.  
However, the universality of mining tools does not mean that the importance of tools in 
mining should be minimized when discussing mining technology, otherwise Wu’s treatise, which 
recorded the size, shape, structure, and the material of tools, would be pointless. Although the 
mining tools might seem common, making them still required support from ecology, craftsmen, 
and trade networks. Where did the materials for the tools come from? Who made them? How did 
the materials and the tools arrive in the mining site? In the following chapter, I will use an 
ecological approach to explore peripheral but necessary materials such as water, charcoal, iron, 
and timbers which were consumed during mining operation. 
Furthermore, most of the miners were migrants from China proper. How did they adapt to 
local ecology and local society, set up trading networks, and transmit mining technology from 
China proper to the Southeast borderland? How did they raise funds, organize labor, and regulate 
mining and trade in the absence of law codes? In the early modern world, the transmission of 
mining technology was more than a movement of mining tools and machines, but a complicated 
process that involved the movement of a whole community, its adaptation to local environment, 
and a reconstruction of local social order. In the following chapter, I will follow Jacob Eyferth’s 
                                               
114 Golas, Chemistry and Chemical Technology, 274. 
115 Ibid, 349. 
  65 
lead in using “technology” to trace the trajectories of a cluster of embodied skills, labor 
organization, and financing techniques that are embedded in social networks.
  66 
CHAPTER TWO 
Ecology and the Migrating Miners’ Community 
 
The mineral resources underground attracted landless peasants and merchants with capital 
to migrate from central plains of China to the southwest frontier of Gejiu. According to the local 
gazetteer published in 1712, 80 to 90 percent of the population in Gejiu were not Yunnan locals. 
Among these migrants, 70 percent were from Hubei Î< and Hu’nan Î>, 30 percent were 
from Jiangxi ÃĬ, and the rest were from Shanxi, Shaanxi, and other provinces.1 In the second 
half of the eighteenth century, more Yunnan locals started to engage in mining. Therefore, a 
more precise understanding of the “local” tin mining technology in Yunnan travelled with miners 
from disparate parts of China proper as they migrated to the Southwest borderland.  
Although the mining tools and miners might have been “foreign” to Yunnan, the operation 
of mining relied on local ecology. Migrant miners had to adapt to the local environment and 
depend on local mountains, rivers, forests, and trade networks to provide peripheral but essential 
materials such as water, charcoal, iron, and timber. Anthropologists like Bruno Latour and Tim 
Ingold have offered an analytical framework that brings non-human actors and the environment 
into the formation of social space and human skills.2 Therefore local ecology co-constituted the 
tin mining technology in Gejiu with these migrant miners.  
Meanwhile, as David Bello has pointed out in his research on Qing borderlands, human 
action or “culture” and nonhuman factors constituted the historical space of Qing borderlands, 
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and the southwest borderland of Yunnan is no exception.3 The mining community, its industry, 
and the trade networks that developed around mining, likewise changed the local ecology, 
society, and the ethnic environment. Therefore, in this chapter, I will adopt an ecological 
approach to analyze tin mining technology in Gejiu. In this way, I can provide a fuller picture of 
mining technology which included the non-human actors, while showing the interrelationship 
between the natural resources, infrastructures, ethnic environment, and the trade network in the 
changing local ecology of the borderland of the Qing empire.  
The ecology of the Southwest frontier, constituted by both human and non-human factors, 
makes up the local aspect of mining practice in Gejiu. In addition to local ecology, the 
organization of the migrant mining community constituted an inseparable part of mining 
technology, making the mining technology movable from the center to the frontier. I follow 
Jacob Eyferth’s lead in using “technology” to trace the trajectories of a cluster of embodied 
skills, labor organization, and financing techniques that are embedded in social networks. I 
reconstruct the labor division among miners, property rights between miners, and the financing 
technique of merchants and shareholders. I argue that, just like the technology of Jiajiang paper 
makers, mining technology cannot be separated from the organization of labor and other “social 
technologies” in the mining community. The local mining community, which was made up of 
migrant miners and merchants, formed a semi-autonomous society though a “Seven Chiefs” 
system. This kind of semi-autonomous society, which guaranteed the operation of mining 
enterprises and the order of local society, was widespread in Chinese mining communities in 
China and in Southeast Asia. The social networks that formed the semi-autonomous society 
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enabled the movement of mining technology from China to Southeast Asia and should be 
considered central to the mobility of mining technology. By putting social networks under the 
rubric of technology, I can provide a deeper understanding of the travel of technology in the 
early modern period.  
Moreover, if social technology made the mining technology movable, then the ecology of 
mining technology constituted its local particularity. Therefore my social and ecological analysis 
of technology can shed light on not only the transmission of technology but also its appropriation 
and localization in the local context in the early modern period. 
 
Tools, Ecology, and the Trade Network 
The first chapter has shown that the tools used in mining were widely used in different 
geographical locations and also in agriculture. However, the transmission of mining technology 
from China proper to the borderland was far more complicated than merely bringing tools to the 
borderland. The making of tools and the supply of materials that were consumed in mining 
demanded the adaptation to local ecology and a whole supply chain constituted by the local trade 
network. Therefore an ecological approach is necessary to study these tools and arrive at a fuller 
understanding of mining technology. Scholars of Actor-Network-Theory have pointed out the 
agency of non-human actants in forming the society, technology, and science.4 Environment 
historians explained how ecology constituted human culture and social space.5 Therefore, the 
ecology of Yunnan was indispensable in constituting mining technology and practice. Except for 
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tools, the timbers used in the timbering system, the water consumed by miners and used in ore 
dressing, and the charcoal burnt in the furnace were all parts of tin mining technology that call 
for more analysis. 
The tools used in mining were made by local ironsmiths. No historical records have 
survived to show where ironsmiths resided before the twentieth century, but it is unlikely that 
each mining site had its own ironsmith, because according to Wu’s mining treatise, when the 
chisels became blunt, miners had to sharpen their chisels themselves.6 Therefore I infer that the 
ironsmiths lived a short distance away from mining sites. Perhaps they all lived in the town 
center of Gejiu, where there was a market for iron, ore sacks, oil, rice, salt, and charcoal. 
Iron was one of the most important materials that was consumed in mining production that 
could not be produced in Gejiu. The tools used in underground mining and smelting, such as the 
hammer, the chisel, and mattock, and the iron pike and the scoop were all made from iron. 
Yunnan has its own iron deposits, and excavation started in the Ming and the Qing dynasties.7 
Other possible sources of iron were neighboring provinces such as Sichuan and Hu’nan. 
According to treatises on copper administration, there were two major shipping routes that 
connected the mining area of Yunnan with neighboring provinces. One route connected Yunnan 
to Beijing, while the other connected Yunnan to other provincial mints. In the first route, the 
copper was transported by caravans to northeast Yunnan and south Sichuan, then loaded onto 
cargos to sail down the Jinsha River ŇÅÃ, the upper stretches of Yangzi River. Then the 
                                               
6 Wu, Diannan kuangchang gongqi tulue, 15a. 
7 Golas, Chemistry and Chemical Technology, 162. 
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copper cargos sailed down the Yangzi River and the canal to Beijing.8 In the other route, the 
copper was transported overland to Bo’ai 4Ŗ in southeastern Yunnan to the Guangxi border. 
Then the copper was carried through waterways to Lake Dongting É}Î and the Yangzi River.9 
It is very likely that the traders shipped the iron from Hu’nan and Sichuan using the same routes 
that they shipped the copper out of Yunnan. 
Both routes could bring iron into Yunnan. The first route that connected Yunnan and 
Beijing passed Panzhihua ¶ĝ, a huge iron mine in south Sichuan. The second route, which 
passed Lake Dongting, connected to Yueyang pŔ, another big iron mine in Hu’nan province. 
Undoubtedly, the long waterways and the trade route along the Yangzi river contributed to the 
supply of iron to Yunnan. As merchants from Hu’nan, Hubei, and Jiangxi moved to Gejiu, they 
brought in the source of iron and the trade network. In addition to the older trade routes, the Qing 
state helped make the transportation of iron easier. From early 1740s, the Qing state started to 
regularize the transportation of copper. Extensive efforts were made to improve the 
transportation infrastructure of roads and waterways.10 Bridges and roads were built to shorten 
the distance and reduce transportation costs. For example, the road between Xundian and 
                                               
8 Lan Yong ̦, “Qingdai diantong jingyun dui yantu de yingxiang yanjiu: Jianlun Ming Qing shiqi Zhongguo 
xinan ziyuan dongyun gongcheng ȝ>ȣω8ΓēȊΙɷŐ¿ʌʭ——t͡ƳȝƱǉ#Ï̷ͺȡ ΓĬʧ,” 
Qinghua daxue xuebao, no. 4 (2006): 95–103. Also, see Nanny Kim, “Copper Transports out of Yunnan, ca. 1750-
1850: Transport Technologies, Natural Difficulties, and Environment Change in a Southwest Highland Area,” in 
Thomas Hirzel and Nanny Kim, Metals, Monies, and Markets in Early Modern Societies: East Asian and Global 
Perspectives (LIT Verlag Münster, 2008), 191-220.  
9 Thomas Hirzel, “Mint Metal Procurement for Jiangsu and Zhejiang during the Qianlong Period (1736-1795): An 
Inquiry into the Central Government’s Expectations and the Provinces’ Strategies of Implementation,” in Hirzel and 
Kim, Metals, Monies, and Markets in Early Modern Societies, 225–26. 
10 Nanny Kim, “Copper Transports out of Yunnan, ca. 1750-1850,” 207. 
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Weining was “levelled and straightened” to make it more suitable for cart transportation.11 In 
1740s, the Qing state spent over 200,000 taels of silver to dredge the Jinshajiang River to create 
a safer shipping route and to lower the shipping cost.12  
The development of the transportation route led to the formation of the transportation trade 
and boosted the economy of the towns on the trade route.13 Moreover, the development of 
infrastructure also changed the landscape and the ecology of the southwest border. As a result, 
Yunnan became more closely connected to the trade networks of China and the southwest 
borderland became more integrated with China proper. The development of trade routes not only 
eased the shipping of tin from Gejiu to the markets in China proper, it also enabled more traders, 
investors, and miners to migrate to Gejiu to participate in the mining boom in the eighteenth 
century. Furthermore, the trade networks also provided means to transport other kinds of 
consumed materials in mining production. 
In addition to the state’s effort in improving the Southwest transportation and trade 
network, the mining industry relied on the trade networks of local Yunnanese and indigenous 
ethnic groups, such as the Yi, to provide the caravan transportation, charcoals, rice, salt, oil, and 
ore sacks that were necessary for mining production. In other words, the incoming migrant 
miners had to adapt to and make use of local trade networks for production, clothing, and food. 
At the same time, the mining production of these immigrant miners changed the local 
                                               
11 Ibid, 208–9. 
12 Lan Yong ̦, “Qingdai diantong jingyun dui yantu de yingxiang yanjiu,” 95–103. 
13 Ibid. 
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ethnography and economic life, as more local Yunnanese, Yi and Hui ethnic groups transformed 
their livelihood to support the mining industry. 
Mining consumed a large amount of ore sacks, oil, salt, and rice. Salt was used to build 
smelting furnaces and was essential to miners’ food. Yunnan has its own salt wells in Heijing ŧ
 (Black Well) in northern Yunnan. The salt from Zigong ėĹ, Sichuan province could also 
enter Yunnan through the copper trade routes. Oil and rice were the largest costs in underground 
mining. Each oil lamp could burn half a catty of oil per day and every four miners needed one oil 
lamp.14 Each miner consumed at least one sheng = of rice per day, and each mining site would 
have as many as tens of thousands miners. Therefore, a mining site with two thousand miners 
would consume at least two hundred and fifty catties of oil and two thousand sheng of rice per 
day. Since Gejiu’s mountainous terrain was not conducive to agriculture, miners in Gejiu relied 
on other places for the supply of rice, oil, and ore sacks. There were no historical records from 
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries but twentieth-century records shows that the rice came 
from nearby counties like Jianshui Á, Shiping õm, and Mile 9.15 The ore sacks were 
made from ramie cloth, which came from Kunming  ¡ and the oil was imported from the 
United States.16 The source of oil may have been different from the twentieth century, but the 
                                               
14 Wu, Diannan kuangchang gongqi tulue, 12a. 
15 See Wang Zhi’an ɔȉą, “Gejiu shangye de lishi qingkuang "ưÅɷ®ŧx,” in Gejiu wenshi ziliao, vol. 
4 (1984), 81-2. 
16 Gejiu mining industry started to use kerosene imported through French companies in the twentieth century. It was 
probably shipped from Vietnam and entered Yunnan through Kunming–Haiphong railway. Popular brands included 
“Crown” and “Shell.” See Wang Zhi’an, “Gejiu shangye de lishi qingkuang,” 81-2. 
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supply of rice and ramie in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries should be similar to the 
situation in the twentieth.  
Gejiu’s mountainous landscape and the subtropical climate provided large forests, which 
provided wood to build the timbering system and to produce charcoals for smelting. Mining and 
smelting required a large amount of wood, which could lead to deforestation. For example, the 
iron industry in Northern Song (960-1127) had led deforestation across northern China.17 The 
increase of deforestation and the consequent erosion could result in mudslides and floods, which 
could destroy arable land, houses, and tombs around the mining area. Therefore, in densely 
populated areas like Guangdong, local gentry and farmers were often opposed to mining 
operation. Gejiu and Yunnan province, in contrast, enjoyed environmental and ecological 
advantages, since the southwest borderland was scarcely populated and the land had a high 
density of forest coverage.18 Furthermore, the subtropical climate enabled forests to regenerate 
faster.19  
The need for wood and charcoal created a new supply chain. Merchants hired laborers to 
cut down trees, burn the trees into charcoal, and ship the timber and charcoal to mining sites.20 
The charcoal was traded by local Yunnanese and the indigenous Yi participated in the production 
of charcoal. According to the provincial commissioner of Yunnan province Zhang Yunsui #ŗ 
                                               
17 Eugene N. Anderson, Food and Environment in Early and Medieval China (University of Pennsylvania Press, 
2014), 172. 
18 Li, Mengzi Xian zhi, 3a. 
19 The best charcoal for mining is pine charcoal, made from Yunnan pine (Pinus yunnanensis), a local specie found 
in Yunnan, Guizhou, Sichuan, and Guangxi provinces in China. Yunnan pine grows faster than other kinds of pine 
trees. Other subtropical trees could also be used to make charcoals. 
20 Hans Ulrich Vogel, “Copper Smelting and Fuel Consumption in Yunnan,” in Hirzel and Kim, Metals, Monies, 
and Markets in Early Modern Societies, 147–48. 
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(1693-1751), by the mid-eighteenth century: “The Yi-ethnic people had no knowledge of 
building furnaces and smelting, and can only burn wood to make charcoals, plant vegetables, and 
raise livestock. They like to trade with miners to enjoy the profits.”21 The local traders then ship 
the charcoals by caravan to Gejiu. In the early twentieth century, the charcoal trade was 
dominated by merchants from Jianshui County and Shiping County.22 
Although Yunnan initially enjoyed high forest coverage, mining and smelting still had an 
impact on local ecology. According to the calculation of Yang Yuda Ǒȿΐ, copper mining 
destroyed approximately twenty percent of forest in northeast Yunnan from 1726 to 1855.23 The 
data in Gejiu before the twentieth century is not available, but the deforestation around tin 
mining areas was similar to that around copper mines in northeast Yunnan.24 Before the 1910s, 
the charcoal and the timbers were carried by mule from Jianshui and Shiping, around a hundred 
kilometers from Gejiu.25 This means that in the nineteenth century, tin mining had already 
destroyed the forests around Gejiu. After the construction of the Gejiu-Besezhai-Shipin (Gebishi 
!÷ʉ) railway, the supply of timber and charcoal extended to areas around the railway as 
deforestation spread.26  
                                               
21 “ō:͖ǘˠȽȼ.Ä˶ɅȳʪǤ̨̞ͧЃɎɫǮ̀łǿ3ƴ.?7q” Zhang Yunsui Ŋb
ϩ, “Zhang Yunsui zougao,” Ŋbϩðʫ, in Fang Guoyu ƪÏɚ, Yunnan shiliao congkan .®Ƨ~, vol. 8 
(Kunming: Yunnan daxue chubanshe, 2000), 683. 
22 Wang, “Gejiu shangye de lishi qingkuang,” 79-80. 
23 Vogel, “Copper Smelting and Fuel Consumption in Yunnan,” 147–48. 
24 C. Patterson Giersch, “Commerce and Empire in the Borderlands: How Do Merchants and Trade Fit into Qing 
Frontier History?” Frontiers of History in China 9, no. 3 (September 23, 2014): 370. 
25 Wang, “Gejiu shangye de lishi qingkuang,” 79-80. 
26 Wang Zhi’an ɔȉą, “Tufa lianxi de zhuyao yuanliao songtan ÒȌȶϏɷ&̸Ƨǔʓ,” in Gejiu wenshi 
ziliao, vol. 4 (1983): 63-64. 
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Precipitation played a key role in mining technology. Too much rain would flood the 
underground tunnels and force the mining to stop. At the same time, ore dressing could not be 
done without water. For example, in 1751, the general-commissioner of Hunan Province, Yang 
Xifu ºŋĈ (1701-1768) reported to Qianlong emperor in a court memorial: “Tin ores needed 
plenty of water to be washed. The Shizhuyuan ·þP and Dongchong ³Ä tin mines located in 
deep mountains that had no connection to lakes or rivers nearby. Once there was a drought, 
miners would disperse immediately.”27 Yang’s report shows that lack of rainfall could bring the 
whole mining process to a halt and even destroy a mining enterprise. 
Tin mining in Gejiu benefited from the subtropical monsoon climate. Compared to tin 
miner in Hunan, the construction of ponds and waterways in Gejiu was similar to hydraulic 
projects in agriculture and was also carried out by Hunan miners. What differentiated Gejiu from 
Hunan is that the rainfall in Gejiu was more predictable. In Gejiu, the rainy season started in the 
fourth lunar month and ended around the eighth. Miners built ponds and canals before the rainy 
season, and dressed ore during the rainy season. During the dry season, although the drought 
inconvenienced miners, it also reduced the cost of pumping water out of the underground tunnel. 
The mining technology extends like “the spider’s web.”28 The web--or ecology--was 
woven by the local resources, ecology, trade networks, and the community of miners, smelters, 
artisans, and traders. The tools were created by artisans; the raw materials consumed in mining 
were brought in through trade routes and trade networks; the charcoal and the timber was 
provided by the local forest, lumberjack, charcoal producer, and caravans. Ore dressing was 
                                               
27 Yang Xifu ǥοː, court memorial, QL 16/10/12, The First Historical Archives of China, 02-01-04-14532-013. 
28 Tim Ingold, “When ANT Meets SPIDER: Social Theory for Arthropods,” in Being Alive: Essays on Movement, 
Knowledge and Description (London, New York: Routledge, 2011), 89-94. 
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conducted through a collaboration between local climate and miners. The site of tin mining 
technology is not limited to Gejiu, nor to the knowledge and skills of miners and smelters. It was 
situated in the collaboration and negotiation between local ecology and the community and trade 
networks that developed around the mining industry. 
Mining practice changed the local landscape and ecology, transforming the local 
ethnographic landscape and indigenous livelihood. Roads, bridges, and waterways were built to 
support the transportation of minerals and consumed materials. New towns were built for in-
migrant Han Chinese miners. Tunnels and shafts were built underground. Mountains were 
deforested. Local Han Yunnanese and Yi ethnic groups also transformed their way of life due to 
mining rush: they produced food, clothing, and fuel for miners, and formed professional caravans 
to support mining production. The migrant miners and the mining technology adapted to the 
local ecology and trade networks, while migrant miners and mining practice contributed to the 
remaking of the landscape and ecology of the southwest border of the Qing empire. The 
transmission of mining technology to the southwest border involved more than just a mass 
migration of miners, it also transformed the organization of local society and ecology.  
 
The Social Aspects of the Needham Question 
Apart from tools, the embodied skill of miners, and the local ecology, the development of 
tin mining also relied on social technologies such as financing techniques, labor organizations, 
and mining regulations. Although these problems traditionally belong to the fields of economic 
and legal history, they lie at the heart of the Needham Question, which searches for the causes of 
oriental stagnancy in scientific development. When scholars discuss the rise of the West and the 
stagnancy of the East, they ask three interrelated questions: “Why did China fail to develop 
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modern science?” “Why did China fail to have an industrial revolution?” “Why did China fail to 
develop capitalism?” Western-trained historians tend to asssociate the birth of capitalism and the 
industrial revolution with the development of market economy, financing technology, and the 
legal protection of private property.29 The development of the modern banking and credit 
systems brought commercialization and the rise of modern firms. The civil law securing private 
property encouraged people to accumulate capital and to invest in industries that required high 
fixed capital--the only distinguishing characteristic of modern industrial firm. Investment 
encouraged technological innovation and scientific discovery. Therefore, the technology of 
fundraising and the legal protection for firms are not just problems that belong to the field of 
economic and legal history; they are also keys to the history of science and technology. 
Economic historians like R. Bin Wong, Kenneth Pomeranz, and Bozhong Li have 
demonstrated the “sprouts of capitalism” and the highly advanced market economy in 
eighteenth-century China.30 Scholars of economic and legal history are more interested in 
discussing how China was able to develop a highly commercialized market economy without the 
support of modern banking system and civil law.31 The case of tin mining in Gejiu is a good 
sample to investigate this question. How did the merchants raise funds? How did investors in tin 
mines protect their interests without company law and civil law? How did the mining enterprises 
organize labor? Furthermore, given that there were no law codes regulating mining rights or 
mining operations before the twentieth century, how did the miners and merchants solve disputes 
                                               
29 For example, see Karl August Wittfogel, Oriental Despotism; a Comparative Study of Total Power (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1957); Eric Lionel Jones, The European Miracle: Environments, Economies, and Geopolitics 
in the History of Europe and Asia (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 66–67. 
30 Pomeranz, The Great Divergence. Wong, China Transformed. Li Bozhong, “The Early Modern Economy of the 
Yangzi Delta in a New Perspective,” Social Sciences in China 36, no. 1 (January 2, 2015): 91–109. 
31 Madeleine Zelin, “The Firm in Early Modern China,” 623–37. 
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over mining rights and organize mining operations? Although there were no formal laws or 
regulations made by the Qing state to support and to administer commercial activities in mining, 
the migrant community formed its own rules and regulations to govern its members and had 
formed a highly effective, rational, and pro-business system to develop the mining industry. 
 
The Structure of Investment and the Organization of Labor 
Mining required high-fixed capital to rent the mountains and land. Each site required a 
large amount of rice, oil, wood, and charcoal every day.32 The operation of a large mining site 
cost over twenty thousand taels of silver every year in the late Qing.33 Furthermore, the mining 
production could not provide immediate returns. Therefore, mining required a substantial long-
term investment. Unlike copper mining, tin mining did not receive much attention or intervention 
from the Qing state. The laissez-faire policy on tin mining was a double-edged sword. On one 
hand, the state did not force merchants to sell tin to the state at a fixed low price. On the other 
hand, the Qing state did not offer state loans to tin merchants and miners.34 Therefore, the 
investment in tin mining came mainly from merchants. In the early Qing, local Yunnanese 
merchants lacked capital to invest in mining, therefore most of those investors were merchants 
from Hunan, Hubei, and Jiangxi. It was not until the late eighteenth century that local Yunnanese 
merchants took on an important role in mining in Gejiu. 
                                               
32 Wu, Diannan kuangchang gongqi tulue, 12–13. 
33 Tang Jiong Âȴ, “Chou yi kuangwu ni zhaoji shanggu yanpin dongyang kuangshi shu,” ˃͝ʕƓ«ϬÅ˳ń
˯ǓȐʕĴɱ, in Ge Shijun ̣åȭ and He Changling ͰϓЕ eds., Huangchao jingshiwen xu bian ɹǈˑ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˕ (Taipei: Wenhai chubanshe, 1972), juan 26, 18-19. 
34 Chiu, “Shiba shiji diantong shichang zhong de guanshang guanxi he liyi guannian”; Wang,“Qingdai Yunnan 
tongkuang kaicai zhong ‘dibenyin’ zhidu kao”; Chang, “Qingdai Yunnan ‘fangben shoutong’ zhengce”. 
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Merchants and miners developed financial techniques to raise funds and to pool resources 
to start the mining enterprise. Just like other Chinese firms, the tin mining enterprises in Gejiu 
used a shareholding system.35 However, because most merchants and miners were migrants, the 
shareholding system in Gejiu tin mines was not connected by kinship. The non-kinship 
characteristic of Gejiu tin mining enterprises was similar to the situation that Zelin has described 
in Sichuan’s coal mines.36 The shareholding system in Yunnan mines was called “rice share 
system” (mifen zhi ă+/) or “dan share system” (danfen zhi õ+/).37 
The “rice share system” got its name from the first investors in the mining enterprise who 
needed only to provide oil for lighting and rice for food.38 The amount of rice was measured in 
dan. When the investors opened a new mine, their investments were based on the amount of 
rice.39 Providing one dan of rice meant the investor had one share of the capital. Their 
contribution of capital was recorded in contracts. When the mining site generated a profit, the 
shareholders could get their return based on their shares. According to an eighteenth-century 
local gazetteer, the startup capital to open a new mine pit in Gejiu ranged from ten to twenty rice 
                                               
35 Zelin describes typical shareholding firms in salt industry in China in late imperial China. See Zelin, Merchants of 
Zigong. 
36 Madeleine Zelin, “Eastern Sichuan Coal Mines in the Late Qing,” in Empire, Nation, and Beyond, ed. Joseph W. 
Esherick, Wen-hsin Yeh, and Madeleine Zelin (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006), 105-122. 
37 Dan ʉ is a Chinese unit of volume. Dan was often used in the measurement of grains. The volume of dan varied 
in different periods in Chinese history. The Board of Revenue standardized the measurement of dan to be 2070.938 
cubic centimeters. However, this standardized measurement was only used in the context of taxation. In the context 
of private trade, merchants and traders used a different size of dan, called shi dan ıʉ (market dan), which was 
usually larger than the size of dan regulated by the Qing state. The size of market dan varied in different regions. 
See Guo Songyi Χǔ(, “Qingdai de liangqi he liangfa ȝ>ɷίÈ¼ίȌ,” Qingshi Yanjiu, no. 1 (1985): 6. 
38 Wu, Diannan kuangchang gongqi tulue, 12a. 
39 Ibid, 18a. 
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shares, and a mine pit could have up to seventy shareholders.40 These shareholders or investors 
were called mine owners (donghu , literally means shaft housholds).41  
The large number of shareholders indicates that most merchants and investors in Gejiu did 
not have sufficient capital to start a tin mining enterprise. Mining has always been a capital-
intensive industry. The land lease, the construction of the mining tunnels, and labor all required 
large sums of capital, since mining could not provide an immediate return. To solve this 
problem, miners and investors in Yunnan developed techniques to minimize startup capital. 
These techniques formed a sophisticated system to pool resources without having to start with a 
big sum of cash. 
The most important way to reduce the startup capital was the hiring and the distribution 
system called “true brotherhood” (qinshen ĮĿ).42 There were two forms of hiring in Yunnan 
mining enterprises were true brotherhood and “monthly work” (yuehuo ­Ë). Monthly work 
referred to wage laborers who were paid monthly. It was used to recruit less skilled temporary 
laborers. Most underground miners were hired through the true brotherhood system.43 True 
brotherhood created a seemingly harmonious and equal labor-capital relationship.44 Mine owners 
called miners “brothers” (dixiong %), and the miners called the mine owners “pot headmen” 
                                               
40 Han, Mengzi xianzhi, 12a. 
41 Ibid, 12b. 
42 Wu, Diannan kuangchang gongqi tulue, 15a. 
43 Yang Yuda, “Silver Mines in Frontier Zones: Chinese Mining Communities Along the Southwestern Borders of 
the Qing Empire,” in Nanny Kim and Keiko Nagase-Reimer ed. Mining, Monies, and Finance in East Asia, 1600-
1900: Mining, Monies, and Culture in Early Modern Societies (Brill, 2013), 108–9. 
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(guotou Ōŝ) since they provided the food to the miners. The miners received no minimum 
wage for their work. Instead, they shared the profits from the ore they excavated.45  
The system of true brotherhood minimized the startup capital of the investors, because the 
investors initially needed only to provide basic food and shelter to a small number of miners. As 
miners started to find rich mines and as the adits went deeper into the earth, more miners, enticed 
by the promise of high profit, would join the mining enterprise. 
The true brotherhood was also a distribution system. All miners shared 40 percent of the 
surplus profit, the timbering headman got 10 percent, and the investors shared the remaining 50 
percent.46 Undoutedly, this distribution of surplus profit among investors and “true brothers” 
greatly motivated the miners to work longer in mines. If a mine developed several sub-adits, the 
timbering headman and the miners could only take the surplus profit from the sub-adit in which 
they were working. Therefore, the true brotherhood system created both a sense of ownership 
and a sense of competition among miners. The true brotherhood also attracted technical experts. 
Unlike regular miners who engaged strictly in excavation, the timbering headman as the key 
technical expert stood to gain a much higher profit.  
The true brotherhood worked like an extended shareholding system. The distribution of 
profit made the relationship among miners, investors, and the technical experts more like a 
partnership. The skilled miners contributed their labor, the investors contributed the capital, and 
the timbering headman contributed his expertise. The three pooled their resources to run the 
mining enterprise. This partnership was also found in Chinese mining communities in Southeast 
                                               
45 Ibid, 15a. 
46 Han, Mengzi xianzhi, 12b. 
  82 
Asia. In the tin mines in Bangka Island, for instance, the mine managers were called “tiko,” 
meaning “big brothers” in Chinese.47 
As the mining enterprise grew, the mining enterprises also required more capital to support 
additional miners and to construct more mining facilities. The shareholding system provided the 
means to attract more investment. When miners discovered rich veins, one mining adit could 
split into several sub-adits. The original mine owners could invite more partners to take over the 
sub-adits. New partners would sign a contract with the old owners, in which they promised to 
cover the cost of mining in the “guest adit” (kejian ei).48 The investors of the guest adit had to 
pay ten to twenty percent of their profit to the old owners as rent. Several people could invest in 
the guest adit, and they reproduced the rice share system in their partnership.49 The guest adit 
also used the true brotherhood system to recruit laborers and technical experts. The expansion of 
a mining enterprise involved a reproduction or multiplication of the shareholding system and the 
true brotherhood system. The collaboration of these two systems allowed the merchants and 
miners to start mining with limited capital and enabled the mining enterprise to expand from a 
single adit with dozens of miners to hundreds of adits and tens of thousands of miners.  
The fragmented shareholding system led to the development of management system mines. 
Zelin’s research on Sichuan salt industry has shown that although the ownership of salt wells 
was fragmented, the management was centralized and professionalized. Chengshouren 
                                               
47 Thomas Horsfield, “Report on the Island of Bangka,” Journal of the Indian Archipelago, 1848, 299–336, 373–
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See Zelin, Merchants of Zigong, 35. 
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performed as the middleman and the manager to run the salt wells.50 A similar management 
figure could also be found in Yunnan’s mining industry. In Wu’s treatise, the manager of a 
mining enterprise was called “mine manager” (dongzhang ŏ), and was in charge of the 
operation of the whole mining enterprise.51 In Gejiu, the mine headman was called shangqianren 
2.52 Under the mine headman, each adit had its own timbering headman who directed the 
miners. Sometimes the timbering headman had several assistants to supervise the work in each 
sub-adit.53 In this way, the mining enterprise formed a well-developed and centralized 
management system which was responsible for the organization of labor as well as the security 
in mines. 
The fragmented ownership and the complicated profit distribution system led to the 
formation of the bookkeeping system. Each mining enterprise had at least one accountant to 
record the cost, income, and the output of each sub-adit in order to calculate the shared profit of 
each person who was engaged in mining.54  
The culture of true brotherhood and the shareholding system were not only efficient in the 
expansion of a mining enterprise; they also helped to reduce the risks in mining when the 
economic situation of a mining enterprise declined. The true brotherhood system transferred the 
risks of resource depletion from investors to miners. When the mine deposit was showing signs 
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of depletion, or when the cost of drainage and air ventilation exceeded the mining output, the 
true brothers would eventually leave the mines since there was no more potential profit.  
To sum up, the true brotherhood and the rice share system should be considered a social 
technology that was suitable for industries with high risk and high potential profit, especially 
when there was no institutional support such as the modern banking system and the company 
law. In addition, in early modern Southeast Asia, Chinese miners also used the “Kongsi” 
shareholding system to organize mining enterprises; and the culture of true brotherhood was also 
popular.55 The shareholding system and the culture of brotherhood functioned as technologies of 
fundraising, labor organization, recruitment, and risk control. These technologies were embedded 
in the social networks of Chinese mining organizations where they not only enabled the 
development of mining industry in China, but also enabled the movement of mining technology 
from China to Southeast Asia. 
 
The Semi-Autonomous Mining Community and the Seven Chiefs System 
The shareholding system was based on the culture of contracts. Scholars of Chinese 
economic history have pointed out that the culture of contracts guaranteed most of late imperial 
China’s commercial and economic activities.56 Unlike most traditional firms that were based on 
                                               
55 For the discussion of Chinese Kongsi in tin mines in Bangka island, Indonesia, see Mary F. Somers Heidhues, 
Bangka Tin and Mentok Pepper : Chinese Settlement on an Indonesian Island (Pasir Panjang, Singapore : Institute 
of Southeast Asian Studies, 1992). For the origin of Kongsi in Southeast Asia, especially in gold mines in Borneo, 
see Wang Tai Peng, The Origins of Chinese Kongsi (Petaling Jaya, Selangor Darul Ehsan, Malaysia: Pelanduk 
Publications, 1994). 
56 For studies of contract culture in China, see Madeleine Zelin, Johnathan K. Ocko, and Robert Gardella, eds., 
Contract and Property in Early Modern China, 1 edition (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 2004); Valerie 
Hansen, Negotiating Daily Life in Traditional China: How Ordinary People Used Contracts, 600-1400 (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1995). 
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kinships and family ties, the shareholding system of mining enterprises in Yunnan was formed 
by non-kin strangers. What kind of authority guaranteed the enforcement of these contracts?  
The Qing state’s intervention in tin mining was limited to taxation and local security.57 
Furthermore, there was no law code governing mining regulations and mining rights.58 However, 
everyday life and the production in the mining community were by no means harmonious. Court 
memorials from the Board of Punishment and Wu’s mining treatise show several disputes over 
property and mining rights, some of which even led to murder. How did miners settle these 
disputes? What kind of authorities chould they appeal to for arbituation? What regulations were 
used to solve disputes? To answer these questions, we must first understand the social 
organization of Gejiu’s mining community.  
The mining community in Gejiu was different from the Chinese society familiar to 
historians and sociologists. Sociologists like Fei Xiaotong argues that China’s local society was 
bound by ties of kinship and native place.59 Historians such as Terada add that the gentry and 
local customs were important in regulating local community.60 Moreover, the mining community 
                                               
57 Starting from 1707, the Qing state started levy tax on tin and silver mines in Gejiu. The local government sent 
three clerks (shuji ƿ͈) and six guards (xunyi īő) to Gejiu for taxation and security. The clerks and guards 
resided in Gejiu village center and seldom went into mining sites in nearby mountains. See Li, Mengzi xian zhi, 42. 
58 In The Great Qing Code, there is only one statute regulating mining under article 271 “Stealing Rice and Wheat 
from Fields”: “In the case of everyone who mines gold, silver, copper, tin, and mercury without authorization. 
Calculate the value of the illegally obtained property [and sentence according to the value]. If the miners hide in the 
mountains and are armed to resist arrest, if they did not kill or injure anyone, all participants shall be sent to exile. If 
they killed or injured someone, the leader shall be beheaded.” 
59 Fei Xiaotong, From the Soil, the Foundations of Chinese Society: A Translation of Fei Xiaotong’s Xiangtu 
Zhongguo, with an Introduction and Epilogue (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), 30-1. For the 
summary of study on kinship, see James L. Watson, “Chinese Kinship Reconsidered: Anthropological Perspectives 
on Historical Research,” The China Quarterly, no. 92 (1982): 589–622. 
60 Terada Hiroaki ĔɦșƳ, “Min-shin hōchitsujo ni okeru ‘yaku’ no seikaku” ƳȝȌʥĺ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Š
ǚ, in Mizoguchi Yūzō Ȣ¨Ϫ, ed., Shakai to kokka ʖDÏĎ, Shohan, Ajia Kara Kangaeru 4 (Tokyo: Tōkyō 
Daigaku Shuppankai, 1994): 69-130. Terada Hiroaki ĔɦșƳ, “Shindai tochi hou chitsujo ni okeru ‘kankou’ no 
kouzou ȝ>ÒÓȌʥĺ	
‘Ů̯’ǪΛ,” Toyoshi Kenkyu ǓȐ®ʌʭ 48, no. 2 (1989): 130–57. 
Kishimoto Mio’s research also presents how gentries in Jiangnan area influenced the social order. See Kishimoto 
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in Gejiu is comprised of people of different ethnic, cultural, and class backgrounds. Wealthy 
merchants from China proper invested in mines, while local Han Yunnanese, Chinese Muslims, 
and poor migrants from China proper did the mining. Indigenous families in surrounding villages 
supplied miners and smelters with food, clothing, and charcoal.61 Among the miners and 
smelters, there were neither kinship ties nor gentry to sustain the mining community.  
In the absence of a local gentry, stable kinship ties, and intervention from the Qing state, 
the mining community in Gejiu formed a semi-autonomous social field with its own rituals, 
regulations, and governing organizations. In Wu’s treatise, four chapters —“Managers,” 
“Regulations,” “Prohibitions,” and “Rituals” — introduced the structure and the organization of 
this semi-autonomous social field.62 The “Seven Chiefs” system (qizhangzhi ŏ/) was the 
most important organization to regulate the order in each mining site in the local mining 
community.63 
The “Seven Chiefs” system was derived from the labor division and production 
management in mining. The seven chiefs were “guest chief” (kezhang eŏ), “tax chief” 
(kezhang ĵŏ), “smelter chief” (lutou áŝ), “pot headman” (guotou Ōŝ), “timbering 
headman” (xiangtou Ŏŝ), “mine manager” (dongzhang ŏ), and “coal headman” (tanzhang 
                                               
Mio ĥǍˤ˔, Min Shin kōtai to Kōnan shakai: 17-seiki Chūgoku no chitsujo mondai Ƴȝ3ǁȅʖD: 17 
，#ÏʥĺÆϿ (Tokyo: Ǔ8êĀzɊD, 1999). 
61 Giersch, “Commerce and Empire in the Borderlands,” 370. 
62 The semi-autonomous social field is a methodological concept raised by Sally Moore to study legal pluralism. The 
semi-autonomous social field is defined not by its organization but by its procedural characteristic, which 
emphasizes on the social field’s capacity to generate rules and induce or coerce conformity in a bigger legal 
environment. See Sally Falk Moore, “Law and Social Change: The Semi-Autonomous Social Field as an 
Appropriate Subject of Study,” Law & Society Review 7, no. 4 (1973): 719–46. 
63 Wang Song ɔĦ, “Kuang chang cai lian pian” ʕłάȼˀ, in Wu, Diannan kuangchang gongqi tulue, 30b. 
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øŏ). The pot headman, timbering headman, and the mine manager originated from the 
management organization in mines. They were responsible for the finance, technical support, and 
the labor management in mines. In addition, the mine manager settled disputes over mining 
rights among miners who worked in the same mining site but in different adits. The coal 
headman was in charge of the coal supply for the mining site.64 The responsibility of the smelter 
headman, like the mine manager, was to organize production and the division of labor in 
smelting factories.65  
The tax chief recorded the mining output and collected tax in each mine.66 The tax chiefs 
did not belong to the bureaucratic system of the Qing empire. Rather, they were hired by the 
local government as tax farmers. Their term of service was three years at which point they might 
be promoted into the bureaucratic system. To be a tax chief, one needed to be extremely 
proficient in accounting and familiar with the operation of tin mines.  
For example, Liu Shiyan 5ĩ was a tax chief of Maolong Ġŕ silver mine in the mid-
eighteenth century. He worked for three years as the assistant to the previous tax chief to 
complete his training before being promoted. Liu performed well during his appointment, but his 
career path was blocked for more than fifteen years because none of his assistants was qualified 
enough to replace him.67 Liu Shiyan’s example shows that Yunnan’s local government 
developed a system of training technocratic bureaucrats with expertise in mining administration. 
                                               
64 Ibid, 16b-17a. 
65 Ibid, 17a. 
66 Ibid, 16b. 
67 For the case of Liu Shiyan, see the court memorials sent by the Governor-General of Yunnan and Guizhou 
provinces in 1767 and 1781. National Palace Museum (Taipei), document number: 403040444 and 403022770. 
Also, see the memorial by the Governor-General of Yunnan and Guizhou Tuside ÑŞŘ, QL 41/12/12, The First 
Historical Archives of China, document no. 04-01-12-0177-157. 
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Although the tax chiefs did not belong to the bureaucratic system of the Qing empire, they 
belonged to the lowest rung of the system of state intervention into mining and the “contact 
zone” between the mining community and the Qing state. 
It is hard to reconstruct how this semi-autonomous community functioned since most of 
the disputes were solved within the community rather than by the state-level administration. But 
we can still glimpse the administrative process in the mining community through murder cases, 
which were sent to the capital for review. One murder was committed in a copper mine in Huize 
¬Ø County in 1746.  
Lu Xue Ť_ and Li Mao ±Ġ were timbering headmen working under the mine manager 
Sun Liangcai ^ě. Lu Xue was in charge of the No. 1 sub-adit; Li Mao directed the mining 
operation in the No. 2 sub-adit. On the night of the sixteenth day of the eleventh lunar month, Li 
Mao went to steal the ore in the No. 1 sub-adit, which belonged to Lu Xue’s team. However, Lu 
Xue caught him. The next day, Lu Xue and Li Mao bumped into each other in the kitchen. Lu 
Xue accused Li Mao of stealing his ore and threatened to report him to the investor.68 
Li Mao tried to stop Lu Xue from calling the investor and the two men began to fight. 
Before meeting Li Mao, Lu Xue had been pounding salt with an axe. During the fight, Lu Xue 
accidentally struck Li Mao in the head with his axe, seriously injuring him. When mine manager 
Sun Liangcai returned from the market, he found Li Mao. Sun reprimanded Lu Xue and went to 
buy medicine for Li Mao. However, Li Mao died of his wound eight days later. Sun reported the 
murder to the county magistrate.  
                                               
68 See the report from the Minister of the Board of Punishment Akedun Ϟfơ QL 12/11/3. The First Historical 
Archives of China, document no. 02-01-07-04837-003. 
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The murder of Li Mao shows the structure of administration and authority in the mining 
community. The murder was precipitated by an argument over mining rights. As timbering 
headsmen, Lu Xue and Li Mao sought justice from the highest level of management in the 
mining enterprise—the investors. When their conflict became physically violent, the mine 
manager attempted to solve the problem since he was responsible for the safety of the mining 
site. The mine manager did not report the fight to the county magistrate until Li Mao had died. 
This suggests that most conflicts within the mining community stayed inside the mining 
community. When the mine manager reported the case, the county magistrate arraigned the mine 
manager instead of the murderer, because the county magistrate held the mine manager 
responsible for the security of the mining site. In sum, the mining community had created its own 
accountability system in which seven chiefs had the authority to solve most disputes. The seven 
chiefs had taken the place of the Qing state and the migrant community. They replaced the 
gentry families to regulate mining production and solve disputes. 
The most powerful chief was the “guest chief,” literally the leader of migrants. The guest 
chief settled disputes among miners, investors, and traders. Each province had one guest chief, 
and the Hui Chinese Muslims had their own. Although the guest chiefs were elected, the 
government recognized their leadership.69 According to Wu’s treatise, the guest chiefs: 
Handle all the disputes that happened in mining sites. They have to be 
experienced and just to garner the trust and respect of the people so that they 
could pacify the disputes and turn big conflicts to small disagreements.70 
 
The Qing bureaucrats wished the guest chiefs to serve as judges and mediators within the 
migrant community. In other words, the Qing state hoped that the migrants working in the 
                                               
69 Wu, Diannan kuangchang gongqi tulue, 16b. 
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mining site would form their own administrative and justice organization so that most of 
conflicts and disputes could be controlled internally (figure 2.1).  
The rule of guest chiefs was not limited to the mining community, nor was it limited to 
Yunnan. They could be found in migrant communities in China and across Southeast Asia. 
Scholars have found guest chiefs in merchant communities in Sichuan and Taiwan, in mining 
communities on the border of China and Vietnam, and in the mining communities in Southeast 
Asia formed by Chinese diaspora.71 In Lanfang Republic (1777-1888), a kongsi federation 
formed by Chinese migrant gold miners in Western Borneo (today’s Kalimantan in Indonesia), 
the president was also called the guest chief.72 According to Liao Shumin and Liang Yong, the 
Qing state used the guest chief to supplement the baojia system. Although guest chiefs were 
elected by migrants from different provinces, the local officials offered them a designation. The 
earliest record of guest chiefs in Gejiu is in a 1712 land contract. Ten guest chiefs signed their 
names at the end of the land contract as guarantors (pingzhong ) to provide validity and 
authority for the contract.73 In this contract, the role of the guest chief was similar to the role of 
the leader of the baos. The Qing state provided them authority and relied on them to maintain 
local order, while the community in Gejiu relied on them for conciliation and justice.  
 
Regulations and Rituals: The Yunnan Temple 
                                               
71 Liang Yong Ǟ, “Qingdai Sichuan Kezhang Yanjiu ȝ>ÊĩČϓʌʭ,” Shixue Yuekan, no. 3 (2007): 28–35; 
Liang Yong Ǟ, “Chongqing Jiaoan Yu Basheng Kezhang ήůƟǜ̀lʁČϓ,” Shehui Kexue Yanjiu, 2007, 
170–75; Liao Shumin ŁȜƜ, “Qing Dai Gongshang Qunti Zhong de Kezhang ȝ>ĬÅ˥Њ#ɷČϓ,” Guoli 
Zhengzhi Daxue Xuebao, no. 42 (2014): 1–34. 
72 Liao, “Qing Dai Gongshang Qunti Zhong de Kezhang,” 16. 
73 “Zhao Tianjue jiyi bei” ΀ëɇ͈ɮʑ, in Gejiu wenwu gailan, 59. 
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The guest chiefs regulated the local order from guild halls called huiguan ¬Š. Huiguan 
were native place associations that could be found in many of China’s big cities. According to 
Susan Mann, huiguan addressed the “three great concerns” of merchants and sojourners from 
faraway places: “a place to eat, an institutional structure for buying and mourning the dead, and a 
sacred space for sacrificing to patron deities and ancestors.”74 For merchants, huiguan offered a 
place for information exchange and networks. In mining towns like Gejiu, the huiguan was the 
place from which the guest chiefs regulated the migrant community. In a stele memorializing the 
establishment of Guansheng Palace ŐĔf, the guild hall of Yunnanese in Gejiu, the author 
stated its purpose: 
The silver and tin mines in Gejiu particularly brought good fortune to the state 
and benefited people, therefore merchants from different provinces come and go 
like a constant stream. [Migrants] gather like clouds and sound from all over 
China, and they set guild halls as the space to regulate the mining community. 
Inside the hall, [they] burn incense for sacrifices and rituals.75  
 
The inscription explains that the guild hall offered space for the regulation of local order, 
and for rituals and sacrifices. For eighteenth-century miners and merchants, these two functions 
went hand in hand, since the guild halls united gods and the human, and prioritized “the rites and 
righteousness” (liyi üď). The rituals and the sacrifices were means of ordering the community 
and creating harmony between human beings and nature. Therefore, the author of Wu’s treatise 
added the chapter “Rituals” to those on “Regulations” and “Prohibitions” because in the 
epistemology of Qing bureaucrats, rituals were a part of the social technology of mining.  
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The guild hall of Yunnan province was built in 1765 and is now the only surviving guild 
hall from that era (figure 2.2). It is on the southern outskirts of Gejiu town, on the road from the 
town center to the mountainous area where tin mines were located. Until the end of the 
eighteenth century, the building complex was called both Guansheng Palace ŐĔf and the 
Yunnan Province Guild Hall (Yunsheng huiguan řó¬Š). It is now known as Yunnan Temple 
(Yun miao ř~).76 The dual naming system suggests the dual function of the temple as a space 
for rituals and for autonomous administration. Before Yunnan guild hall was founded, Gejiu 
already had at least three guild halls in Hunan, Hubei, and Jiangxi provinces. The guild halls of 
Hunan and Hubei provinces were called Guansheng Palace.77 This is probably because 
Guansheng, also known as Guan Yu ŐĐ, is the guardian of merchants and the deity of wealth. 
Jiangxi merchants had a guild hall in the Longevity Palace (wanshou gong ĤVf).78 Fujian 
merchants, however, chose to worship their local deity Mazu and build their guild hall Mazu 
Temple (Tianhou gong XFf) in the city of Mengzi.79  
The construction of the Yunnan Temple shows the source of authority and power in this 
semi-autonomous social field. It gives us an example of how the power of migrant leaders and 
support from the state authority collaborated to legitimize local authority. In 1765, Zhou Enmin 
                                               
76 The stele memorializing the founding of Yunnan Province guild hall called it Guansheng Palace and the Yunnan 
Province Guild Hall. See “Guansheng gong bei ji,” in Gejiu wenwu gailan, 59. The bronze bell casted in 1784 had 
the inscription of “Yunnan Province Guild Hall” (Yunsheng huiguan ϰʁ、Ѕ). In the local gazetteer finished in 
1791, the Yunnan Province Guild Hall was called Guansheng Palace. This evidence shows that until the late 
eighteenth century, the building complex had two names at the same time. Li, Mengzi Xian Zhi, 163. which means 
that the Guansheng Palace Gejiu wenwu gailan, 19. 
77 Li , Mengzi Xian Zhi (Nanjing: Fenghuang chubanshe, 2009), 163. 
78 Ibid, 164. 
79 Ibid, 162. 
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HÀ, a Yunnan merchant, realized that merchants from other provinces had their own guild 
halls, while merchants from Yunnan did not have. He therefore proposed building the Yunnan 
Province Guild Hall in Gejiu. More than ten merchants agreed with Zhou and raised funds for 
the project. However, they did not have the land.80 Tang Lian Ïæ, the Expectant Appointee of 
the Vice County Magistrate (houbu xian zuotang"ĪċsT), had just arrived in Gejiu to take 
charge of mining administration.81 After listening to the Yunnan merchant leaders, Tang 
approved a piece of land for the guild hall.82  
When the construction was completed in 1783, the merchant leaders invited Chen Shilie œ
Ý (1707-1789), a Yunnanese who had risen to the position of the Academician of the Grand 
Secretariat and the Vice-Minister of the Board of Rites, to compose an essay to memorialize the 
founding of Yunnan guild hall. In addition, the migrant leader invited the magistrate of Zuoyun 
sř County Zhang Jiugong 7, probably a good calligrapher, to write down Chen’s essay 
and inscribe the calligraphy on a stele. Three bureaucrats who administered the tin and silver 
mines, including Tang Lian, signed the essay.83 
The composition of the ex-high officials and the signatures of the Qing bureaucrats shows 
how the Qing state participated in the construction of local order. Although the Qing state did not 
intervene directly in local economic and civil activities, it still supported the semi-autonomous 
local authorities. The support from the state was mostly nominal, but it legitimized the authority 
                                               
80 Chen Shilie, “Guansheng gong bei ji,” Gejiu wenwu gailan, 60. 
81 Ibid, 60-1. 
82 Ibid, 60. 
83 Chen Shilie, “Guansheng gong bei ji,” Gejiu wenwu gailan, 61. 
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of local migrant leaders and associations, who maintained local order through actual practices. In 
sum, the Qing state and the merchant leaders co-constructed the space of authority in Gejiu.  
 
Mining Regulations and Mass Agreements 
Before the Qing court enacted the first mining law in 1898, no law codes regulated mining 
production in the Great Qing Code. The seven chiefs in Yunnan regulated the mining practice 
and the mining community based on customary law. The author of Wu’s mining treatise 
introduced the relationship between state’s law codes and customary mining regulations: “The 
officials rule based on the precedents (li ), while the commoners abide by regulations (gui ĭ). 
Regulations covered the void that was not stipulated by the state’s precedents. The custom that 
has been passed down for generations can indeed remain salient for a long time.”84 The 
relationship between the law codes and the customary law were a reflection of the power system 
formed by the state’s authority and local autonomy: the customary law supplemented the state’s 
law codes, just like the Seven Chiefs system supplemented the vacuum of the state’s 
administration. 
In Gejiu, miners and merchants followed their own customary law—mining regulations. In 
1798 the leaders of the Gejiu mining community codified and inscribed the ten regulations on a 
stele (figure 2.3). According to the preface of the inscription, by the end of the eighteenth 
century, the leaders of the mining community in Gejiu realized that as the customs varied from 
place to place, they needed to standardize their regulations so that all the miners and merchants, 
regardless of where they were from, could follow the same rule. Therefore, in 1789, the leaders 
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of the mining community gathered to agree on ten mining codes. Then they inscribed the 
regulations in the stele in the hope that the regulations could be followed by posterity.85  
The codification of the customary law imposed a unified code of conduct upon miners and 
merchants from different native-places and cultural backgrounds. It shows that the mining 
industry in Gejiu had developed to a stage that the migrant miners and merchants were so closely 
connected in their social and economic life that the differences in customs were not enough to 
regulate such a unified and sophisticated community. 
The ten regulations covered production, trade and taxation. The first, second, and eighth 
codes regulated mining rights. Mining started with leasing the land. The lease guaranteed the 
mining right to a certain piece of land. According to the eighth code, the land lease had to be 
signed before the tenth month of each year, and excavation could not begin until the lease had 
been signed, to “prevent disputes over mining rights.”86 During excavation, sometimes miners 
would abandon a pit when the output was too low, and other miners might take it over. However, 
this often led to disputes: the old mining group would sometimes come back and claim the 
mining right when the new team started to have output. Therefore, the first code stipulated that 
“If a sub-adit has not been excavated for over three months, it is considered as an abandoned 
sub-adit; if a mine is not worked for over three years, it is considered as an abandoned mine, no 
matter whether the mine pit is old or new.”87 By setting a time limit, this regulation prevented 
disputes between old and new mining groups. At the same time, it encouraged miners to make 
use of idle mining resources.  
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The murder of Li Mao shows that the theft of ore between miners working in the same 
mine but different sub-adit often led to violence. Therefore the theft of ore was prohibited under 
mining regulations. According to the second code, the distribution of the profit must be based on 
contract. Miners should not encroach on other miners’ adits or covet the profits from other pits.88 
Apart from solving disputes over mining rights, the ten regulations protected the interest of 
investors. The investors trusted mine managers to direct the operation of excavation, so it was 
possible for the managers and miners to defraud the investors. Therefore, the third, fifth, ninth, 
and tenth codes were intended to protect the investors’ interest. The fifth and tenth codes 
stipulated that managers and miners could be sentenced to death for stealing ore, rice or oil.89 
The third code required middlemen to report every potential sale of ore to the investors. No sale 
could be conducted without a certificate from the investors.  
The ninth code was related to the debt between the investors and the managers of a mining 
enterprise. If a mining enterprise ran a deficit, the manager had to sign a clearing debt statement 
(qingfei Íş) with the original investors before contacting other investors for more capital. 
When the mine generated a surplus profit, the manager had to pay off the debt to the original 
investors before sharing the profit with new investors. Although the process sounds complicated, 
this code regulated the transfer and redistribution of shares. The debt statement was similar to an 
agreement on the transfer of shares, in which the old investors agreed to redistribute their shares 
and receive the arrears once the mining enterprise had recovered from loss. The debt statement 
thus guaranteed the return of capital investment and minimized the old investors’ losses. 
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Moreover, the redistribution of shares allowed a deficit mining enterprise to absorb more capital 
investment which could help it recover from difficult conditions. 
The mining regulations in Gejiu also covered the trade of ore and tin ingots. The third code 
specified that the trade of ore could not be done with the sale certificate. The fourth code 
standardized the measurement of tin ore. The fifth code forbade the trading and shipping of tin 
ore from Gejiu, and threatened ore smugglers with death.90 The seventh code regulated the trade 
of tin ingots. All tin ingots had to be shipped to an official institute for weighing. Anyone who 
falsified the weight and quality of tin ingots would be sentenced to death. 
Among these ten codes, three were about mining rights, four protected the interest of 
investors, and four were dedicated to protecting trade. In other words, the mining regulations in 
Gejiu placed more emphasis on protecting the interests of merchant and traders than on resolving 
potential conflicts over mining rights. The people behind these regulations were undoubtedly 
merchant leaders, meaning that most lawmakers were investors and traders who were speaking 
for their own interests. More importantly, the protection of investors’ interest and trade 
contribute to the sustainability of Gejiu’s tin industry. The protection of investors’ profit and 
capital investment secured the investors’ confidence and thus attracted more capital investment. 
The restriction on ore trade gave Gejiu a monopoly on the tin trade. The standardization of 
measurement eased the tin trade among merchants from different regions of China, and the 
guarantee of quality and weight protected the reputation of tin ingots in the national market. In 
sum, these regulations were meant to promote Gejiu’s tin mining industry and local economy. 
Apart from the interest of investors and traders, the mining regulation protected the interest 
of the Qing state. Of the three codes (5, 6, 7) that made some crimes subject to the death penalty, 
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two (6 and 7) were related to taxation. So far there are no surviving records that mention whether 
or not the seven chiefs had imposed the death penalty, but the tone of the codes certainly 
suggests that the leaders of this semi-autonomous community paid serious attention to the state’s 
interest in taxation.  
The taxation was made during the trade of tin ingots and the amount of tax was calculated 
by the weight of the tin ingots. Traders needed to have a tax receipt issued by the Office of 
Provincial Commissioner to pass the customs so that they could ship the tin ingots to other parts 
of China.91 Therefore, by restricting the trade of ore and the smelting process inside Gejiu, the 
sixth code banned the smuggling of tin ore. The rule on weighing the ingots in the official 
institute was designed to prevent tax evasion. The seriousness about taxation indicates that 
although the Qing state was almost absent from the social and economic life of the mining 
community, community leaders still had to, and were eager, to collaborate with the state, because 
they needed at least nominal support from the state to enhance their authority. 
The formation and the content of mining regulations in Gejiu showed the warp and the 
woof of local authority. The regulation was created by merchant leaders through “public 
discussion” (gongyi 'ķ) Support from the state and mass discussion legitimized and codified 
the authority of the regulation. Terada has pointed out that the legal order in village communities 
in China was co-constructed by the state’s law codes and the “village contracts” (xiangyue 
ą), agreements spontaneously established by mutual consent among village members.92 The 
                                               
91 The Qing state collected tin tax based on the weight of tin ingots using tin tickets (xipiao οʜ). The tin ticket was 
issued by the Office of Provincial Commissioner as a tax receipt. Every 2160 catties of tin ingot needed one tin 
ticket. Merchants who wanted to ship tin ingots outside of Gejiu must have the right number of tin tickets as the 
certificate for tax. For the meaning of tin tickets, see Han, Mengzi xian zhi, juan 3, 10a. For the content of the stele, 
see Zhang Rulin, “Yongyuan bei ji ȂΠʑ͈,” in Qingdai de Kuangye, 604. 
92 Terada Hiroaki, “Min-shin hōchitsujo ni okeru ‘yaku’ no seikaku,” 69-130. 
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mining regulation in Gejiu was similar to the village compacts in China proper: on one hand, 
they were formed through mutual agreements among commoners; on the other hand, they relied 
on the state’s authority and represented the state’s interest.  
The mining regulations in Gejiu were amended in1887 and 1890. The content of the ten 
codes remained but details were added. Local government was deeply engaged in the creation of 
both amendments. The drafts were composed through discussion in the mining community, and 
the drafts were sent to the office of county magistrate and the office of the prefect of Lin’an Ėa 
prefecture. After receiving the letter of consent from the government, the community leaders 
inscribed the amendments on the steles as customary laws in Gejiu. The formulation of the 
amendments not only shows how community leaders and the state co-constituted local legal 
order, it also clarifies that towards the end of the nineteenth century, the process of mutual 
agreement enabled the Qing state to promulgate the law in migrant communities.  
As a customary law, the mining regulations in Gejiu filled a void in civil law in the Great 
Qing code. They protected and encouraged long-term investment by protecting the investors’ 
interest, and they facilitated the trade of tin. Moreover, they offered principles and rules to solve 
disputes over mining rights and reduced the potential for violence, thus providing a secure 
background for the mining industry. Thus, the mining regulation were not merely a way to 
maintain order within the mining community. They were more of a technology that ensured the 
prosperity and development of mining in Gejiu. 
 
The Concept of Technology in the Early Modern Context 
The discussion of social organization and legal order in the semi-autonomous community 
helps us to answer the Needham question and its counterparts in economic history and legal 
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history: how could China develop such a capital- and labor-intensive mining industry in the 
absence of certain legal and social facilities? The shareholding system and the “true 
brotherhood” made it possible to raise funds and pool resources, so that investors and miners 
could start a capital-intensive industry in the absence of a modern banking system.  
The Seven Chiefs system not only provided a centralized labor management system, it also 
supplemented the state administration in the social and economic life of the migrant community. 
The mining regulations in Gejiu, in addition, filled a void in the Great Qing Code and functioned 
as the mining law, company law, and civil law to regulate the production and the trade of tin.  
Jacob Eyferth’s research on Jiajiang paper makers shows us that technology was more than 
just tools, recipes, and embodied skills. The “secret” of success in paper making was situated in 
the labor organization, financing techniques, and trade networks embedded in social networks.93 
In tin mining, the shareholding system, the culture of “true brotherhood,” the Seven Chiefs 
system, the guild halls, the rituals, and the mining regulation embedded in the semi-autonomous 
mining community constituted the social technology of mining--they provided the techniques of 
fund raising, labor management, and institutional facilities to regulate mining and trading 
activities.  
The semi-autonomous social field was not particular to the migrating mining community in 
Gejiu, but also existed in the mining communities of the Chinese diaspora in Southeast Asia. The 
organization of Kongsi originated from the semi-autonomous mining community and shared 
some features of the migrant mining community in Yunnan. The Kongsi was a fund raising 
organization, a form of labor management, and a political entity for the autonomous rule by 
                                               
93 Eyferth, Eating Rice from Bamboo Roots. 
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Chinese migrants.94 On the one hand, Kongsi allowed migrant miners to pool their capital and 
labor so that the Chinese could open larger mining enterprises than indigenous people. On the 
other hand, the autonomous rule within the Chinese mining community enabled Chinese miners 
to maintain the production and social order despite differences in cultural background and 
changing political conditions outside the community. On the island of Bangka, although the 
regime changed from sultans to the British East Indian Company and again to the colonial 
government of the Dutch East Indies, the Chinese miners’ community still managed to maintain 
a stable social organization and to continue its production by collaborating with different 
regimes.95 The semi-autonomous mining community and the social technology of mining that 
organically embedded in the organization of the community facilitated the transfer of mining 
technology from China to Southeast Asia. 
If the social technology made the mining technology movable, then the ecology of mining 
technology constituted its particularity. The landscape, climate, and natural resources provided 
the peripheral but necessary materials for mining. Moreover, the ecology was more than just 
nonhuman elements. Local indigenous communities, trade networks, and even infrastructures 
such as the waterways, roads, and bridges built by Qing states, all contributed to the ecology of 
mining technology in the southwest borderland of China.  
Social technology and ecology were as important as embodied skills and tools. All three 
aspects were indispensable parts of tin mining technology in Gejiu in the eighteenth and 
                                               
94 De Groot’s research on the Kongsi in Borneo is the first comprehensive study on the organization of Chinese 
Kongsi. See Jan Jacob Maria de Groot, Het kongsiwezen van Borneo: eene verhandeling over the rondslagen den 
aard der chineeseche politieke vereenigingen in de koloniën (‘s-Gravenhagen: M. Nijhoff, 1885). The Chinese 
Kongsi in Borneo has even developed to a republican political entity called “Lanfang Republic” in the seventeenth 
century. 
95 Heidhues, Bangka Tin and Mentok Pepper. 
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nineteenth centuries. If we look back at the content of Wu’s mining treatise, we can find that the 
content of Wu’s treatise precisely covered these three aspects of mining technology. Of the 
sixteen chapters of Tools of Mines, the first seven describe the tools and embodied skills 
pertaining to mining and smelting. The last nine cover the social technology of fund raising, 
labor management, and the autonomous administration of the mining community. Although 
ecology seems to have been left out of the treatise, the records about shipping routes and 
shipping cost in mining administration manuals, the discussion of deforestation and the anxiety 
about the drought and flood in court memorials all show bureaucrats’ concern with the ecology 
of mining. In sum, in the epistemology of Qing bureaucrats, the realm of mining technology was 
much bigger than our post-industrial understanding of technology--it included the miners’ 
embodied skills, tacit knowledge of nature, social organization, and ecology. Moreover, in the 
eyes of Qing bureaucrats, compared to skills and tools, the ecology and the social organization of 
mining were more deserving of attention and occupied a larger space in their knowledge system.  
The emphasis on the social technology of mining was not unique to China. The experience 
of industrial revolution in the West has limited our concept of technology to the excellence of 
artisans’ craft, the advancement of tools, and the development of mechanization. However, when 
the English East Indian Company seized the monopoly over tin mining in Bangka from the 
Dutch in the early nineteenth century, they paid no attention to tools and machines. Although the 
British had already installed steam machines in Cornwall’s tin mines, they did not even think 
about applying this “advanced” machinery in Bangka. Instead, the British were more concerned 
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with the improvement of social technology of mining: they discussed offering a better loan 
system to Chinese miners and importing more Chinese laborers from Canton.96  
In 1850, the Dutch engineer Croockewit still considered the “indigenous” mining 
technology of Chinese miners in Bangka to be sufficient and requiring no improvement.97 
Croockewit was later proven wrong, but at least until mid-nineteenth century, the knowledge 
structure and the epistemology of Qing bureaucrats still shared many similarities with those of 
their European colleagues.
                                               
96 Raffles Letter to Supreme Governor Lord Minto, 4th August, 1812, Indian Office Records IOR G/21/61 (2), 
British Library. 
97 Johan Hendrik Croockewit, Bangka, Malakka, Billiton (‘s-Gravenhage: Fuhri, 1852), 41. 
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CHAPTER THREE  
Foreign Tin from Bangka: Trade, Migrations, and the Transmission of Mining Technology 
from China to Southeast Asia 
Bangka is a small island that lies to the east of Sumatra, south of the Malacca Strait. It is 
separated from Sumatra by the Bangka Strait, which connects Sumatra and the outer Java Sea. It 
commands the mouth of the Mosi River, the artery of Palembang’s trade route (map 1).1 Located 
at the southern entrance of the Malacca Strait, Palembang controlled the trade routes between the 
Indian Ocean, the South China Sea, and the Java Sea from the seventh century.2 At the beginning 
of the eighteenth century, Bangka’s strategic location and its tin deposits drew the attention of 
international traders. The island’s tin became an important commodity in the China trade. From 
the eighteenth to the nineteenth centuries, Bangka tin was important not just to European traders, 
but also to the monetary policy of the Qing state (Chapter Five). The demand for tin from the 
Chinese market and the European traders attracted Chinese laborers to Bangka where they 
worked in the tin mines. As a result, this small island became a node for the transmission of 
mining technology from China to Southeast Asia.  
                                               
1 James Jackson, “Mining in 18th Century Bangka: the pre-European Exploitation of a Tin Island,” Pacific 
Viewpoint, vol. 10, no. 2 (1969), 29. 
2 For example, archeologists have discovered a nine-century ship in Palembang which was built in the Red Sea and 
but had sailed between South China Sea and Indian Ocean. See Michael Flecker, ed., The Tang Shipwreck: Art and 
Exchange in the 9th Century (Singapore: Asian Civilisations Museum, 2017). 
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Map 1. Location of Bangka Island 
 
In this chapter, I discuss the movement of mining technology in the context of global trade 
and the Chinese migration network. The history of science and technology has experienced the 
global turn and the travelling turn in the past decades.3 Instead of offering a progressive narrative 
of scientific and technical developments, historians are now interested in exploring the 
transmission, exchange, and circulation of knowledge, skills, and material objects.4 In addition, 
scholars have acknowledged that western contemporary technosciences and indigenous 
knowledge systems should be placed on the same footing, since they are all assemblages of local 
knowledge and do not exist outside of their social and cultural networks.5 Therefore, by 
examining the transmission and movements of science and technology we can comprehend the 
                                               
3 For the global turn, see Fa-ti Fan, “The Global Turn in the History of Science,” East Asian Science, Technology 
and Society 6, no. 2 (June 1, 2012): 249–58. For the travelling turn, see David Turnbull, “Travelling Knowledge: 
Narratives, assemblage and encounters,” in Marie Noëlle Bourguet, Christian Licoppe, and H. Otto Sibum, eds., 
Instruments, Travel and Science: Itineraries of Precision from the Seventeenth to the Twentieth Century, 1st edition 
(London ; New York: Routledge, 2002), 273-294. 
4 Fa-ti Fan, “The Global Turn in the History of Science,” 251. 
5 Helen Watson-Verran and David Turnbull, “Science and Other Indigenous Knowledge Systems,” in Sheila 
Jasanoff eds., Handbook of Science and Technology Studies, Revised edition (Thousand Oaks, Calif: Sage 
Publications, 1995), 116. 
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ways in which knowledge traversed geographical, cultural and social boundaries. Furthermore, 
the travelling narrative allows us to clarify the connections and networks that eased the 
transmission of knowledge and to identify the hurdles in its path.  
I approach the transmission of mining technology from China to Southeast Asia through 
the networks of trade, migration, ecology, and social organizations. I will start by describing the 
patterns of the tin trade to show the demand of tin on the China side, and how Bangka tin started 
to enter China through the Dutch East Indian Company (VOC), the British East Indian Company 
(EIC), and the Chinese junk trade. The shipping and mining of Bangka tin was by no means a 
European invention. Scholars such as Janet Abu-Lughod and Hamashita Takeshi have shown 
that a pre-modern world system across Eurasia existed in the thirteenth century, well before the 
formation of the hegemonic European world system.6 The European establishment of the Asian 
trade networks in the sixteenth century should be considered an integration into the regional 
circuits of Indian Ocean, East Asia, and Southeast Asia.7 The case of Bangka mining is a perfect 
example of the way in which global connections and international trade could not have been 
formed without non-European actors, and how the rise and flourishing of the VOC cannot be 
discussed without mentioning the Chinese migrants and junk trades. 
I will then go beyond the scope of global trade and discuss the transmission of mining 
technology from China to Southeast Asia. The movement of Chinese miners and mining 
organizations deconstructs national boundaries and reveals a new geographic macroregion 
                                               
6 Janet L. Abu-Lughod, Before European Hegemony: The World System A.D. 1250-1350 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1991). Hamashita Takeshi, Mark Selden and Linda Grove, China, East Asia and the Global 
Economy: Regional and Historical Perspectives, (New York, NY: Routledge, 2008). 
7 Hamashita Takeshi further points out that the tribute-trade system formed the world order and the interdependent 
trans-regional economic system that connected Southeast Asia and East Asia from the fourteenth century to the early 
twentieth century. Its implication was so strong that the Europeans, the Japan Empire, and the US all had to take 
efforts to engage in and to reform the system. See Hamashita, China, East Asia and the Global Economy. 
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around the South China Sea that was linked by trade connections and natural resources. The 
Chinese miners brought with them Chinese mining technology, which helped them dominate the 
local mining industry. How did the Chinese mining technology travel from China to Southeast 
Asia? What enabled the geographical transmission of technology? What contributed to the 
Chinese dominance of mining? To answer these questions, I will take a comparative approach 
and analyze the transmission of mining technology through three comparisons.  
First, I compare the Chinese and indigenous mining technology to identify the factors that 
contributed to the success of Chinese miners. Then I compare the Chinese mining technology in 
Yunnan and in Bangka to find the similarities between the two regions and to ask why highly 
autonomous yet exploitative mining corporations existed in both regions. Finally, I compare the 
understandings of technology between the Chinese bureaucrats and European colonizers to show 
how their conceptualization of technology changed around the 1850s. I argue that the 
transmission of technology entailed more than a simple transplantation of tools and skills. Here I 
define the social organization of Chinese miners as the social technology in mining. I argue that  
it was the social technology that enabled the movement of mining technology and contributed to 
the technology advantages of Chinese miners. As a labor- and capital- intensive industry, mining 
implied the capitalist characteristics of the Chinese mining organizations, which in return 
contributed to the success of Chinese mining corporations in the age of global capitalism. 
 
“Foreign Tin” in the Age of Maritime Trade 
Scholars working on Canton trade in the past 150 years have tended to focus on luxurious 
commodities and artifacts like tea, porcelain, lacquerware, export paintings, or clocks; and most 
scholars have emphasized the social, literary, cultural, and technological changes brought by the 
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trade in luxury goods.8 Tin, as a ballast metal, is often neglected by scholars working on 
maritime trade. However, as I will show, the trade in tin was far from minor. China had to import 
large amounts of tin as early as the eighteenth century to produce everyday items, and the 
Chinese government had to rely on imported tin to issue its currency. 
In 1740, the Qing court began a currency reform: it started to issue green money (qingqian 
), which contained about five percent tin, to replace yellow money (huangqian ).9  As a 
result of this reform, the Board of Revenue asked Guangdong province to deliver 150,000 jin 
of tin annually to the metropolitan mint (jingju 	)  in Beijing.10 However, this reform was 
untenable due to the shortage of domestic tin in Guangdong. According to a 1740 survey made 
by the provincial commissioner of Guangdong province Wang Mo  (1668-1754), there was 
a shortage of domestic tin on the market of Guangdong, but plenty of foreign tin (yangxi Èŋ) 
shipped by foreign traders from outer oceans (waiyi yangshang ).11 Two years later, the 
governor of Guangdong province, Wang Anguo  (1694-1757) reported to Beijing that 
although the Guangdong government had opened more tin mines, domestic output still lagged far 
behind the demand.12 Therefore, he suggested to “wait for the foreign ships to come to Canton in 
                                               
8 Liu Yong, The Dutch East India Company’s Tea Trade with China, 1757-1781 (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 21. Brewer 
and Porter eds, Consumption and the World of Goods. Crossman, The Decorative Arts of the China Trade. 
9 Gaozong chunhuangdi shilu WÍţcĆðvgŊ (Xinjing: Da Manzhou diguo guowuyuan, 1937), juan 121, 
23a. The Qing court changed the alloy contents of its currency as a response to the currency shortage in the early 
eighteenth century. The details of the reasons and process of this currency reform will be explained in Chapter Five. 
10 Qinding daqing huidian shili, Jiaqing chao ¼dWÍ¬) (M®) (Scripta Sinica database), juan 684, 21a. 
11 Wang Mo ä, court memorial, QL5/8/23, The First Historical Archives of China, No. 04-01-35-0123-15. 
12 Ideally, the Guangdong government would tax the miners in Guangdong 30 percent of tin output (20 percent as 
mining tax and 10 percent as fees) and ship the taxed amount to Beijing. However, Wang Anguo pointed out that 
even though the court has issued orders to open new mining sites and to search for new tin deposits, the tin tax could 
  109 
the seventh and eighth lunar months, and to purchase the rest [of tin] to ship [to the metropolitan 
mint].”13 The Board of Revenue approved this suggestion, and after 1750 it became a regular 
practice for the Qing court to purchase foreign tin annually to issue its currency.14 The currency 
reform reveals important information about how the Qing court relied on international trade and 
foreign tin for its monetary system. The “foreign tin” mentioned by Qing officials was actually 
Bangka tin, and the “foreign traders from outer oceans” were the VOC traders. 
Scholars working on Dutch trade in Asia have pointed out that the VOC used tin as a 
substitute for silver to trade for tea and porcelain with China.15 A contract dated 1760 between 
the VOC and the Hong merchants shows that the tin sold by the Dutch was called “pan-gâ tê 
siah” åãĢŋ (tea tin from Bangka) (figure 3.1).16 As the name suggests, the Chinese demand 
for tin was closely related to the tea trade. The exportation of tea increased the demand for tin in 
China. Pewter, a tin alloy, had the quality of not adulterating the taste of its contents, so it was 
used for the interior linings of the wooden chests in which tea was exported.17 Pewter caddies 
were also used for high-end tea products (figure 3.2). The Chinese also used pewter to produce 
everyday dining vessels, teapots, wine pots, candlesticks, cosmetic boxes, and tin foils that were 
                                               
not reach the need of metropolitan mint, and the Guangdong provincial government had to purchase the rest from 
the market. 
13 “UǍĸl。ϘȐ̈）.ɀƣͷ΁.ª̯õÀ;̓”Huke tiben, cited from Qingdai de kuangye, vol. 2, 
616. 
14 Qinding daqing huidian shili, Jiaqing chao, juan 684, 21a.  
15 Els M. Jacobs, Merchant in Asia: The Trade of the Dutch East India Company during the Eighteenth Century 
(Leiden: CNWS Publications, 2006). Liu Yong, The Dutch East India Company’s Tea Trade with China, 1757-
1781. 
16 Contract (in Dutch) dated 29 August 1760, National Archives, The Hague, 1.04.02: 4384, 476-7, cited from Paul 
van Dyke, Merchants of Canton and Macao (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2011), plate. 03.03. 
17 Ernest Sydney Hedges, Tin in Social and Economic History (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1964), 95. 
  110 
burnt in ancestral worship rituals. The mining ban in China proper that started in the early Qing 
greatly decreased domestic tin output. Even after the Qianlong emperor (1711-1799) lifted the 
ban in 1739, the output in Guangdong was far from sufficient to meet the demand from the 
Chinese market.  
The Europeans were not the first to trade in foreign tin from Southeast Asia. The Chinese 
merchants were already familiar with tin from the Malacca Strait through the long-standing intra-
Asia trade. Fei Xin  (1388-1436?) and Ma Huan 
 (active 1414-1451),  who participated 
in Admiral Zheng He’s (1371-1433) voyages, recorded that tin was already being produced in 
Siam, Malacca, and Sumatra.18 The VOC followed the intra-Asia trade routes and established its 
tin trade when it took over Malacca in 1641.19 In the eighteenth century, Palembang became the 
major supplier of tin to Batavia after the Dutch signed a series of agreements with Sultan 
Kamaruddin (r. 1714-1724), by which the Sultan promised to deliver a large quantity of Bangka 
tin at an extremely low price to Batavia in 1722.20  
The Dutch started the regular trade of large quantities of tin to China. At the beginning of 
the eighteenth century, the Dutch sold tin to Chinese junks that came to Batavia. In 1734, after 
realizing that “Batavia goods” were being sold at a much higher price in Canton, the VOC 
started to send ships loaded with tin and other goods from Southeast Asian to China to sell them 
in Canton.21 “Batavia goods,” including tin from Bangka, gave the VOC a great advantage in 
                                               
18 Fei Xin ĺ (1388-1436?), Xing cha sheng lan, £»:į  (China: Lu Ji Yan shan shu yuan, 1544), juan 2, 1a, 
2b. Ma Huan Ţ½ (active 1414-1451), Yizhengtang dingzheng ying ya sheng lan Tı¾ÙÌ:į, Xuxiu  
siku quanshu č N|&ª, vol. 742 (Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 2002), 12a-16a, 17b-19b. 
19 Heidhues, Bangka Tin and Mentok Pepper, 3. 
20 Jacobs, Merchant in Asia, 215.  
21 According to Liu Yong, from 1735-1756, the High Government in Batavia would sent ships from Batavia to 
Canton. From 1757, the China Committee controlled by the Gentlemen Seventeen took over the trade. The ships 
would sail directly from the Dutch Republic, make a stop at Batavia, loaded with “Batavia Goods,” and sell to 
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their competition with other European traders.22  Through the second half of the eighteenth 
century, the VOC used tin as the supplement of Spanish silver coins to fund the China trade.23 
The amount of tin shipped to China by VOC was considerable. In the mid-1750s, the annual 
average delivery of tin from Bangka to Batavia was around 20,000 piculs per year 
(approximately 2,450,000 pounds).24 From 1758 to 1759 alone, VOC sold 1,668,071 pounds of 
Bangka to Hong merchants in Canton.25 
The Dutch traders were not the only source of Bangka tin. Although the VOC tried their 
best to monopolize the tin trade with Malay sultans through contracts and agreements, the 
Chinese junks and the British East India Company (EIC) never stopped shipping tin from 
Malacca and Palembang. In 1777, a Dutch report estimated that the English took over 500,000 
pounds of tin from the Malacca Straits.26 From 1810, Sir Thomas Stamford Raffles, who later 
became the lieutenant governor of Java, pointed out that the goods from Southeast Asia, 
including Bangka tin, were “the foundation of the Dutch prosperity in Europe,” and suggested 
                                               
Canton. See Liu Yong, The Dutch East India Company’s Tea Trade with China, 1757-1781, 1-50. Liu Yong, “Lun 
1757-1794 nian Helan duihuamaoyi zhong Badaweiya de juese”  1757-1794 
wģ
¢tŁïİĜ, in Nanyang wenti yanjiu, no. 3 (2008): 56. 
22 In 1752, Jacob Mossel, the Governor-General of the Dutch East Indies, pointed out explicitly that the East Indie 
goods, including tin, enabled the VOC to enjoy an advantageous position compared to other European nations, who 
could only trade with Chinese using gold and silver. See Jacob Mossel, “Bedenkingen over den intrinsiquen staat 
van de g'octroyeerde Nederlandsche O.I.C.” (Concerns about the intrinsic state of the Dutch O.I.C.), National 
Archives of the Netherlands, Den Haag, the Netherlands, no. 1.04.02:4747, from Liu, The Dutch East India 
Company’s Tea Trade with China, 1757-1781, 3. 
23 Liu, The Dutch East India Company’s Tea Trade with China, 1757-1781, 50. 
24 J. A. Schuurman, Historische Schets van de Tinwinning Op Banka. (’s-Gravenhage: Algemeene Landsdrukkerij, 
1898), 62. According to Liu Yong, 1 picul equals to around 122.5 Dutch pounds. 
25 Data from Yong, The Dutch East India Company’s tea trade with China, 1757-1781, 178. Other tin might be 
purchased by Chinese junks from Batavia or might be sold to Japan and the Kingdom of Ryūkyū. 
26 According to Reinout Vos, this number was about 78,000 pounds more than the Dutch brought in that year. See 
Reinout Vos, Gentle Janus, Merchant Prince: The VOC and the Tightrope of Diplomacy in the Malay World, 1740-
1800 (Leiden: KITLV, 1993), 213.  
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that the British East Indian Company should take over Java and gain the monopoly of Bangka 
tin.27 As a result, the British controlled Bangka and monopolized the tin trade from 1812 to 1816.  
While the British were intervening in the trade of Bangka tin, the Chinese traders 
continued their trade connection with Southeast Asia. Chinese traders had known the Malacca 
Strait was a source of tin since the fourteenth century.28 Communities of Chinese emigrants from 
Quanzhou Çrand Zhangzhou Õrin Fujian and Guangdong were established in Palembang, 
the Sultanate to which Bangka belonged.29 By the beginning of the eighteenth century, Chinese 
junks had started to ship Bangka tin from Batavia. After 1756, when the VOC limited the amount 
of tin and pepper sold to the Chinese junks in Batavia, the Chinese junks either began to 
purchase tin from indigenous merchants in Riau, or they just smuggled tin procured from small 
illegal markets in Bangka.30 The fact that the Bangka tin was excavated and smelted by Chinese 
miners further eased the smuggling aboard Chinese junks. From a Eurocentric perspective, the 
tin trade was a competition between the Dutch and the British East Indian Company. However, 
in the eyes of Asian traders and miners, the Dutch and the British were new players who intruded 
into the intra-Asia trade system that has been established by emigration and marriage-
connections thousands of years earlier. As I will show, Bangka tin mining would not have been 
possible without Chinese emigration and intermarriage between the Chinese and local sultans. 
 
                                               
27 Thomas Raffles, “Letter to Lord Minto,” Malacca, 18 February, 1811, Mss Eur C35: 1810-1911, 102, London, 
The British Library, UK. Thomas Raffles, “Notes on Trade” Rx. Calcutta, 1810, Mss Eur F148/3, 68, 73, London, 
The British Library, UK. 
28 Fei, Xing cha sheng lan, juan 2, 1a, 2b. Ma, Ying ya sheng lan, 12a-16a, 17b-19b. 
29 Ma, Ying ya sheng lan, 10a-b. 
30 Jacobs, Merchant in Asia, 216. 
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The Start of Tin Mining in Bangka and the Origin of Miners 
There are several local stories about the origin of tin mining in Bangka; the agency of 
Chinese is palpable in all of them.31 According to the most popular narrative, Bangka tin was 
discovered in 1710 when the local natives (probably Orang Gunung, the mountain people) cut 
down and burnt brush to create rice fields. The locals found melted tin ore in the ashes and 
brought the tin to the sultan of Palembang. The sultan’s Chinese expert described the metal, and 
advised the Sultan to open mines and to send Chinese migrants to Bangka.32 This narrative 
suggests that although indigenous Bangkanese might have engaged in mining before the Chinese 
arrived on the island, local productivity remained unknown to the sultan of Palembang or 
international traders. 
The Chinese started to engage in tin mining in Bangka by marrying into the family of the 
sultan of Palembang. Bangka became the dominion of the Palembang Sultanate in the 
seventeenth century.33 Radem Lambu (Sultan Lemabang), later Sultan Mahmud Bararudin (r. 
1724-57), married the daughter of a Chinese convert to Islam when he was in exile in Johor-
                                               
31 According to Schuurman, there are three possible dates 1709, 1710, and 1711 offered for the discovery of tin on 
Bangka. Schuurman, Historische schets van de tinwinning op Banka, 4. For example, Franz Epp, the medical officer 
of the Dutch East-Indies in Bangka from 1836-8, believed that the tin was discovered in 1710. Meanwhile the 
American naturalist Dr. Thomas Horsfield concluded that the tin mining started in 1711 after his extensive survey in 
Bangka in 1812 and 1813. In general, most European scholars and traders in the nineteenth century were convinced 
that there was no tin excavation in Bangka before the eighteenth century. See Horsfield, “Report on the Island of 
Bangka,” 819; Major Henry Court, An Exposition of the Relations of the British Government with the Sultaun and 
State of Palembang, and the Designs of the Netherlands’ Government upon That Country: With Descriptive 
Accounts and Maps of Palembang and the Island of Banca (London: Printed for Black, Kingsbury, Parbury, and 
Allen, 1821), 150.; Franz Epp, Schilderungen aus Ostindiens Archipel (Heidelberg: J. C. B. Mohr, 1841), 183. 
32 Epp, Schilderungen aus Ostindiens Archipel, 183. 
33 Jackson, “Mining in 18th century Bangka,” 29. 
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Riau.34 After returning to Palembang around 1717,35 Sultan Lemabang turned Mentok (Minto), a 
town on the northeast edge of Bangka island, into a retreat for his Chinese wife and her 
relatives.36 The family of the sultan’s father-in-law settled in Mentok, and many Chinese 
followed.37 These Chinese Muslims who have been living in Johor for years are believed to have 
founded Bangka tin mining.38 They gained access to tin mines in Bangka through their marriages 
with sultans of Palembang. These intermarriages continued until the nineteenth century. Even 
under British rule (1812-1814), the sultan of Palembang continued to apply to the British to 
acquire Chinese brides from Mentok.39  
Heidhues argues that intermarriage shows that Chinese ancestry was an asset in the 
Bangkanese tradition.40 At the same time, this custom shows that intermarriage was a powerful 
way for prestigious Chinese families in Bangka to maintain their social status, power, trade 
connections, and safety. These Chinese Muslims who had emigrated to Southeast Asia long 
before the arrival of the Europeans not only had marriage connections with the royal family of 
                                               
34 Horsfield, “Report on the Island of Bangka,” 308-9. Radem Lambu, or Sultan Lemabang was the younger brother 
of Depati Anum. From 1710, there was a faction in the Palembang Sultanate between the young Sultan Departi 
Anum and his uncle Sultan Kamarudin. The VOC decided to support the uncle, so Depat Anum ended up in exile in 
Johor-Riau. Sultan Lemabang accompanied his elder brother to Johor-Riau and married a Chinese wife in Siantan. 
See Horsfield, “Report on the Island of Bangka,” 305-8. 
35 In 1717, Sultan Lemabang returned to Palembang from exile and switched his side to ally with Sultan Kamarudin 
to fight against his elder brother. Then Sultan Lemabang obtained the entire possession of Palembang from Sultan 
Kamarudin to become Sultan Bararudin in 1724.  See Heidhues, Bangka Tin and Mentok Pepper, 5-7. Horsfield, on 
the other hand, believe the transmission was done in 1722. Horsfield, “Report on the Island of Bangka,” 308. 
36 Horsfield, “Report on the Island of Bangka,” 308. 
37 Ibid, 309.  
38 Heidhues, Bangka Tin and Mentok Pepper, 7. 
39 Horsfield, “Report on the Island of Bangka,” 309.  
40 Ibid, 25.  
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Palembang, but also maintained their marriage alliances with chiefs of Orang laut (sea people), 
who lived in ships and were involved in trade and fishing.41  
If Chinese Muslims gained the right to mining through marriage connections, the labor 
force in the mines was primarily made up of non-Muslim Chinese from Chaozhou ×r
(“Teochow” in their dialect) communities in China and Southeast Asia. According to the survey 
conducted by Horsfield in 1812, the administrator of the chief mining district was the descendant 
of a Chinese man named Oen Assing. After the sultan’s father-in-law established the first 
Chinese communities in Mentok, Oen Assing moved to Belo, a town east of Mentok, to establish 
new mining sites. He employed Chinese laborers recruited either from China, or from Borneo, an 
island with longstanding Chinese gold mining communities.42 The origin of Oen Assing is hard 
to trace, but his connection with Borneo hints at his link with China’s Chaozhou region: one of 
the two largest groups working in the Borneo gold mines were the Hakkas from Chaozhou.43 
Even today, the Chinese community in Bangka speaks the Hepo Æ\ dialect,44 which is spoken 
                                               
41 Ibid, 315, 329-333. There were two groups of indigenous people living in Bangka: the Orang laut, literally means 
sea people, and the Orang Gunung, literally means mountain people. Orang laut lived and travelled in their boats 
around the coastal areas of Malaysia peninsula, Singapore, and Riau Islands. They mainly engaged in trade and 
fishing, some engaged in piracy. The Orang Gunung lived in interior Bangka in the mountains. They lived in 
disperse families and did not have centralized authority. According to Thomas Horsfield, the Chinese intermarried 
with a tribe of Orang laut called Rayads, who often engaged in trade and piracy. Although the description might not 
be accurate, it certainly shows how some of the earliest Chinese settlers established their trade connection before the 
coming of Europeans. 
42 Horsfield refers to the Chinese who established Belo settlement as Assing. See Horsfield, “Report on the Island of 
Bangka,” 310. The full name Oen Assing was mentioned in a Dutch source. See F. S. A. de Clerq, “Bijdrage tot de 
Geschiedenis van het Eiland Bangka, (naar een Maleisch Handschrift),” Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land-, en 
Volkenkunde van Nederlandsch-Indië, 45 (2), 1895, 144. 
43 Mary Heidhues, Golddiggers, Farmers, and Traders in the “Chinese Districts” of West Kalimantan, Indonesia, 
(Ithaca, NY: Southeast Asia Program Publications, Cornell University, 2003), 31.  
44 Zhou Xin, “Bangjia manbi xilie (1)” ņ8ÔÿĄ,, Indonesia Sinchew Daily (March 13, 2013), 
http://inindonesia.sinchew.com.my/node/37996tid=13. 
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by the Hakka community from mountainous areas in Chaozhou region, such as Jieyang Ŕ.45 
Many scholars associate the Chinese gold mining community in west Borneo with Hakkas, but 
the differences between Hakkas and Chaozhou people should not be exaggerated. Hakkas 
speaking Hepo dialect were called pansanka or banshanke ĢČ (literally, half-Hakka half-
Teochew), distinguishing them from the “pure” Hakkas from Meixian お and being more 
integrated into the Chaozhou community.46 Here I emphasize the regional connection of 
Chaozhou over the Hakka identity of the miners in Bangka because the regional link outweighed 
ethnic identity in the transmission of mining technology.  
The founding legend of Lim Tau Kian (Lin Daoqian µń,) in Bangka also shows the 
connection between Chaozhou and Bangka. Although early surveys did not mention the name of 
the Chinese father-in-law of the Palembang Sultan,47 local legends, probably created later, 
associated the Chinese Muslim family with Lim Tau Kian, a Chinese pirate and trader from 
Teochew.48 Lim Tau Kian plated deep roots in Patani: he married the daughter of the sultan in 
Patani and built the first cannon there.49 This story is not entirely historically accurate, since Lim 
Tau Kian was active in the sixteenth century, while the father-in-law of Sultan Mahmud 
Bararudin was a man of the eighteenth century. Nonetheless, the legend is a good example of the 
ways in which the different channels of Chinese migration to Bangka are condensed into a single 
                                               
45 Heidhues, Golddiggers, Farmers, and Traders in the “Chinese Districts” of West Kalimantan, Indonesia, 36. 
46 There are several explanations of pansanka, I find Heidhues’ explanation more convincing. Based on my 
fieldwork in Jieyang, the difference between Hakka and local Teochew identity is very small. Most people identified 
with Chaozhou region rather than their sub-ethnicity. 
47 Neither Horsfield, de Clerq, nor Schuurman have mentioned the name of Lim Tau Kian.  
48 Heidhues, Bangka tin and Mentok Pepper, 7. 
49 Wayne Bougas, “Patani in the Beginning of the XVII Century,” in Archipel 39 (1990): 113-138. 
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story. These miners came to Bangka through long-established links between Chaozhou and 
Southeast Asia. The earliest settlers were Chinese traders or even pirates from coastal Chaozhou. 
They had a long history of sailing to Southeast Asia, and they could engage in mining through 
their marriage connections with local Malay rulers. Their Chaozhou compatriots who lived in the 
interior mountainous areas followed their trade routes. The Hepo dialect-speaking people, who 
were poor but had experience in mining in China, followed the junk trade route of their 
townsmen to Southeast Asia to try their luck in mining. 
 
Mining Nomads: The Transmission of Mining Technology from Chaozhou to Bangka 
At the beginning of the nineteenth century, Chinese miners in Bangka attributed the 
introduction of advanced mining technology to Oen Assing, who had connections with 
Chaozhou. According to the Chinese mining administrators Horsfield interviewed in 1812, the 
people Oen Assing recruited from China and Borneo were already “acquainted with the process 
of collecting the ore and refining the metal.”50 In addition, Oen brought mining implements and 
machinery. In particular, he introduced the water management technology, such as the canals, 
waterwheels, and aqueducts. Moreover, Oen standardized the shape and weight of tin ingots.51  
It is unlikely that Oen Assing single-handedly introduced  all of these technologies. The 
legend of Oen Assing’s innovations is like all the legends that attributed inventions to a single 
charismatic leader or a leading scientist. Oen was more likely to have been a well-connected 
trader who brought in miners from Chaozhou or Borneo who were already acquainted with 
                                               
50 Horsfield, “Report on the Island of Bangka,” 310.  
51 Ibid, 310. 
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mining technology.52 The transmission of mining technology from Chaozhou to Bangka was not 
just a movement of tools and knowledge; it was also a reflection of the movement of the mining 
population from Chaozhou to Bangka, and the formation and the reproduction of the mining 
community in Bangka. The movement of Chinese miners was like movements of nomads who 
followed mineral resources and trade routes. The geological similarity of the “tin belt” enabled 
the transmission of mining technology; the mining policy in early Qing forced the miners to 
move to Southeast Asia; and the junk trade networks and the semi-autonomous character of the 
mining community enabled the miners to establish and reproduce their mining organizations in a 
foreign context. 
The geographical similarities between Chaozhou and Bangka facilitated the movement of 
mining knowledge. Bangka is located on the Southeast Asian tin belt, an elongated north-south 
zone extending from present-day Myanmar and Thailand to the Malay Peninsula and 
Indonesia.53 North of the Southeast Asian tin belt is the Southeast China-North Vietnam tin 
province, to which the tin mines of Chaozhou belong. The Southeast China-North Vietnam tin 
province and the Southeast Asian tin belt belonged to the same Malayan-collision type, since 
they share a collision process in their formation and have the same S-type granites (Figure 3.3).54 
                                               
52 According to de Clerq, the Palembang Sultan banished Oen Assing from Bangka because he was engaged in the 
illicit trade of tin with Chinese junks (probably junks of Chaozhou traders). However, in the end, they had to ask 
him to come back to be the Captain of the Chinese because nobody knew the business except from him. Clercq, 
“Bijdrage tot de Geschiedenis van het Eiland Bangka,” 144-7. 
53 Michael O. Schwartz, et al. "The Southeast Asian tin belt," Earth Science Reviews 38.2 (1995):95. 
54 Although the two collision belts shared similar formation process, they did not have the same tectonic settings. 
The Southeast China-North Vietnam tin province were formed through several episodes of continuing rifting from 
the Paleozoic to the Cenozoic, while the Southeast Asian tin belt is formed through a succession of collisions. See 
Charles S. Hutchison, “The Tin Metallogenic Provinces of S.E. Asia and China: A Gondwanaland Inheritance,” in 
Charles S. Hutchison, et al., Geology of Tin Deposits in Asia and the Pacific: Selected Papers from the International 
Symposium on the Geology of Tin Deposits Held in Nanning, China, October 26–30, 1984, Jointly Sponsored by 
ESCAP/RMRDC and the Ministry of Geology, People’s Republic of China (Berlin: Springer, 1988), 232-233. 
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The tin deposits in Northeast Guangdong province and Bangka belong to the category of alluvial 
placer deposit, meaning that the cassiterites were weathered and transported by water, then 
accumulated and concentrated in river banks or valleys.55 Unlike the tin deposits in Yunnan, 
located in hard rocks and require underground mining and tunneling, the placer deposits are 
closer to the surface and better suited to open-pit mining—the method shared by Chaozhou and 
Bangka miners.56 
Miners have been practicing open-pit mining in mountainous areas in northeast Guangdong 
province, such as Huizhou r and Jieyang County Ŕ, for centuries.57 According to a court 
memorial in 1743, the ore in the mines of Guangdong were so accessible that even women and 
children could dig out (paoqu .A) the cassiterite sand (xisha ö) with little effort (sui wa sui 
de ŗŗ).58 This might have been an exaggeration, but the official’s description hinted that 
the miners in Guangdong used open-pit mining, which was much easier than Yunnan’s 
underground mining. Unlike miners in Yunnan who had to build underground tunnels, miners in 
Guangdong could excavate the tin deposits that were close to the surface easily.  
                                               
55 Alluvial placer tin deposits play important roles in Guangdong, Hunan, and some parts of Guanxi in China. These 
placer deposits are located close to the primary tin deposits formed by volcanic activities. See Li Xiji, “Geological 
Characteristics of the Tin Deposits of China and the Basic Methods of Prospecting and Exploration,” in Charles S. 
Hutchison, et al., Geology of Tin Deposits in Asia and the Pacific, 310. In Bangka, although primary tin deposits 
exist, the most studied and mined are placer deposits. See Michael O. Schwartz and Surjono, “The Pemali Tin 
Deposit, Bangka, Indonesia,” Mineralium Deposita 26, no. 1 (1991): 18–19. 
56 The tin deposits in Gejiu are mostly cassiterite-sulphide formed by magmatic intrusion and hydrothermal 
processes. The ore bodies locate in veins in granites. See Yu Jun, Zhou Huaiyang, and Chen Zhugi, “On the Ore-
Forming Mechanism of Some Cassiterite-Sulphide Deposits in South China,”  
57 The most productive tin mines in Guangdong Province in the Qing dynasty were in Boluo County ?Ď, Heyuan 
County ÆÐ, and Yingde County ğ. See the list of mines in Huizhou Prefecture, QL 3, The First Historical 
Archives, 03-1069-009. Jieyang Ŕ, Puning ¦`, and Dabu WS were famous for tin mines. Zhou, (Qianlong) 
Chaozhou fu zhi, juan 39, 63a. 
58 Xu Ben, QL 8/8/22, The First Historical Archives, 02-01-04-13643-005. 
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 If geological similarities made the transmission of open-pit mining technology from north 
Guangdong to Bangka possible, the mining policy in early Qing encouraged miners to leave their 
hometown and sail to Southeast Asia. Most of these miners were poor landless peasants from 
Guangdong.59 There peasants formed highly mobile mining organizations--they gathered when a 
new deposit was found, and dispersed when the deposit was exhausted.60 Some of these 
organizations even maintained armed forces. Consequently, the Qing court considered these 
highly mobile and armed mining organizations a threat to local security. From the seventeenth 
century to the mid-eighteenth century, most mining activities on the east coast of China was 
banned. The local government called illegal miners “mining bandits or mining gangsters” 
(kuangtu ù or kuangdao ùñ ), and chased after them throughout the early Qing.61 As a 
result, some miners had to abandon their hometown, follow the Southeast Asia tin belt and move 
to what is now Vietnam, Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia. From the beginning of the 
eighteenth century, many miners crossed the border between Guangxi province and Vietnam 
where they caused trouble for borderland security in Guangxi.62 A law code of the Later Lê 
dynasty (1533-1789) promulgated in 1717 shows that most mines in northern Vietnam were 
                                               
59 Court memorial from Provincial Military Commander of Guangdong Zhang Pu Ò to Yongzheng Emperor, YZ 
9/03/22, database of Ch’ing Palace Memorials and Archives of the Grand Council, National Palace Museum, Taipei, 
No. 402001025. 
60 Court memorial from Provincial Military Commander of Guangdong Zhang Pu, archive no. 402001025. 
61 For example, see the case from 1737 to 1738, Qingdai de kuangye, 608-9. Also see the Court memorial from 
Provincial Military Commander of Guangdong Zhang Pu Ò to Yongzheng Emperor, 1731, archive no. 
402001025, National Palace Museum, Taipei. 
62 Court memorial from Guangxi Province Chief Commander Zhang Yingzong c, YZ 9/11/01, database of 
Ch’ing Palace Memorials and Archives of the Grand Council, National Palace Museum, Taipei, no. 402002458. 
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operated by Chinese miners,63 most of whom were from Chaozhou and Shaozhou śr of 
Guangdong province.64 Like their townsmen who had gone to Vietnam, the Chaozhou miners 
followed the long-established trade routes in South China Sea to the island of Bangka. 
 In summary, the geological similarities between Southeast Asia tin belt and tin province 
in Southeast China enabled miners to bring their alluvial technology from China to Southeast 
Asia. The mining ban in early Qing dynasty motivated miners to leave their hometown for 
Southeast Asia. The long-established trade routes of Chaozhou merchants in South China Sea, in 
addition to the marriage connection between Chinese and the Malay rulers in Palembang, 
facilitated the movement of mining organizations from Chaozhou to Bangka. The mobility and 
organization of miners from China contradicted the stereotypical image of “traditional Chinese 
people” as farmers attached to their land. Miners were more like nomads who followed mineral 
resources. They left when the mining resources were depleted and moved to new deposits. In the 
first half of the eighteenth century, we can find several waves of migration of mining 
communities moving from central China to southwest and Southeast frontiers of the Qing 
empire. Some moved from Hunan and Jiangxi to Yunnan. Others moved along the tin belt from 
Guangdong to Vietnam, and to Thailand, some even sailed to Bangka. When these mining 
organizations moved from the east coast of the Qing empire where government administration 
was dense, they formed semi-autonomous social organizations or even little kingdoms to 
organize labor and protect the social order outside of the supervision of the state.65 
                                               
63 Chen, Wenwei œÜ, Pan Qingjian ÖÍĂ, and Fan Chun'gui ġ¤¸, Qin ding Yue shi tong jian gang mu 
¼dĽBłōĊò (Taibei: Guoli zhongyang tushuguan, 1969), juan 35, 21a. 
64 Chen, Qinding Yue shi tongjian gangmu, juan 43, 1b. 
65 The semi-autonomous or autonomous social organization could be found in various regions in China as well as 
Southeast Asia. As I pointed out in Chapter Two, the miners in Yunnan had their own semi-autonomous 
organization as the government administration in mining areas was weak. Miners in Guangdong had a history of 
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Chinese Tin Mining Technology in Bangka: Tools, Methods, and Skills 
 Tin mining technology in Bangka resembled mining technology in Chaozhou and Gejiu 
in Yunnan in terms of tools, methods, and organizations. The difference was that miners in 
Bangka did not have to create tunnels and shafts in mountains and rocks. In this section, I 
introduce the Bangka tin mining technology used by the Chinese miners. I will first compare the 
mining and smelting technology in Bangka with that in Gejiu to show the connections. Then I 
will compare Chinese to Bangkanese mining technology to discuss what contributed more to the 
success of Chinese miners.  
 Most European observers in late eighteenth and early nineteenth century considered 
Chinese mining methods superior to indigenous ones, because the Chinese used more powerful 
instruments. However, their assessment was influenced by their standpoint as employers of the 
VOC and EIC. These Europeans were more interested in mining methods that could maximize 
productivity and profit; therefore they valued methods that were the most capital- and labor- 
intensive, and the most exploitative. As I will demonstrate, the biggest difference between the 
Chinese and the indigenous ones is their scale. The Chinese could employ more laborers, use 
more powerful tools, and build more hydraulic infrastructures to excavate deeper than the 
Bangkanese. The Chinese miners adapted the technology and knowledge of water management 
                                               
forming militias. In Southeast Asia, Lanfang Republic in West Borneo was not a single case. At the border between 
China and Burma, Wu Shangxian jļ also built his own little kingdom in the silver mines of Maolong Ġŕ. In 
northern Vietnam, Chinese miners formed their own autonomous communities with militias. See You Jianshe 
k, “Shi xi 17 shiji houqi zhi 19 shiji zhongqi Yuenan fengjian zhengfu de huaqiao huaren zhengce 
´17F¯Ę19¯Ľ>h{ïā,” in Xinan shifan daxue xuebao, (2006, vol. 32, no. 
6): 57. Yang Yuda ßŁ, “Qingdai zhongqi dian bian yinkuang de kuangmin jituan yu bianjiang zhixu: yi 
Maolong yinchang Wu Shangxian wei zhongxin 
Í¯ÓïÀŘ	ìýzŪĠŕ@Gj,” Zhongguo bianjiang shidi yanjiu 
(2008, no. 4): 43-55. 
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from agriculture, and applied machinery like water-wheels and chain pumps to the mining 
industry. However, it does not necessarily mean that the Chinese methods were superior than the 
indigenous ones. Some Chinese used indigenous methods, and some Malays used the same 
machines used by Chinese miners.66 The success of the Chinese miners was largely due to their 
ability to hire a huge workforce, and make a larger initial investment. They benefited from the 
willingness of Chinese migrants to perform highly intensive, exploitative labor. 
 The tin mine deposits in Bangka belonged to the alluvial placer deposit, meaning that the 
tin ore was washed down by water and accumulated in valleys or near streams. The miners only 
had to remove the topsoil to reach the stratum of ore. There were three types of mining methods 
in Bangka: indigenous burrowing, kulit (“skin”) and kolong (“a pit”).67 Burrowing was the 
smallest and simplest operation.68 It was usually performed by Bangkanese but occasionally by 
ethnic Chinese.69 The length of a burrowed tunnel was only one digger’s height and no more 
than 4 to 5 feet in diameter.70 The indigenous method of dressing ore was simple. Miners sieved 
the ore-bearing soil in a braided basket, then put the ore in a wooden box and washed it in a 
stream. The earth was filtered out, leaving the heavy ore.71 This method was done on a small 
scale for short amounts of time. As Jackson has pointed out, the small pit was quickly exhausted 
and the miners had to work near streams. The pit was so shallow that the miners could not reach 
                                               
66 Heidhues, Bangka Tin and Mentok Pepper, 11. 
67 Ibid, 11. 
68 S. Fraenkel, “Beschrijving tot de kennis der tinmijnen van het Eiland Banka,” Tijdschrift voor Nederlandsch 
Indië., v. 5, pt. 2 (1843), 392.  
69 Heidhues, Bangka Tin and Mentok Pepper, 11. 
70 S. Fraenkel, “Beschrijving tot de kennis der tinmijnen van het Eiland Banka,” 393.  
71 Ibid, 393. 
  124 
the ore deposits in lower strata. Furthermore, the lack of water management caused pits to 
flood.72 In the nineteenth century, indigenous mining was limited to remote locations.73  
Chinese miners introduced the kulit and kolong methods.74 Although the Chinese miners in 
Bangka did not engage in underground mining like their counterparts in Yunnan, their 
technology was similar to the “grass cover deposit” in Yunnan. Both kulit and kolong mining 
started with prospecting by an experienced miner with an iron drill or borer, with a small conical 
scoop at the bottom, called jian i (ciam or tjiam in their dialect).75 The name of the drill in 
Bangka is the same to the name of the chisels used by Yunnan miners. The tools were similar: a 
long, pointed iron rod used to penetrate the earth and work on the ore body. Although there was 
no record showing Yunnan miners used jian for prospecting, the fact that the shafts and sub-
shafts that followed the vein of the mine were called jian suggests that jian might have been used 
for prospecting in Yunnan. 
 The miners drove the drill perpendicularly into the ground and the prospector estimated the 
depth of the ore deposit by the sound and feel of the drill. When he reached the ore stratum, he 
drew up the drill and examined the metallic particles brought up by the scoop. If the ore was rich, 
then he ascertained the direction of the vein. If the ore stratum was within ten feet of the surface, 
then a kulit mine was built.76 A kulit mine was small and shallow. Both Chinese and the Malays 
                                               
72 Jackson, “Mining in 18th Century Bangka,” 42. 
73 Heidhues, Bangka Tin and Mentok Pepper, 15. 
74 Fraenkel called Kulit and Kolong mining as the Chinese method. Fraenkel, “Beschrijving tot de kennis der 
tinmijnen van het Eiland Banka,” 393. Heidhues points out that a few Bangkanese also worked in Kulit mines. 
Heidhues, Bangka Tin and Mentok Pepper, 11. 
75 Fraenkel, “Beschrijving tot de kennis der tinmijnen van het Eiland Banka,” 394. Heidhues, Bangka Tin and 
Mentok Pepper, 11. 
76 Court, An Exposition of the Relations of the British Government with the Sultan and State of Palembang, 221-2. 
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worked in kulit mines. A canal was built close to the pit to carry off the upper layers of soil and 
to wash the ore. Some kulit mines used water-wheels and pumps.77  
 If the stratum of the ore was more than 18 feet below the surface, then a kolong mine was 
constructed. Kolong mines were worked only by the Chinese. European observers reported that 
the largest kolong mine was more than 21 feet deep, 480 feet long, and 150 feet wide. The 
kolong mine shared many similarities with the tin mining technology in Yunnan: as the 
excavation went deeper, the Chinese miners had to build sophisticated hydraulic works and 
drainage machinery to protect the mining pit from floods; this kind of mining also required the 
construction of canals and ponds for ore dressing.  
 In Bangka, the kolong mines started from careful planning. Alluvial placer deposits often 
appear in valleys or near streams, so flooding was a serious problem. When a site was chosen, 
the ground was cleaned and a dam called a “peetow” (PY: beitou Œŝ, pond head) was built to 
create a reservoir (figure 3.4). Then the dam diverted the stream into two canals. One canal was 
called “choonchweekoo” (PY: chongshui gou ÄÁÑ, flooding canal), it was used to carry off 
the extra water. The other was called “cheekow” (PY: chegou ŀÑ, water wheel canal), which 
was used to direct the water to drive the water wheel. Right next to the water wheel, the third 
canal, “chungkow” (PY: chonggou ÄÑ, flushing canal) was built to carry away the water 
drained from the mining pit.78 At the low reaches of the major canals, some small canals or 
trenches called “swakow” (PY: shuagou 0Ñ, means washing canal) were built to wash the ore.  
                                               
77 Heidhues, Bangka Tin and Mentok Pepper, 11-12. 
78 Court, An Exposition of the Relations of the British Government with the Sultan and State of Palembang, 230. 
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The most important contribution of the Chinese miners was the introduction of the water-
wheel and the chain pumps (figure 3.5). The water wheel was installed at the edge of the mining 
pit, next to the “cheekow” (figure 3.4). The water wheel was connected to an wooden chain with 
square wooden pallets that rotated around the axis of the water wheel. The other side the of the 
chain dipped into the bottom of the pit (figure 3.5). When the water wheel was turned by the 
water from the canal, the chain drew water up from the mine. The water drained from the mine 
was discharged into the “chungkow” canal and run into the “swakow” where the ore was 
washed.  
Unlike the indigenous Bangkanese ore dressing method, which was done manually in the 
streams, Chinese miners in Bangka used canals and the currents of water to wash the ore. They 
built small canals or trenches (“swakow”) connected to larger canals so that they could recycle 
the water drained from the mining pits and the water from the stream to wash the ore.79 The 
miners laid planks of wood or bark at the bottom of the “swakow.” When the water passed over 
the wood, the heavier particles containing ore sank and the light waste was washed off. At the 
same time, the miners used large spades to move the ore in water, to break up the clay and refine 
the ore. Then the ore was taken out and dried for smelting.80  
The usage of drainage machinery, the construction of canals, and the ore dressing process 
shared great similarity with the mining technology in Yunnan and Hunan. The Chinese started to 
use the chain pump and the water wheel from at least the first century C.E. and the farmers 
                                               
79 Ibid, 227. 
80 Court, An Exposition of the Relations of the British Government with the Sultan and State of Palembang, 227, also 
Thomas Horsfield, “Report on the Island of Bangka,” 813. 
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started to use these two hydraulic machines for irrigation from the Song dynasty (960–1279).81 
The combination of the square-pallet chain pump and the water wheel in Song Yingxing’s (1587-
1666) Tiangong kaiwu (figure 3.6) was almost identical to the drainage machinery used by 
Bangka miners. Both models had a water wheel connected to a pallet chain pump. Water wheels 
were also used for drainage in mining in Hunan. A court memorial in 1779 shows that Hunan 
miners also used water pumps to lift the water from the pit.82 The canal-building technology and 
the construction of ore dressing trench were similar to ore dressing technology in Gejiu, Yunnan. 
Both used the canals to direct the currents of water and built the paralleled walls at the bottom of 
the dressing pond to separate the ore and waste. Lastly, the use of large spade to move the ore in 
Bangka was just like the process of rouhuang  (rubbing ore,  Chapter One) in Gejiu tin mines. 
Hydraulic technology, such as canals, water wheels, and chain pumps, was widely used in 
agriculture in China. Chinese miners transferred and adapted the knowledge and technology of 
water management and machinery from agriculture to the mining industry. Then miners from 
Chaozhou brought the hydraulic technology to Bangka. As most miners were peasants, it was not 
difficult for them to apply farming tools and technology to mining.  
After excavation, the ore was smelted. Bangka’s smelting technology was similar to 
Gejiu’s. The smelting was skilled workers using specialized facilities. First, the ground was 
cleaned and an open shed with two furnaces was built.83 Like the furnaces in Gejiu, those in 
                                               
81 Joseph Needham, Tsuen-hsuin Tsien, and Dieter Kuhn, Mechanical Engineering, Physics and Physical 
Technology, Science and Civilisation in China, vol. 4, part 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965), 339. 
82 Court memorial by the Commissioner Commander of Hunan Province Li Hu ±Î, QL 44/9/24, The First 
Historical Archives, Beijing, no. 02-01-04-17118-006. 
83 Horsfield, “Report on the Island of Bangka,” 813. 
  128 
Bangka were built of clay and salt.84 The furnaces in Bangka were shaped like the tin furnaces 
used in Gejiu in the early twentieth century. The furnace had an oblong form and measured ten 
feet long, four feet wide and four feet high.85 The fire place or the crucible looked like a funnel 
in a pit and occupied the middle part of the furnace. At the bottom of the furnace was a basin for 
the smelted tin (figure 3.7).86  
The most distinctive tool used by Chinese smelters was the bellows, made from the 
hollowed-out trunk of a large tree.87 Although the cylindrical shape of the bellows in Bangka was 
different from the box bellows used in Gejiu, the working mechanism of the two was the same—
both belonged to the double-acting force and suction pump (figure 3.8).88 Two intake valves 
were attached to each end of the trunk. At the middle of the trunk was the outlet valve, which 
was attached to the fire place. A piston with a disc that fit the hollow of the trunk was inserted 
into the bellows. When the bellows was operated by the smelters, while expelling the air on one 
side of the piston it drew in an equal amount of air on the other side. In this way, the bellows 
could provide a constant flow of air to the furnace.89 
The smelting process was the same as the one used in Yunnan. For fuel, the miners in 
Bangka used charcoal made from trees that had been cleared from the mining site.90 The miners 
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either made the charcoal themselves, or hired specialists.91 The smelting was performed only at 
night when it was cooler (figure 3.9). The smelters filled the furnace with hot charcoal, threw the 
tin ore into the furnace, then covered the ore with another layer of hot charcoal.92 When the ore 
was melted, they opened a hole at the bottom of the furnace to let the melted tin flow into a basin 
made of sand and clay. Like their counterparts in Yunnan, the smelters in Bangka cleaned the 
scum and slag with long shovels, scrapers, and pikes, then used the ladle to pour the melted tin 
into moulds to make tin slabs or ingots (figure 3.9).93 One night’s work of one furnace could 
produce around 40 slabs or 20 piculs of tin. In contrast, the indigenous furnace could smelt only 
3 to 7 piculs of tin per night. 94  
European observers of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, such as Horsfield, 
Epp, and Court, attributed the advantage of Chinese mining technology to more powerful and 
efficient tools, especially the water wheel and the bellows. There is no question that careful 
planning of canals and drainage facilities enabled the Chinese to exploit deeper and richer tin 
mines. The water wheel and the chain pump used hydraulic power and increased the efficiency 
of mining. Finally, the more powerful bellows and furnace made Chinese smelters three times as 
productive as indigenous smelters. However, better tools and machinery were just one part of the 
story. The success of Chinese miners and mining technology cannot be separated from their 
ability to mobilize large numbers of workers and to make a substantial initial investment.  
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Both excavation and smelting were labor-intensive and required careful labor management. 
Opening a kolong mine demanded a team of 25 to 40 miners.95 The miners had to first clear the 
forest, build lodges, then build the dams, dig the canals, install the water wheel, and dig the 
mining pit. The water wheel had to be made by specialists.96 During the excavation, miners were 
divided into groups to dig the pit, to carry out the ore, and to wash the ore. Smelting required 
much advance labor: building the shelter, making the charcoal, and constructing the furnace. The 
large bellows was operated by a team of six men working in rotation, three men for each shift 
(Figure 29). During the smelting season, which ran from February to April, the smelters had to 
work through the night.97 
In addition to being labor intensive, mining in Bangka was also capital intensive. The 
construction of the water wheels, canals, the furnace, and the supply of food and the fuel all 
required a substantial capital outlay. The most sophisticated Chinese machinery—the water 
wheel and the chain pump—was built by carpenters who had to be paid in cash by the day. The 
men who operated the Chinese bellows were also paid daily. In contrast, the indigenous miners 
did the excavation and the smelting on their own.98 In other words, the more technically 
advanced machinery would not have been possible without the initial investment. Moreover, the 
Chinese mining method required a long-term investment—in large kolong mines the miners had 
to work for three to four months to reach the ore-containing stratum, and had to wait for smelting 
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season to sell the tin ingots before receiving the return. This means that the Chinese miners had 
to work for months before their mines realized a profit. Most Chinese miners had no more capital 
than the indigenous miners; they also had to pay to emigrate to Bangka, to hire skilled carpenters 
and smelters, to provide the tools, to build the machinery, and to complete the smelting. As a 
consequence, many Chinese miners incurred debts and assumed a greater risk, unlike indigenous 
miners who could just abandon their small pits when they became less productive. 
In conclusion, European traders might have seen the Chinese mining method as superior to 
the indigenous method , as it followed the logic of economies of scale in the pursuit of greater 
output and profits. To the miners, the Chinese method assumed greater risk and was 
subsequently more exploitative than the indigenous method. Moreover, the labor- and capital-
intensive nature of Chinese mining technology demanded more an efficient social technology to 
mobilize labor and capital. In short, the success of the Chinese mining technology lies in its 
ability to meet the demand of global capitalism, and its more technically advanced machines and 
infrastructures relied on the social technology of mining—the kongsi system. 
 
The Social Technology of Mining: The Chinese Kongsi 
 The Chinese mining industry, especially the kolong mines, was organized under the 
structure of kongsi. The term kongsi (PY: gongsi 'C), which means “cooperative company,” is 
used by scholars studying Southeast Asia to describe voluntary associations that served the 
economic, religion, social welfare, and political needs of emigrant Chinese communities.99 
Following the study of Lanfang Kongsi ĨĞ'C or the Lanfang Republic (1777-1884) by de 
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Groot in 1885, many Southeast Asian scholars studied kongsi to understand the self-governance, 
egalitarian culture, and the democratic nature of the Chinese community under the indirect rule 
of local rulers and the colonial government in Southeast Asia.100 Based on the rich scholarship on 
Chinese kongsi by Southeast Asian scholars, I explore  kongsi as a social technology in mining. I 
agree with Wang Tai Peng that the system of kongsi did not originate from the Chinese village 
system, but was a social technology of mining brought by Chinese miners. I argue that kongsi 
provided means to raise funds and to organize labor, thus enabling Chinese miners to fund 
infrastructures like canals, waterwheels, and more powerful furnaces and bellows.  
 I will compare the kongsi with the Seven Chief system in Yunnan to show this 
autonomous social structure was prevalent in mining communities across China and Southeast 
Asia. These autonomous socio-economic corporations shared the characteristics of capitalist 
institutions, providing means to develop capital- and labor- intensive industries in the early 
modern period across China and Southeast Asia. 
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 Each kolong mine was operated by a kongsi, an association of miners. Each kongsi would 
elect a leader, a cook, a gardener, a pig tender, and a bookkeeper.101 The elected headman was 
responsible for managing the labor, settling disputes, and purchasing necessities.102 Once they 
decided on a location to open a mine, they would build their communal housing and purchase 
their food and tools. The water wheel was made by specialist carpenters in the mining group. If a 
mining group did not have a suitable carpenter, they had to hire one who was paid each day.103 
Other specialists like smelters and charcoal burners were also paid by wages from kongsi. The 
smelters were paid according to an established rate for each night’s work, and the charcoal 
burners receive a fixed price for each basket of coal.104 Sometimes the kongsi also hired wage-
laborers (koelie-kongsi) to perform temporary work such as the construction of the canals.  
The kongsi also served as a business partnership and financing system for the miners. Like 
the miners in Yunnan, those in Bangka used a shareholding system to raise funds and to 
distribute the profit.105 As miners voluntarily formed the mining corporation, they became the 
shareholders of kongsi. The shares, called “hun” (PY: fen ), were equally distributed among 
the miners. Therefore, each shareholder shared the profit and the risk of the mining operation 
equally. In addition, the shareholding system allowed other investors, probably Chinese traders 
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or residents of Bangka, to purchase a certain number of shares in a mine. These non-working 
shareholders would hire wage workers to work as their proxies.106  
The shareholding system coexisted with a sophisticated bookkeeping and credit system. 
Since mining required a large long-term investment, they had to advance money from their 
leaders and administrators—the Tikos. The Tikos were descendants of a Chinese father and 
Malayan mother. They were responsible for administering the Chinese miners in their districts, 
advancing money, and buying the tin ingots for the sultan.107 Horsfield described the Tikos as 
absolute rulers. They wielded power over the lives and property of the Chinese.108 The obligation 
and the title of Tiko showed a close connection between the mining organizations in Bangka and 
Chaozhou. Heidhues observes Tiko in Bangka was a variation of “Thaiko” in Lanfang Gongsi in 
west Borneo.109 “Thaiko” is likely a corruption of dage WJ “the elder brother,” a title that was 
used by miners in Guangdong to refer to the leader of the mining organization.110  
Although in principle the Tikos had authority over the miners, in Bangka their main 
function was to supply the capital for mining. The Tikos resided in Palembang and visited their 
districts only occasionally. Each year, the sultan advanced five to ten thousand Mexican silver 
dollars to each of the Tikos, and contracted with them for the delivery of tin at the price of eight 
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dollars per picul.111 Tikos used these money for necessities such as food,112 and they lent the 
money as credit to the miners to pay for the expenses of constructing water works, furnaces, 
buying charcoals, and hiring smelters.113 At the end of the smelting season, the Tikos collected 
the tin at the price of six dollars per picul from the miners. According to Court’s observation in 
early nineteenth century, two-thirds of this payment was made in provisions and merchandise 
received by the miners for their work, and the remaining one-third was paid in tin coin, called 
petis, issued by the Tikos.114 To some extent, the Tikos acted like a modern commercial bank, 
lending capital to the miners to run the mining operation using a sophisticated credit system. 
Since the Tikos seldom came to the mining sites, the day-to-day administration and the 
finance of the mines were done by their agents in Bangka—the Congsee m¯(figure 3.10).115 A 
Congsee (or Kongsy) was the regional administrator of a mining district. Here I follow 
Heidhues’ practice of using Congsee to refer to the person and kongsi to refer to the mining 
corporation.116 Congsee was the agent of Tikos who supervised several mines in a mining 
district; kongsi was a mining organization using the shareholding system to work in one single 
mine. While the miners lived in scattered itinerant mining sites, Congsee lived in fixed 
establishments or villages. In the village lived the people who supported the mining industry: 
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carpenters, blacksmiths, coal burners, smelters, shopkeepers, fishermen.117 Congsee provided the 
miners with rice, salt, oil, clothing, and tools; he also acted as the middleman to support the 
miners in employing skilled workers such as carpenters and smelters.118 The miners were not 
paid for their work—all necessities and payments were recorded by the bookkeepers in the 
Congsee’s accounting books. At the end of the smelting season, the miners sold the metal to 
Congsee at a fixed price and cleared their debts with Congsee. This was done for each mine, and 
each shareholding corporation was considered one body. The debts were settled in the following 
sequence: 
 First, the monthly advances in money and in the necessaries like food and tools; 
 Secondly, the pay of the smelters and his assistants; 
 Thirdly, the price of the coals used in refining; 
 Fourthly, the hire of furnace and implements; 
 Fifthly, the amount of transportation for the metal.119 
 
After the balance was cleared, the remaining profit was divided equally among the miners 
according to the shareholding system. The Congsee also kept accounts for individual miners. If 
the miners had taken private advances from the Congsee, they were called upon to pay them off 
from their individual shares.120  
The Congsee not only supplied the necessities and the artificers to the miners, he also 
recruited the laborers. The Congsee annually sent their Chinese agent by junks from Palembang 
to China to invite able-bodied men to emigrate to Bangka. The agent chose the laborers from his 
hometown, selecting the most capable men. The Congsee paid the cost of the voyage and the 
                                               
117 Horsfield, “Report on the Island of Bangka,” 816. 
118 Ibid, 820-1. 
119 Ibid, 821. 
120 Ibid,  821. 
  137 
establishment in advance, and the miners or artisans had to repay the Congsee from their 
individual shares or wages. Until they had cleared all their debts, they were not permitted to 
leave the mines.121 By the middle of the nineteenth century, a contracted laborer with debts had 
to work for up to three years before being free to join a kongsi as a shareholder (figure 3.11).122 
Before 1812, when colonial rule changed the administration of mining in Bangka, the 
Chinese miners formed an autonomous mining community. The mining organization met the 
needs of a labor- and capital-intensive industry. The Tikos connected the sultan’s court and the 
miners’ community, and acted like a bank. The Congsees were the district administrators and 
provided the network of trade, labor, and artisans to facilitate the mining industry as they 
recruited labor, and supplied the necessities and experts. The bookkeeping technology and credit 
system provided financial tools for the miners to embark on the capital-intensive industry which 
required long-term investment but had no short-term return. The shareholding system 
encouraged the miners and traders to pool their labor and capital resources.  
Due to the shareholding system, the free miners who participated in the corporation 
enjoyed equal status and received equal share of profit. The shareholding miners shared a bond 
and practised democracy in the mining corporation. The headman of a mine was elected in the 
kongsi meeting when the debt was settled. The meeting was a boisterous event: each shareholder 
could shout out his opinion and vote for his preferred headman. Sometimes the meeting lasted 
for eight days until the Congsee or the ex-headman intervened.123 The autonomous mining 
community not only provided the means to raise funds, organize labor, and administer the 
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miners; it also ensured some regional security for the mining district, as miners were organized 
to build fortresses to defend the sea from pirates.  
In sum, Bangka’s mining organization resembled mining organization in Yunnan. First, the 
division of labor in the mines was similar. The head of a kolong mine in Bangka was like the 
mine manager in Yunnan; both organized the labor and were responsible for the security and 
order of the mining organization.124 The smelting process and charcoal production were operated 
by specialists and managed by independent organizations in both places. In Bangka, the kongsi 
outsourced the smelting and the charcoal production to specialists, while in Yunnan, these two 
production processes were managed by the smelter headman and the coal headman. Second, 
miners in both places used the shareholding system to pool limited resources and to distribute the 
profit. In both places, the shareholders enjoyed a degree of democracy: in Bangka, the headman 
of the mines was elected by the miners; in Yunnan, the mining regulations were decided through 
collective agreements among miners and traders. Third, in both places, a leader of the mining 
district mediated between the government and the mining community. The roles of Tikos and 
Congsees in Bangka were similar to that of the guest chief in Yunnan. Both kept the connection 
with the state, while administering the mining district. 
The similarities between Bangka and Yunnan support Wang Tai Peng’s argument that 
kongsi in Southeast Asia originated in mining organizations in China.125 However, this kind of 
autonomous mining organization was specific neither to Yunnan or Bangka, nor to the Hakkas. 
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Similar mining organizations and partnerships were found in mining organizations in 
Guangdong, Sichuan, north Vietnam, at the border between present-day Myanmar and Yunnan, 
and in Malaysia. The miners on the frontiers of the Qing empire were not much different from 
the miners who emigrated to Southeast Asia—both groups were nomads who followed the 
resources, both were migrants and outliers who were isolated from their society. In places where 
the central administration was weak, miners would form this kind of autonomous organization 
because it could raise funds, recruit and organize labor, distribute risks, and guarantee security 
for a capital- and labor- intensive industry.  
As an economic institution and as a social organization that served a capital- and labor-
intensive industry, the mining organization was democratic to an extent, but it was by no means 
egalitarian. In fact, it was exploitative. The shareholding system, on the one hand,  enabled 
miners to start with little capital. But at the same time, it forced miners to exploit themselves. As 
owners of the mining corporation, the miners worked without payment before the mine started to 
generate a profit. The shareholding system also distributed the risk and the cost of mining among 
the miners. Moreover, although the correlated credit system and the loan from the Tikos 
provided the long-term capital to build expensive facilities and pay for the miners’ travel 
expenses, their high-interest loan also put the miners in heavy debt. The Congsee sold necessities 
like rice and oil to the miners, at an inflated price; they also opened gambling and opium houses 
under the same credit system. By the early nineteenth century, a miner could work for a whole 
year and still not earn enough to pay off his debt to the Congsee.126  
Furthermore, although the miners enjoyed some democracy as shareholders, the 
distribution of power and profit was capital-oriented. Before the European colonial intervention, 
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the Tikos gained huge profit from high-interest loans to the miners, and the Congsees controlled 
the miners with debts. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, when the colonial government 
replaced the Tikos to supply the capital and collect the metal from miners, the problem of mine 
debts became worse. Under the Tikos and Congsees, the kongsi still had the freedom to sell the 
metal to the smugglers, and the miners with debts were still able to escape the debts by simply 
running away, like their counterparts in Yunnan. Under the colonial government, the kongsi 
could no longer sell the tin to the smugglers at a higher price. The careful bookkeeping of the 
Dutch also prohibited the miners from escaping the mine debts. As a result, many miners ended 
up working for a year and not getting paid.127  
The power relationship remained somewhat “democratic” and egalitarian due to the 
shareholding system in the mid-nineteenth century.128 But democracy and equality were limited 
to shareholders. As Heidhues has stated, the egalitarianism of kongsi gradually gave way to 
authoritarianism and brutal exploitation as the mining organization expanded.129 As miners 
started to rely on more expensive European machinery to exploit deeper deposits, the cost of 
mining soared. As a consequence, the shareholders changed from miners to merchants who had 
more capital. By the second half of the nineteenth century, shareholding became concentrated in 
the hands of a few investors, most of whom were not miners.130 These bosses were more willing 
to hire cheap laborers called coolies, who received monthly wages.131 These coolies were not 
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shareholders and consequently had no right to the equality in kongsi. The once-egalitarian kongsi 
became blatantly exploitative.  
 
From Social Technology to Machinery 
For Qing bureaucrats who lived at the turn of the nineteenth century, the social technology 
of mining was more important than the tools and the machines. As I argued in Chapter Two, 
Qing bureaucrats paid special attention to the labor division as well as the social organization of 
the miners, and they urged their leaders to regulate mining. Their efforts were not just for the 
regional security of the mining area. They regarded the social technology such as the fund-
raising methods, supply of necessities, and the logistics as the key to increase productivity and 
accumulate the wealth of the empire. Large sums were invested in roads, bridges, and canals to 
ship metal and other necessities. In court memorials, Qing bureaucrats paid special attention to 
the source of investment and commanded local governments to encourage wealthy merchants to 
invest in mining.132 For copper mining, which was essential to the monetary policy of the empire, 
the Qing court made loans to merchants and the control of mining debts became a serious issue 
in the career path of local bureaucrats.133 These actions led to the collection and systemization of 
managerial technologies among Qing bureaucrats, subsequently led to the rise of a technocratic 
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culture in the mid-eighteenth century. In addition, the codified managerial technology and 
practical knowledge became the canon in the political and intellectual  movement of jingshi 
zhiyong ˑ˾ɥ (ordering the world with practical learning) and preceded China’s 
modernization and industrialization projects in the late nineteenth century. 
The emphasis on social technology of mining over tools and machinery was not unique to 
the Chinese; the British and the Dutch colonizers before 1850 agreed with their Chinese 
colleagues. Before the 1850s, instead of improving the mining machinery in Bangka, the Dutch 
and British colonizers reformed its financial system and the management of mines. As early as 
1803, the Dutch representative in Bangka, van den Bogaart, suggested that VOC provide capital 
directly to the miners to open new mines.134 When the British colonial government took over 
Bangka in 1812, they followed van den Bogaart’s suggestion and eliminated the sultan, Tikos, 
and the Congsees as the middlemen, so that they could no longer exploit the miners. The British 
colonial government replaced the sultan and the Tikos in providing the capital to the miners, and 
the British Resident and his officers assumed the Congsees’ responsibility. The British 
government also advanced the funds to build water works and furnaces, and supplied the miners 
at a reasonable price. It also took over the unliquidated debt from the Congsees and allowed the 
miners to pay off the advances with their profit from selling the metal.135 When the Dutch 
colonial government took over Bangka in 1819, they followed the British pattern. By providing 
more capital and improving both the financial system and the supply chain, the Dutch and the 
                                               
134 Heidhues, Bangka Tin and Mentok Pepper, 28. 
135 Court, An Exposition of the Relations of the British Government with the Sultan and State of Palembang, 165-6. 
Also, Indian Office Records, the British Library, London, UK, IOR G/21/61 (2), 148-9. 
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British increased mining output from 1800 to 1850 (figure 3.12).136 
The emphasis on social over mechanical technology was not exclusive to Qing 
bureaucrats; it was a priority shared by the Chinese and European administers before the 1850s. 
Even though the Cornwall tin mines adopted steam pumps in the 1830s, when the Dutch 
engineer Dr. Crookewit visited the tin mines in Bangka and Belitung, he concluded that “the 
Chinese had managed to get the most and purest ore for the least cost and that their means of 
working and smelting the ore could hardly be improved upon, given the conditions in Bangka, 
even by the introduction of machines.”137 The Europeanization of machinery happened gradually 
after 1858, when the ore in superficial strata was depleted. In 1858, the mining engineer 
Akkeringa invented the Bangka drill, which could take a larger and deeper sample.138 The 
improvement of prospecting technology led to the exploitation of deeper mines, which 
consequently increased the difficulty of drainage. In 1891, steam pumps were introduced to large 
mines so that deeper mines could be worked longer.139 The Dutch also introduced the 
Vlaanderen Oven, which used less charcoal and produced more metal from the same amount of 
ore.140 However, as the bellows was driven by water, Vlaanderen Oven could not work in mines 
that were far from a water source. Moreover, the Europeanization of machinery greatly increased 
the investment for mining. As a consequence, miners could no longer afford to be shareholders 
                                               
136 Heidhues, Bangka Tin and Mentok Pepper, 47. 
137 Ibid, 48. 
138 Ibid, 66. 
139 Ibid, 68. 
140 Ibid, 68. 
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who could invest in mining, and the egalitarian relationship between shareholder was replaced by 




The development of mining technology in Bangka offers a more complex example to 
understand the transmission and the innovation of technology. The transmission of technology 
from China to Bangka shows the movement of technology is more complicated than simply 
transplanting tools, methods, and machines from one place to another. The mining technology 
had to move with the mining community, which was the social technology of mining in itself. 
The route of technology transmission was constrained by trade networks, migration networks, 
and ecology.  
The mining technology in Yunnan and Bangka also challenges our modern concept about 
the industrial revolution, capitalism, and modernity. As the success of Chinese miners in Bangka 
demonstrates, technological progress was not necessarily related to machinery production and 
industrialization. Before the 1850s, innovations or improvements in technology were more likely 
to be situated in the improvement of social technology, which determined the fundraising, labor 
organization, and the supply management. At the same time, capitalism was not necessarily 
related to machinery production either. The social organizations of Chinese mining corporations 
in Yunnan and Bangka have already shown the characteristics of capitalist production. Miners 
and merchants formed capital-intensive, profit-seeking, and highly-exploitative mining 
organizations without the installation of machines.  
The emphasis on the social technology is by no means peculiar to China. The Dutch 
colonizers’ reform on the financial and management technology before the 1850s echoes with 
Qing bureaucrats’ interest in the social organization of miners. It suggests that even after the 
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Industrial Revolution, the close connection between machinery production and technologyical 
progress was not a universally shared concept. The change happened only after the 1850s, when 
the Dutch decided to introduce steam engines to excavate deeper mines.  
The experience of Chinese miners should be read as a story about the global expansion of 
capitalism. The internal and external migration of miners show how landless peasants 
transformed themselves to labor forces in the early modern period. The economic and labor 
relations gave them a chance to form a relatively autonomous and egalitarian community, a 
“republic” that the Dutch easily identified themselves with. However, after the introduction of 
machinery production, the increasing investment quickly changed the structure of finance and 
consequently destroyed the illusion of democracy, turning miners from equal shareholders to 
coolies.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Crafting Guangdong Style: Innovations and Technology Transmission in Pewter 
Workshops in Guangdong in the 18th and 19th Centuries 
The tin from Huizhou r [in the Guangdong province] was called high quality 
diantong (Ũŉ)…Its nature was solid and pure, and was the most refined 
[material] for making vessels. The craftsmanship there was also extremely 
exquisite. Artisans from other provinces could not match their skills. The foreign 
tin (yangxi Èŋ) was particularly solid and white. Vessels made with foreign tin 
was like silver ware but would not tarnish over time.1 
 
By the end of the seventeenth century, after his journey to Guangdong Province, Wu 
Zhenfang ·ϳƪ (1651-1710) praised the quality of tin and the excellent craftsmanship of 
pewter artisans in Guangdong to be the best of the whole Qing empire.2 Wu’s observation was 
not a misconception. Throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, local literati and 
authors of local gazetteers in Guangdong celebrated the exquisite craftsmanship of Guangdong 
pewter artisans using the idiom, “Suzhou style, Guangdong artisans.”3 Among the Guangdong 
artisans, those from Chaozhou ×r (near Huizhou) turned out to be the best.4 The local pride of 
these authors was not a boastful statement. During my research trip in museums in China, the 
United States, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands, I found a great number of pewter 
                                               
1 “οzũĪˬ͗)Бζ…Šß˭ȝ.ÈɥǂˆĬ:4ǧˆĭ=ʁ)˶¢*ȐοĜß˭ɵ.
Èòε.'̊͟” Wu Zhenfang ·ϳƪ, Lingnan zaji ĨϮ͈, Longwei mishu edition Жøʣƿ 
(Shimen: Mashi Daqiu shanfang, 1794), 75b. 
2 Pewter is an alloy of tin, lead, and copper. It was widely used to produce everyday objects like table wares, 
offering vessels, candlesticks, and dowry goods.   
3 Qu Dajun ĞêÕ, Guangdong xinyu ŃǓƩ͑ (Tian shui ge, 1700), juan 15, 10b. 
4 Zhou Shuoxun ºʒ ed., (Qianlong) Chaozhou fu zhi ,+ϨȫĪļŜ (1775 edition, reprint 1893), juan 39, 
63a. 
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objects produced by workshops in Guangdong Province piled high on the storage shelves. 
Although most of them were forgotten by museum curators, they initially arrived at their final 
destinations as tributary presents to the Qing emperor, as precious belongings Chinese migrants 
brought from their hometown to Southeast Asia, and as souvenirs that western expatriates 
brought back home.  
Wu Zhenfang’s observation offers us a glimpse of a major innovation in pewter craft of 
that period: artisans used imported materials such as the “foreign tin” to produce pewter objects; 
the exquisite craftsmanship and new styles created by Guangdong artisans were key factors in 
the relocation of the center of pewter production in the empire from Suzhou, the traditional 
heartland, to coastal Guangdong, the center of maritime trade. Chapter Three has shown that the 
foreign was in fact Bangka tin that imported to China through VOC, EIC, and the Chinese junk 
trade. Then how did artisans learned to handle the new material? What did the exquisite 
craftsmanship of Guangdong look like and how did the artisans make innovations? Lastly, what 
enabled the shift of production center from Suzhou to Guangdong, and what enabled Suzhou 
style to maintain its cultural hegemony? In this chapter, I treat pewter objects as a material-
emotional complex. I will show that the Suzhou style pewter was closely associated with the 
craft culture of Yixing clay, the gift culture, and the craft of wen among literati. Its relationship 
to the literati’s nostalgia of Jiangnan culture enabled Suzhou style to maintain its cultural 
hegemony in literati’s discourse. Meanwhile, Guangdong style pewter was welcomed by most 
consumers. I argue that Guangdong style pewter was woven by the threads of international trade, 
the transit of mining technology through Chinese diaspora in Southeast Asia, and Guangdong 
local artisans’ network of craft and skills.  
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I will start with famous artisans in the Ming dynasty to describe the context of the creation 
of so-called “Suzhou style” in the Qing dynasty. Then I will move to the eighteenth-century 
Guangdong to show how Chinese artisans and consumers understood and received the Bangka 
tin. I will introduce pewter objects produced in Guangdong Province to show how European 
silverware and porcelain contributed to innovations in pewter workshops in Guangdong, and 
how the community of local crafts and ecology, together with the transit of craft knowledge 
enabled the innovations in pewter making. I will end this chapter with a discussion about the 
tension between Suzhou styles and Guangdong artisans, which was a result of the power 
dynamics in craft culture. 
 
Pewter before the Qing dynasty and the Formation of “Suzhou Style” 
The history of tin mining and the usage of tin in China can be dated back to the middle of 
the first millennium BC.5 Tin by itself is not a very useful metal as it is too soft and is prone to 
cracking when the object , so it is often used to produce alloys—artisans either add tin to copper 
to make bronze or add lead and copper to tin to make pewter.6 China has a long history of using 
pewter, and the earliest excavation of pewter objects is from late Shang dynasty (roughly 
eleventh century B.C.).7 In the thirteenth century, there were specialized pewter shops on the 
street of Lin’an a (modern-day Hangzhou), the capital city of the Song empire.8 Pewter does 
                                               
5 Golas, Chemistry and Chemical Technology, 97. 
6 Guoli Taiwan gongyi yanjiu fazhan zhongxin  Ðʱ­ȯĬ̫ʌʭɴĠ#ř, “Taiwan xiyi fazhan ji gongfa 
xingzhi fenxi ziliaoku jianzhi jihua ­ȯο̫ɴĠ¢ĬȌ×}ǕͱƧľņˡ͆,” 2008, 2; Golas, Chemistry 
and chemical technology, 97. 
7 Golas, Chemistry and chemical technology, 97. 
8 Wu Zimu ¸˼Ɍ, Meng Liang lu éǞμ, Xue jin tao yuan edition ”Ȕ͇ (Changshu: Zhao kuang ge, 1805), 
juan 13, 4b. 
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not have any scent or smell, therefore Song connoisseurs considered it an ideal material to make 
containers for food and drink. Zhao Xigu ľuť (active. 1180-1240), a member of the Song 
imperial family, believed that pewter was the best material for tea caddies.9 
Although pewter production has a long history in China, most pewter objects that survive 
until the present were produced in the Ming and the Qing dynasties. Excavation evidences show 
that in the Ming dynasty, pewter was used to make candle stands, tableware, wine vessels, and 
ritual objects.10 Pewter’s physical property—the silver color and malleability--allowed artisans to 
use pewter to imitate the form and the style of silverwares. For example, the pewter wine pot 
excavated from Xu Da Ņ’s (1332-1385) tomb imitated the pear shape of silver wine pots.11 
Many excavated pewter objects could find similar silver counterparts. According to the 
sumptuary law of the Ming dynasty, commoners could only use pewter vessels while high rank 
officials and the monarch’s family members could use silver and gold vessels.12 Although the 
sumptuary law became hardly effective in practice towards the end of the Ming dynasty, it shows 
that pewter was used as a cheap substitute for silver among commoners for everyday use. 
Although the major tin deposits in the Ming dynasty were in the provinces of Guangxi, 
Guangdong, and Hunan, the most well-known pewter artisans were from Suzhou and the rest of 
                                               
9 Bennet Bronson and Ho Chuimei, “Chinese Pewter Tea Wares,” Arts of Asia 18, Issue 6 (Jan. 1, 1998). 
10 For example, see archeological evidences from Xu Da’s family tomb and Huang Mengxuan’s tomb. He Jiying I
˞̑ ed., Shanghai Ming mu ȚƳã, (Beijing: Wen wu chu ban she, 2009). Ruan Guolin ϝÏǖ, “Ming 
Zhongshanwang Xu Da jiazu mu” Ƴ#ĢɔŔΐĎƬã, Wenwu, No. 2 (1993): 63–76. Other pewter objects can be 
found in Jingzhou Museum. See Peng Hao ŏș et al., “Hubei Jingzhou Ming Xiangxianwang mu fajue jianbao” ȟ
̗ĪƳるɐɔã¤ƈʻſ, in Wenwu, No. 4 (2009): 43–60. Although pewter was widely used a burial objects 
(mingqi ƳÈ) in the Ming dynasty, archeological evidences show that many pewter objects excavated from tombs 
were in fact used as daily objects before they were buried into tombs.  
11 See Ruan, “Ming Zhongshanwang Xu Da jiazu mu.”  
12 Li Dongyang ǏǓϧ et al, Da Ming huidian êƳ、s (Taibei: Guofeng chubanshe, 1963), juan 62, 1075a. 
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the Jiangnan area, the cultural and economic center of the Ming empire. The development of the 
consumer culture in the Ming dynasty motivated art connoisseurs to write about famous pewter 
artisans in Jiangnan area. According to the notation books of Ming literati, famous pewter 
artisans included: Zhao Liangbi ľěç and Gui Fuchu ¿- from Suzhou ħr, and Huang 
Shang Ŧī and Wang Yuanji ä$E from Jiaxing Mę.13 These artisans specialized in making 
pewter teapots and tea caddies. 
We know little about how the works of these well-known artisans actually looked like due 
to the lack of records. Ming connoisseurs did not leave any description about the appearances of 
the works of those Jiangnan pewter artisans and there were no archeological record of pewter 
teapots made by above mentioned artisans. It was not until late eighteenth century when people 
began to describe the appearance of these Ming pewter works. Eighteenth-century taste makers 
made the names of these Jiangnan pewter artisans tags of collectable antiques, and they created 
the cultural legend of “Suzhou style”—the shape of the pewter teapots was modeled on Yixing 
clay teapots and the surface was decorated with jade and hardwood. 
According to writer Li Dou ± (1750-1816), the famous Ming pewter artisan Zhao 
Liangbi was one who first created this fashion. Zhao modeled the shape of his pewter teapot 
based on Yixing clay teapot, and his practice was continued by Gui Fuchu, another big name 
active in early seventeenth century. In Yangzhou, pewter teapots bearing Gui Fuchu’s name were 
                                               
13 Zhao Liangbi first showed up in Wang Shizhen’s Gu bu gu lu ͂͂μ, see Wang Shizhen ɔͩ, Gu bu gu lu 
͂͂μ, in Jingming baoyantang miji ƽƳĒЀÝʣʴ (Shanghai: Wenming shuju, 1922), 9a. Huang Shang was 
a contemporary of Li Rihua ǏƯ̟ and was active in the seventeenth century. See Li Rihua ǏƯ̟, Weishuixuan 
riji »ȁ΄Ư͈, Jiayetang congshu ÇけÝ§ƿ (China: Nanhai wu shi, 1915-1933), juan 7, 8b. Gui Fuchu and 
Wang Yuanji were active in the seventeenth century and were mentioned by Wen Zhenheng Ƥϳ6 and Zhang Dai 
Ŋģ. See Wen Zhenheng Ƥϳ6, Zhang wu zhi ϓɍŜ, Yueyatang congshu edition ）ϫÝ§ƿ (China: Nanhai 
wu shi, 1849-1875), 6b. Zhang Dai Ŋģ, Tao’an mengyi ϦĿéŲ, (China: Wang Wengao, 1794), 11b. 
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sold at a high price by the end of the eighteenth century.14 In the nineteenth century, the 
imagination of Ming pewter teapots became clearer. Xie Kun ĶU (1784-1844), a playwright 
and an antique collector, gave a more specific description about this seventeenth-century 
artisan’s work: “Gui Fuchu made teapots with raw pewter…[He] used sandalwood to make the 
handle, and used jade to make the spout and knob.”15 The more and more specific and detailed 
description about the characteristics of Gui Fuchu’s pewter work suggests the so-called “Suzhou 
style” acquired coherence in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries; the coherence of the style 
was in fact a creation by collectors and literati-artists at a time when Suzhou began to be eclipsed 
by Guangdong as the center of pewter-making in the empire.  
Li Dou and Xie Kun showed us how Qing collectors understood and imagined the Suzhou 
style in the Ming dynasty: pewter artisans applied the shapes of Yixing clay teapots in their 
work, and mounted jade and hardwood to decorate the pewter teapots. However, their imaginary 
association between pewter and Yixing clay in the Ming dynasty was hardly true. Excavation 
evidences show that Ming pewter teapots were much larger to Yixing clay teapots, and they 
looked more like modern-day kettles than teapots.16 Furthermore, in contrast to contemporary tea 
culture, which considered Yixing purple clay as the best material for teapots, tea authorities and 
collectors in the sixteenth and seventeenth century preferred silver and pewter to Yixing clay.17 It 
was not until the mid-seventeenth century when some taste setters like Wen Zhenheng Ś 
                                               
14 Li Dou ǏƦ, Yangzhou hua fang lu ŻĪɨ̆ŋ (Beijing: Zhonghua shu ju, 2007), 102. 
15 Xie Kun ͘Þ, Jin yu suo sui ΰɓɜʐ (Ganquan xieshi, 1880), 12a. 
16 See He, Shanghai Ming mu; Ruan, “Ming Zhongshanwang Xu Da jiazu mu”; Peng Hao et al., “Hubei Jingzhou 
Xiangxianwang mu fajue jianbao”.  
17 Xu Cishu ͌ǳˋ, Cha shu ̖ɱ, Yanbaotang miji ЀĒÝʣʴ (Shanghai: Wenming shuju, 1923), 6–7. 
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(1585–1645) and Zhang Dai o (1597-1679) started to prefer Yixing clay over pewter.18 
However, Wen still had to admit that pewter teapots made by famous artisans were sold at the 
highest price in the market, which could be compared to the price of bronze antiques.19 Even in 
the eighteenth century, the Qing emperors still had no interest in Yixing clay. Therefore, it is 
unlikely that Ming pewter artisans imitated Yixing clay teapots due to commercial interests, as 
pewter teapots were more popular and more valuable than Yixing clay teapots in the Ming 
dynasty. The close connection between pewter and Yixing clay in Qing collectors’ imagination 
was more related to their contemporary circumstance, when the status of Yixing clay teapot 
started to rise in Jiangnan from the eighteenth century. 
In sum, the verbal and textual descriptions of “Suzhou style” reflects more of a nostalgia of 
Jiangnan culture than a realistic description of the pewter teapots in the Ming dynasty. The 
famous names of Ming pewter artisans quickly became super brand-names chased after by 
collectors. The pewter teapot collected in the National Museum of China with Gui Fuchu’s mark 
on the bottom was one example of the pewter teapots that circulated in the antique market from 
the eighteenth century to the present (figure 4.1). Although it is impossible to determine whether 
this is an authentic Ming piece or a later forgery, it was certainly a material manifestation of how 
antique collectors in the Qing dynasty imagined the Suzhou style. Its knob made of white jade 
and its red sandal wood handle perfectly fit Xie’s description. Its short, cubic body and its 
surface, which was covered under a layer of brown lacquer, imitated the shape and the color of 
                                               
18 Zhou Gaoqi ºЋ;, Yangxian minghu xi ϧ˦̕æˇ (Changzhou: Wujin shengshi, 1897), 1a. Wen, Zhang wu 
zhi, 6b. Zhang, Tao’an mengyi, 11b. 
19 See Wen, Zhang wu zhi, 6b. Zhang, Tao’an mengyi, 11b. 
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Yixing clay teapots. This imitation corresponded to Li Dou’s theory of pewter teapots was 
modelled on Yixing clay teapots.  
Literati-artists and artisans in Jiangnan continued to contribute to the legacy of Suzhou 
style in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Thanks to the promotion and the collaborated 
work of Chen Mansheng "«ê (1768ū1822), Yixing clay teapots became the most wanted 
luxurious tea wares among collectors from late eighteenth century. Artisans in Jiangnan area 
followed the trend of Yixing clay and created a hybrid style of pewter teapots: they added Yixing 
clay linings inside the pewter exterior and appropriated the forms of Yixing clay teapot to pewter 
teapots. Artisans like Zhu Jian ° and Yang Pengnian ºw followed the legacy of Gui 
Fuchu and used jade and hard wood to make the knobs, handles, and the sprout (figure 4.2 and 
4.3).20  
Artisans were able to apply and appropriate the shape and design of Yixing clay teapots to 
Pewter teapots because there was a lot of similarities between the craft Yixing clay and pewter. 
Different from other potters, instead of throwing the clay on the wheel, Yixing potters create 
their works from clay sheets. The technique they use, which includes molding, beating, patting, 
and luting, was more similar to pewter production than pottery production. Contemporary potters 
use a wooden hammer to beat the clay into a thin sheet. Then they cut the sheet into the shape 
they intend and pat the sheet using a wooden spade to shape the round body (figure 4.4). If they 
want to create a square or hexagon body, they cut the clay sheet into pieces and join them by 
luting. Then they lute the spout, handle, and the foot (figure 4.5).21 Research based on 
                                               
20 Modern collectors believe Zhu Jian was the inventor of pewter teapots with Yixing clay lining. See Kuei-hsiang 
Lo, Suk Yee Lai, and Wing Chi Ip, The Stonewares of Yixing: From the Ming Period to the Present Day (London: 
Sotheby's Publications, 1986), 118. 
21 Gu Jingzhou Ёƽ̅ ed. Yixing zisha zhenshang Ċ́ˎʋɖͳ, (HongKong: Sanlian shudian, 1992), 23-24. 
  154 
archeological sources has proved that this technique was already used since the Ming dynasty.22 
Compared to other kinds of pottery, the craft of Yixing clay shared more similarities with 
metalwork. The similarities in techniques enabled artisans to appropriate shapes and forms of 
Yixing clay teapots to pewter teapots.  
The pewter surface, which was soft enough to be carved and inscribed, became a space for 
literati and literati-turned-artists to demonstrate their skills in calligraphy and seal carving. For 
example, the cultural hero of Yixing clay, Chen Mansheng, was famous for inscribing on pewter, 
and the famous artisan Zhu Jian also inscribed on his own pewter teapot (figure 4.2).23 In 
addition to the skill of seal carving, the pewter surface also became a medium for literati-artisans 
and literati-artists to exhibit their poem making skills and a monument of friendship and gift 
exchange. For example, on the surface of the pewter teapot in figure 4.6, a Manchu scholar and 
painter, Guaerjia Zhengliang èâě (1791-1842), inscribed a poem praising tea drinking in 
clerical script.24 On the left side of poem, his inscription shows this teapot was a gift to his sixth 
brother. By carving the poem and the afterword to the poem, Zhengliang transformed the pewter 
teapot from a token of exchange to a monument commemorating his close tie with his younger 
brother. Furthermore, the pewter teapot became a material housing of Zhengliang’s craft of wen 
                                               
22 Wu Zhijuan ¸̌ù, “Mingdai zishani chengpianxing gongyi fazhan yanjiu Ƴ>ˎʋȍŴɉŎĬ̋¤Ġʌʭ” 
(Hangzhou: Master Thesis, Zhongguo meishu xueyuan, 2009). 
23 Peng Yuncan ŏ̭ɞ, Lidai huashi huizhuan Ǹ>ɭ®Ō^ (China: Wu men shang zhi tang, 1825), juan 14, 17a. 
The Palace Museum in Beijing has several pewter teapots of Zhu Jian with his own inscriptions.  
24 Songcha ǔØ was the style name of Guaerjia Zhengliang. Guaerjia Zhengliang was the Assistant Prefect of 
Changzhou ĵĪ. He and his more well-known brother, Guaerjia Binliang ɟɈMƥ̉, were famous for painting. 
Li Fang Ǐƙ, Baqi hualu lƭɭμ ([Publisher unidentified], 1919), 511. 
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(culture, literature, civility), which was reflected by his skills of composing poems, calligraphy, 
and seal carving.25 
The production of wen did not stop with pewter teapots. As pewter teapots with Yixing 
clay lining and knobs made of jade became popular among Jiangnan literati and collectors, the 
production of wen went beyond the making and the exchange of pewter teapots and continued in 
the production of texts and collecting history. Literati composed poems to praise these pewter 
teapots and published their poems in their poem collections. For example, the elder brother of 
Zhengliang, Guaerjia Binliang èâě (1784-1847), was also a lover and collector of 
pewter teapots.26 After receiving two responsorial poems from the scholar-official and the 
painter Yao Yuanzhi [$ (1783-1852), he replied with a long poem with a pewter teapot and 
a tea cup made by Zhu Jian. In this long poem, he praised the craftsmanship of Zhu Jian and 
compared Zhu Jian’s artistic achievement to the well-known silversmith Zhu Bishan in the Ming 
dynasty. At the end of the poem, Binliang wished the elegant pewter teapot could nicely 
supplement Yao Yuanzhi’s collection.27  
The practice of gift exchange, collecting history, and the textual production and 
reproduction that evolved around these pewter teapots worked together to create the cultural 
hegemony of Suzhou style among contemporary collectors as well as in modern-day antique 
                                               
25 Dorothy Ko has shown in her book how inkstones were entangled with the production of elite masculinity, texts, 
and the culture of wen. See Ko, Social Life of Inkstones. 
26 Guaerjia Binliang was the Grand Minister Resident of Tibet (amban in Lhasa), a poem writer, and a painter. He 
had close connection to the circle of Han Chinese literati and literati-artists like Wu Songliang ·ħǞ (766-1834), 
Yao Yuanzhi öc) (1773-1852), and Ruan Yuan.  
27 Guaerjia Binliang, Baochongzhai shiji ƀȇД͏Ϭ ( Hunan: 1879), juan 12, 33a. Sun Yuanxiang ÿる (1760-
1829) had also composed poems about the pewter teapots made by Zhu Jian. See Sun Yuanxiang, Tianzhenge ji ë
ʃϙϬ (China: 1800), juan 29, 3a. 
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markets. The Suzhou style pewter teapot was more than an object or a materialization of the craft 
of wen of its creator, it has also become a signifier of social relations and a boundary marker of 
the so-called literati identity. The participants that created the Suzhou style varied from artisans 
like Yang Pengnian, literati-artisans like Zhu Jian, to high officials like Yao Yuanzhi and 
Manchu elites like Binliang. As social mobility became lower towards the end of the Qing 
dynasty, as it was harder for a man to become an official-scholar, objects like the Suzhou style 
pewter teapots became the cultural symbol of the literati circle. By producing, purchasing, using, 
collecting, writing, or even hearing about it, one could claim his identity to be associated with 
the literati circle, even if he was just a jobless scholar who had to produce and sell teapots for a 
living. 
However, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the influence of the Suzhou style 
pewter teapots was limited to the circle of literati and collectors. Suzhou style pewter did not 
entered the imperial collection and they could not compete with pewter objects produced in 
Guangdong in terms of quantity or the variety of product range.28 Furthermore, pewter artisans in 
Guangdong did not follow the Suzhou style. As figure 4.7 shows, the Guangdong pewter objects 
were whiter and shinier, and Guangdong artisans applied more decorative techniques, such as 
embossing, engraving, and mounting, to their pewter products. If Suzhou style was not the 
inspiration to Guangdong artisans, then what led to the formation of Guangdong style pewter? 
We have to start with the context of maritime trade and the “foreign tin” mentioned by Wu 
Zhenfang. 
 
                                               
28 The pewter teapots with Yixing clay lining collected in the Palace Museum in Beijing were donations from 
antique collectors in the 1950s.  
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The Reception and the Localization of the “Foreign Tin” 
According to Wu Zhenfang, the usage of foreign tin was one of the most significant 
characters of Guangdong style pewter. As I have pointed out in Chapter Three, the foreign tin 
was in fact tin from Bangka (in present-day Indonesia) that was shipped by VOC, EIC, and the 
Chinese junk trade from the seventeenth centuries. The mining ban in China proper caused the 
shortage of domestic tin, and the usage of tin for tea packaging (figure 4.8) further increased the 
demand for tin on the China side. The Dutch found Bangka tin an ideal ballast good to substitute 
for silver in the China trade. The British quickly found the secret of the VOC and started to 
“smuggle” tin from Malacca to China. In 1789, the EIC even tried to export Cornish tin to 
China.29 As a result, from late eighteenth to the nineteenth centuries, one can find domestic tin, 
Bangka tin, and even Cornish tin competing with each other in the Chinese market. 
The Chinese artisans quickly adapted to the physical property of the Bangka tin and the 
Chinese customers in Guangdong like Wu Zhenfang cherished the whiteness and the solidity of 
the Bangka tin. The influence of Bangka tin even reached the Qing court in Beijing. The Ryukyu 
Kingdom (modern-day Okinawa) used Bangka tin as one of the tributary goods to the Qing court 
and the Ryūkyū ambassadors transliterated the Bangka tin as “baigang xi” (î3ŋ).30 The 
choice of Chinese characters for the transliteration demonstrates the physical character of 
Bangka tin: white and solid. When the Yongzheng Emperor (1678-1735) saw the Bangka tin 
1724, he praised the quality of the tin and requested the Imperial Workshops to make wine pots 
with the Bangka tin. The whiteness and silver color of Bangka tin even became a standard for 
                                               
29 George Unwin, Letters, remarks, &c. with a view to open an [sic] extensive trade in the article of tin: from the 
county of Cornwall to India, Persia, and China (London : Printed by W. and J. Stratford, 1790), 8–9. 
30 The Ryūkyū Kingdom played a central role in the maritime trade networks of East and Southeast Asia. It started 
to tribute 1,000 catties of Bangka tin to the Qing court since 1693. 
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high quality tin in Guangdong area. The author of a local gazetteeer of late eighteenth century 
even compared the local tin produced in mountainous areas west of Chaozhou to Bangka tin, 
stating that the local tin was even whiter and more silver like than Bangka tin.31  
Meanwhile, the local workshops did not brand the material as Bangka tin or foreign tin. To 
the contrary, the pewterers in Guangdong claimed the composition of their products to be 
diantong. For example, the Yan Yihe ŞďI workshop located in Chaoyang county in 
Chaozhou prefecture stamped “genuine diantong” (zhenliao diantong ôÛŉ) alongside their 
workshop name as the quality certificate for their products (figure 4.7). Except from the Yan 
Yihe workshop, workshops in Zhaoqing and Fuzhou also used “pure diantong” (jing diantong *
Ũŉ) or “diantong that guarantee usage” (diantong baoyong Ũŉ;ë) to market their 
products. According to the observation of , Chinese artisans have already been very familiar with 
Bangka tin and have even developed a preference to Bangka tin.32 Considering the shortage of 
domestic tin shown in the court memorial and the popularity of foreign tin among customers, it is 
very likely that the workshops in Guangdong actually used Bangka tin in their products marked 
with diantong. However, Wu Zhenfang called domestic tin “diantong.” What does diantong 
really mean? Why did pewterers choose to market their products as diantong instead of Bangka 
tin? 
Qing officials used diantong to refer to tin that was sent as tribute to the capital from 
Guangdong Province. The report from the Provincial Governor of Guangdong Province Wang 
Anguo äaO (1694-1757) to the Board of Revenue reveals that diantong was not a name that 
                                               
31 Zhou ed., (Qianlong) Chaozhou fu zhi, juan 39, 63a. 
32 John Barrow, Some account of the public life, and a selection from the unpublished writings, of the Earl of 
Macartney (London: Printed for T. Cadell and W. Davies, 1807), 509. 
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related to its origin, but a name related to the refining technique. On October fourteenth of 1742, 
Wang Anguo reported to the Board of Revenue that after his research based on previous 
documents, the tin called “diantong” requested by the Board of Revenue was actually imported 
from foreign land. The foreign tin procured this year was of low-purity, so it had to be refined 
and copper added (rongjing diantong à*Ũŉ) to meet the quality requirement of the Board of 
Revenue.33 Wang Anguo’s report indicates that the naming of the material diantong came from 
the technique of adding copper to tin. The green rust on the surface of pewter vessels produced 
by Guangdong workshops (figure 4.7) also proved the existence of copper content in pewter.  
The use of the name diantong exemplified how artisans in Guangdong adapted to the 
imported materials and changed its physical quality to fit their purpose. Pure tin is soft and 
ductile, making it a highly malleable material to be hammered. However, pure tin was prone to 
crack so artisans had to alloy it with other metals to increase its solidity. Most artisans used lead 
to increase the solidity of tin, but lead decreases the silver sheen and the whiteness of tin.34 
Therefore most pewter teapots produced in Jiangnan area were grayer than Guangdong products. 
Guangdong pewterers, instead, chose to use copper to increase the solidity, and thus preserved 
the white color and the silver sheen of tin.35 The whiteness and the silver sheen of diantong, in 
return, became the characteristic and the strong point of Guangdong pewter, because the silver-
like character of diantong gave more room for pewter artisans to imitate silver vessels. The 
                                               
33 Xu Ben ŔǍ, Huke tiben ŷʢϿǍ, QL8/6/22, The First Historical Archives of China, no. 02-171-13642-11. Xu 
Ben was the minister of the Board of Revenue. 
34 “Taiwan xiyi fazhan ji gongfa xingzhi fenxi ziliaoku jianzhi Jihua,” 3-4. 
35 Guangdong artisans might also add lead to tin. They tended to use high lead content pewter to produce objects like 
candlesticks and candle stands, while they use high tin and copper content pewter to produce vessels related to 
dining and drinking. 
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description of Wu Zhenfang suggests that the creation of diantong technique might have 
originated from Huizhou, a prefecture west of Chaozhou with rich tin deposits, at the turn of the 
seventeenth century. Guangdong pewter artisans initially applied this technique to domestic tin, 
then they expanded this technique to Bangka tin. This technique spread to other areas in 
Guangdong and even to workshops in neighboring Fujian Province. To pewter artisans, when it 
comes to marketing, the technical term diantong performed better than foreign tin or Bangka tin. 
On the one hand, diantong implied the refining process and emphasized the solid quality and the 
silver sheen of their products; on the other hand, the wide usage of diantong in the context of 
government documents helped them to target customers from a wider geographical region, 
especially those who were not familiar with the reputation of foreign tin. 
The Guangdong artisans received Bangka tin well, but they gave a cold shoulder to the 
Cornish tin from Britain. Witnessing the success of Bangka tin, the EIC started to ship tin from 
Cornwall to Canton from 1789. In 1790, the EIC factory in Canton offered some samples of 
Cornish tin to the Hong merchant Puan Sequa and tried to persuade him that the Cornish tin was 
of same reputation as Bangka tin.36 However, the competition between the Cornish tin and the 
Bangka tin proved to be a failure. The Cornish tin was always sold at a much lower price than 
Bangka tin, and the EIC traders were convinced that the Chinese customers had a prejudice 
against the Cornish tin.37 When the MaCartney Embassy visited China in 1792, the members of 
                                               
36 East India Company Factory Records, China and Japan: Canton Consultations, 1790, the British Library, 
IOR/G/12/98, 146. 
37 For example in 1814, the Cornish tin was sold at 18 ¾ dollars per picul, while Bangka tin was sold at 21 dollar per 
pical in Canton. See East India Company Factory Records, China and Japan, China and Japan: Duplicates, Canton 
Consultations, 1814, the British Library, IOR/G/12/191, 34, 520-1. 
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the embassy did a survey and found out that the Chinese artisans disliked the lack of malleability 
of Cornish tin because it “is not so easily hammered and beat into leaf as the Banca tin.”38 
The preference over Bangka tin was not a prejudice. Rather, it was due to the techniques 
that Chinese pewterers used to make pewter objects. Unlike European artisans, who often used 
casting to craft pewter wares, Chinese pewter artisans melted down tin ingots, added copper, and 
casted the diantong into thin sheets (figure 4.9). Then they used techniques like hammering, 
embossing, soldering, and filing to make pewter objects (figure 4.10 and 4.11). Therefore the 
Chinese artisans preferred the malleability and the softness of Bangka tin to the Cornish tin as 
Bangka tin was more amenable to their craft technology.  
The softness and malleability of Bangka tin was related to both the geological nature of tin 
ores in Southeast Asia and the smelting technology of the Chinese migrant miners there. As the 
case of diantong and the refining of foreign tin have demonstrated, pure metal did not exist 
outside modern laboratories--all metal ingots traded in the market and used as raw materials are 
in fact alloys. Compared to tin ingots produced in Europe, tin ingots produced in Malaysia, 
Singapore, and Thailand contains higher percentage of tin and lower percentage of antimony, 
making the tin from Southeast Asia softer.39  
The migrant Chinese miners’ smelting technique may have also contributed to the softness 
of Bangka tin. As Chapter three has already pointed out, the miners working in Bangka tin mines 
were in fact from China, and they used Chinese mining and smelting technology until the second 
half of the nineteenth century. Many miners were in fact Hakka speaking people who might have 
                                               
38 Barrow, Some Account of the Public Life, and a Selection from the Unpublished Writings, of the Earl of 
Macartney, 507. 
39 Charles Hull, Pewter (Princes Risborough, Buckinghamshire, UK: Shire, 1992), 4. 
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originated from Jieyang Ŕ, a county in northwestern Chaozhou prefecture, next to Meixian ¹
ċ in northern Guangdong province. The Chinese smelting technology contributed to the 
softness of Bangka tin. Chinese smelters often used lead to decrease the melting point of tin ores 
in order to accelerate the refining process.40 This practice increased the lead content in Bangka 
tin, making the Bangka tin softer than Cornish tin.41  
The Bangka tin and diantong exemplify the technology in transit, movement of labor, and 
the appropriation of foreign material in local context in the age of maritime trade. The migrant 
Chinese miners mined the tin from Bangka; the VOC and EIC shipped the tin to Canton as a 
ballast good to trade for tea; and the Guangdong artisans adapted to the imported metal by 
changing the composition of the alloy. They added copper to increase the solidity and they 
managed to preserve the whiteness and the silver sheen of the foreign tin. Through this 
innovation, Guangdong artisans localized the foreign tin to be a local specialty of “diantong,” a 
selling point of Guangdong pewter objects. The competition between Bangka tin and Cornish tin 
further complicates the story: the softness of Bangka tin ingot produced by Chinese migrant 
miners won the heart of their fellow artisans because the Chinese smelting technology practiced 
by migrant miners in Bangka fits the craft technology of Chinese pewter artisans practiced in 
Guangdong.  
 
                                               
40 Adding lead to tin can decrease the melting point of the alloy. The alloy of 60% of tin and 40% of lead is has the 
lowest melting point of all pewter alloys—only 183 degrees centigrade. The practice of adding lead to the smelter of 
tin can be found in 17th century encyclopedia Tiangong kaiwu. Song, Tiangong kaiwu, juan 3, 10b. 
41 Adding lead to soften the tin alloy is a common practice among artisans throughout the world. In a sixteenth-
century French artisanal and technical manuscript, the anonymous author-practitioner mentioned that the English 
pewter (tin) was so hard that artisans had to add lead to soften it. See Anonimous, Choses Diverses, and then as 
Recueil de recettes et secrets concernant l’art du mouleur, de l’artificier et du peintre, Bibliothèque nationale in 
Paris. BnF Ms. Fr. 640. English translation by the Making and Knowing Project. 
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Guangdong Artisans: Innovations in Techniques and Styles 
The import of Bangka tin made Guangdong province a center of pewter production. The 
so-called “Suzhou style” in pewter production has become a matter of nostalgia and was only 
popular among a small group of collectors and literati-artists.42 Pewter vessels produced by 
Guangdong artisans were more popular in both domestic and international market. On the street 
of nineteenth-century Canton, Chinese and western traders could find pewter shops selling 
various kinds of pewter tableware, utensils, ritual vessels, and candlesticks (figure 4.12). By late 
nineteenth century, Guangdong style pewter tableware even entered the forbidden city as 
tributary gifts to the emperor.43 This shows a huge change in the status of pewter: in the Ming 
dynasty, pewter was primarily used as a substitute of silver by commoners, while by the end of 
the Qing dynasty, the craftsmanship of pewter artisans was respected and was valued to be one 
of the tributes that represent the local pride of Guangdong province. 
Among Guangdong artisans, authors of local gazetteers all agreed that the craft of 
Chaozhou (“Teochew” in their native dialect) artisans was the best.44 The majority of exported 
pewter objects were produced by workshops originated from Chaoyang county ×Ŕ, and most 
of workshops shared the same family name Yan Ş. One of the Yan family workshops, Yan Yihe 
ŞşI, even extended their pewter shops to Guangzhou, the provincial city of Guangdong 
                                               
42 Qu Dajun was the first author who used this idiom. See Qu Dajun, Guangdong xinyu, 10b. Authors of local 
gazetteer continued to use this idiom until the nineteenth century. See Zhou, Chaozhou fu zhi, juan 39, 63a, Ruan 
Yuan ed., (Daoguang) Guangdong yong zhi ,ΟeŃǓΚŜ, vol. 671, Xuxiu siku quanshu ？WÊľkƿ 
(Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 2002), juan, 97, 224. 
43 See the gift inventory from the supervisor of Canton custom to Emperor Guangxu in 1900, The First Historical 
Archives of China, archive no. 03-5566-119. 
44 Ruan, (Daoguang) Guangdong tong zhi, vol. 671, juan 97, 224. Also, Zhou, (Qianlong) Chaozhou fu zhi, juan 39, 
63a. 
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Province.45 After the Opium war, as nearby Shantou Âŝ became a treaty port in 1860, a large 
number of Chaoyang workshops moved to Shantou. Customers from all social classes cherished 
the pewter products of Chaozhou artisans. Their pewter boxes entered the imperial collection as 
the packaging of Agarwood bead bracelets—important tributary gifts from Guangdong (figure 
4.13). Prestigious gentry families such as the household of the direct descendants of Confucius in 
Qufu ©ő used Chaozhou pewter tableware sets produced by one of the Yan family workshops 
as formal banquet sets, and western sojourners brought Chaozhou pewter products back to 
Europe and America (figure 4.7). Some of their pewter products even circulated in the Southeast 
Asia market (figure 4.14). It is very likely that they were brought by the Hakka migrant miners 
and Teochew speaking traders. 
The creation of Guangdong style pewter objects and the rise of Chaozhou artisans can be 
attributed to the craft community and local ecology of Chaozhou, as well as the European 
inspirations brought by the intensive material exchanges in the maritime trade. Chaozhou 
prefecture is located at the northeastern border of Guangdong province. It is connected to Fujian 
province to the north, and its southwestern border is connected to the Huizhou prefecture, where 
the most productive tin mines in Guangdong Province were located.46 The western part of 
                                               
45 At the bottom of a pewter box collected in the National Palace Museum of Taipei, it stamped: “Chaoyang Yan 
Yihe, located in the old town of the provincial capital of Guangdong Province” ȫϧЀş¼FŃǓʁ˪Ú, ƛ-Ϯ-
001407. 
46 The most productive tin mines in Guangdong Province in the Qing dynasty were in Boluo County ˣ, Heyuan 
County Ȉȡ, and Yingde County ̑Ř. But these tin mines became exhausted by the end of eighteenth century. See 
the court memorial from Yue Jun Ĥȭ (1704-1753)  to the Qianlong Emperor, QL 13/10/28, The First Historical 
Archives, 02-01-04-14229-007. Also see the court memorial by Yu Minzhong  (1714-1779), QL 40/12/14, 
The First Historical Archives, 02-01-04-16736-008. 
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Chaozhou prefecture is a mountainous area where tin mines were situated.47 Chaozhou artisans 
were familiar with pewter production since the eleventh century as they had close access to the 
raw material.48 
The mountainous landscape translated into a shortage of arable land, thus a lot of 
Chaozhou people left their homeland and sailed to Southeast Asia to make a living. Some 
became maritime traders, and some became migrant laborers, some even became pirates.49 As I 
have shown in Chapter Three, in the seventeenth century, Hakkas and some Teochew speaking 
people migrated to Bangka and Borneo to engage in mining. The migration network helped 
familiarize Chaozhou artisans to Bangka tin, as it was excavated and smelted by miners from 
their hometown. In sum, local tin mines and the long history of pewter production laid the 
foundation of innovations in pewter making in Chaozhou. The migration and the trade networks 
enabled Chaozhou artisans to be familiar with Bangka tin. More importantly, Chaozhou was 
close enough to Canton to be exposed to European inspirations, especially European silverwares 
and the Canton workshops for exporting silver. 
Scholars working on China trade usually treat China as an oriental stimulus that inspired 
innovations in material chemistry in Europe.50 The changes in China in this intensive material 
exchange are usually overlooked. The Guangdong style pewter objects showed little influence 
                                               
47 Jieyang Ɛϧ, Puning ƼĂ, and Dabu êÛ were famous for tin mines. But tin resources in Chaozhou were 
exhausted in the twentieth century. Zhou, (Qianlong) Chaozhou fu zhi, juan 39, 63a. 
48 Xie Keng ͥύ and Chen Jingxi ϟƽɂ, Chao Shan minjian yishu ȫȄǿϛ̋ǎ (Shantou: Shantou daxue 
chubanshe, 2013), 344. 
49 The legendary pirate Lin Daoqian ǖΟ+ (Lim Toh Khiam), who gained prominence in the service of Patani’s 
ruler and became the Sultan’s father-in-law in the 16th century, was from Chaozhou. Patrick Jory, “From Melayu 
Patani to Thai Muslim: The Spectre of Ethnic Identity in Southern Thailand,” South East Asia Research 15, no. 2 
(July 1, 2007): 255–79. 
50 Hook and Gaimster, eds., Trade and discovery. 
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from Suzhou style. On the contrary, they shared a lot of similarities with silverware from Europe. 
The rise of Guangdong artisans and the creation of Guangdong style pewter vessels were 
examples of Chinese innovations inspired by occidental stimulus. To begin with, the import of 
Bangka tin gave Guangdong artisans more access to this high-quality material. Furthermore, the 
maritime trade brought in western styles and decorative patterns, which inspired pewter artisans 
in Guangdong to apply various techniques in pewter production to create new styles and fashion.  
The most important influence brought by the maritime trade was the adaptation of tureens. 
Tureen is an oval shaped deep container with fixed handles and a low domed cover. It originated 
from European dining practice and was not seen in China before the Qing dynasty. Tureens were 
usually made of silver. Artisans in Guangdong became familiar with this kind of vessel through 
export silver commissions. From the eighteenth century, Guangdong artisans started to produce a 
large quantity of pewter tureens for both domestic and international market. However, it would 
be too simple to regard the pewter tureens as a simple substitute for silver tureens. The 
naturalistic form of pewter tureens (figure 4.7 and 4.15) is hard to find its silver counterpart. The 
invention of pewter tureen was not just a direct copy from silverware, but went through a 
complicated process of appropriation across different media and different materials.  
The naturalistic form came from porcelain instead of silver. Influenced by the naturalistic 
movement in the sixteenth century, Meissen porcelain factory in Germany started to produce 
ceramics that represented naturalistic plants and animals in the eighteenth century. Then the 
naturalistic Meissen porcelain was adopted by Chelsea porcelain factory and Bow porcelain 
factory in Britain, and it quickly became a fashion in Europe in the eighteenth century (figure 
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4.16).51 This naturalistic fashion influenced China through the channel of export porcelain. From 
mid-eighteenth century, Europeans started to commission export porcelain that represent plants 
and animals from the kilns in Jingde zhen §! (figure 4.17). The production of export 
porcelain even influenced the imperial production. For example, the Qianlong Emperor ordered 
Tang Ying Kğ (1682-1756), the Supervisor of the Imperial Porcelain Manufactory in 
Jingdezhen to follow the European naturalistic style and to produce the “imitating life” porcelain 
(fangsheng ci êé) in the imperial kiln.52 Pewter artisans in Guangdong might get the idea of 
naturalistic style from export porcelain and applied the naturalistic form on their own products. 
In sum, the creation of naturalistic pewter tureens went through an intricate process of translation 
between silver, porcelain, and pewter in the context of intensive material exchange during the 
age of silver.  
In addition to the creation of pewter tureens, Guangdong pewter artisans also applied 
various techniques on the surface of pewter to make the pewter vessels look more similar to 
silverware. Most of pewter vessels excavated from Ming tombs had a plain surface, while in the 
Qing dynasty, pewter vessels produced in Guangdong were decorated with stipple engraved 
patterns, embossing, brass inlay, colored glasses, exquisite knobs, handles, and stands. 
Embossing is a common technique used by silversmiths. By hammering from the reverse side of 
the metal, silversmiths use the malleability of the silver to create a design in low relief. Then 
they chased from the opposite side of the relief to create a finished piece (figure 4.18). Pewter is 
more malleable than silver. Inspired by their silversmith colleagues, pewter artisans in 
                                               
51 Hilary Young, English Porcelain, 1745-95: Its Makers, Design, Marketing and Consumption (London: V&A 
Publications, 1999), 87. 
52 Chen, Rise of Technocratic Culture in High-Qing China. 
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Guangdong applied embossing on pewter to achieve more complicated shapes. The duck-shaped 
cover of the tureen (figure 4.7 and 4.19) was created by embossing and chasing.  
Engraving is another technique that pewter artisans appropriated from the craft of the 
silversmith. However, the stipple engraved decorations that covered the pewter surface is more 
than just an imitation of the engraved patterns on silver. A close examination of the pewter 
butterfly box (figure 4.20) shows that the pewter artisans used a particular chisel to stamp 
circular impressions on the pewter surface. These circular impressions imitate the texture of 
silver filigrees. In this way, pewter artisans played a trick on the viewers’ eyes: at a distance, the 
pewter butterfly box not only looked like the silver butterfly box (figure 4.21) in terms of its 
shape, the circular prints on pewter also mimicked the texture created by silver filigree on the 
butterfly box. In addition to engraving, pewter artisans also used brass inlay to imitate the effect 
of gilding (figure 4.22). 
The third innovation of Guangdong pewter artisans is mounting. We have seen Suzhou 
artisans using jade and hardwood to create the knobs, handles, and the  spout of pewter teapots, 
but Guangdong artisans were more elaborative when it comes to mounting—they used a wider 
variety of materials, such as coconut shells, glass, and jade, to mount a wider range of objects 
(figure 4.7, 4.14, and 4.15). The usage of glass and jade in mounting came from silversmithy. 
Mounting jade and gems on gold and silver was a common practice by silversmiths. In the Qing 
dynasty, when colored glasses were introduced to the Chinese market from Europe, it quickly 
became a fashion to mount glasses on metalwork to imitate precious gems like rubies and 
sapphires. Even the emperor would order the Imperial Household Workshop to purchase colored 
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glasses to imitate gems.53 The colored glasses not only offered pewter artisans an opportunity to 
mimic the luxurious silver and gold vessels with gems, it also gave pewter artisans greater ability 
to create new styles by adding this shining and exotic material on the pewter surface. For 
example, in the case of duck tureens (figure 4.7 and 4.15), pewter artisans were able to use 
colored glasses to fashion the eyes of the ducks, thus created a more vivid figure in their work. 
The creation of Guangdong style pewter objects and the rising of Chaozhou pewter 
workshops are by no means a mere response to the western stimulus. If imported new materials 
and European commodities brought inspirations, then the local craft community and the ecology 
enabled artisans from Chaozhou and neighboring regions to technically and materially realize the 
innovations. The scissors they used to cut the pewter sheet, the hammer they used for embossing, 
the chisels, engravers, and the files were made by local blacksmiths (figure 4.23).54 The silver 
workshops producing export silver provided Chaozhou pewterers both stylistic and technical 
inspirations. More importantly, the access to Shoushan Vn stone from Fujian province and the 
Chaozhou stone carvers’ carving skill contributed to the most significant characteristic of 
Chaozhou pewter craft: stone mold casting.  
Chaozhou pewterers were famous for their ability to use highly exquisite molds to cast 
decorative components.55 The knobs, handles, and stands on pewter vessels were all casted in 
stone molds that were made of black soapstone (figure 4.24). Chaozhou artisans did not produce 
the stone molds themselves. The stone molds were produced by skilled stone carvers, and 
                                               
53 Colored glasses were called liaoqi ƧÈ or jia baoshi \ċʉ in the Qing dynasty. See the order from Xianfeng 
Emperor to the Imperial Household Workshop in 1857, The First Historical Archives of China, microfilm number: 
10-2946. 
54 Interview with Yan Laiqin, May 17, 2016, conducted by Yijun Wang. 
55 Zhou ed., (Qianlong) Chaozhou fu zhi, juan 39, 63a. 
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Chaozhou is particularly famous for stone carving since the Tang dynasty.56 The black 
soapstone, called Shoushan stone, is a local product from the neighboring Fujian province.57 The 
local stone and the local stone carvers enabled the pewter artisans to cast complicated patterns 
and forms that can be comparable to silverware created by lost-wax casting. The technique of 
stone mold casting also spread to neighboring counties in Guangdong and Fujian Provinces.  
A good example of this technology in transit was the family history of Chen Wanneng 
ϥ̢˶, a pewter master and a preserver of the intangible heritage in Lukang, Taiwan. The Chen 
family moved to Taiwan from Quanzhou ȋĪ, a city slightly north of Chaozhou, in the 
nineteenth century. The Chen family were specialized in pewter making and have been using the 
Shoushan stone molds in their pewter production for generations. They got their Shoushan stone 
supply through the trade connection between Taiwan and Fujian from the nineteenth century to 
mid-twentieth century, when the trade was cut off due to the Sino-Japanese war.  
Stone molds can provide exquisite details, but they also have an obviousdeficiency: the 
stone molds wear out easily and cannot be repaired. Therefore, only pewter artisans living in 
areas with sufficient Shoushan stone supply could apply stone mold casting technique in their 
work. When the trade route between mainland and Taiwan was cut off, Chen Wanneng had to 
give up using Shoushan stone molds and develop his own “cold casting technique.”58 The Yan 
family in Chaozhou experienced a similar problem in the twentieth century. Yan Laiqin 
ЀOǴthe descendant of the Chaozhou Yan family, had to create his own duralumin molds to 
replace the worn-out Shoushan stone molds left by his ancestors because the price of Shoushan 
                                               
56 Xie and Chen, Chao Shan minjian yishu. 
57 “Taiwan Xiyi Fazhan Ji Gongfa Xingzhi Fenxi Ziliaoku Jianzhi Jihua,” 2. 
58 Interview with Chen Wanneng on June 7, 2016 conducted by Yijun Wang. 
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stone became too high.59 However, as it is harder to detach pewter from the duralumin molds 
than the stone molds, Yan Laiqin’s duralumin molds are much simpler than his ancestors’ stone 
molds (figure 4.25). As a result, it is impossible for the twenty-first century Chaozhou Yan 




The Guangdong style pewter turned out to a house of technologies. The making of 
Guangdong pewter objects and the creation of Guangdong style pewter required the mining and 
the smelting technology of Chinese migrant miners, the diantong innovation in metallurgy, and 
the craft of stone carvers. It also showed the pewter artisans’ appropriation of the techniques 
from silversmith and porcelain.  
Moreover, the emergence of Guangdong style pewter is a materialized manifestation of the 
networks of trade, migration, technology in transit, local ecology, and the social network of local 
craft communities in the context of maritime trade. The Europeans brought Southeast Asia tin to 
trade for tea, which stimulated Hakkas and Chaozhou natives to migrate to Southeast Asia to 
engage in mining. Guangdong pewter artisans quickly adopted the Bangka tin mined by Chinese 
migrant miners and created the localized tin alloy diantong through innovations in metallurgy. 
The intensive material exchange and the growing number of commissions from European 
customers encouraged pewter artisans to create new styles. Pewter artisans started to adopt 
imported materials in their craft and were eager to appropriate techniques of the silversmith in 
pewter making. The European silverware and export porcelain further expanded the range of 
                                               
59 Interview with Yan Laiqin, May 17, 2016, conducted by Yijun Wang. 
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pewter objects and created new fashion among Chinese consumers. However, the experiments of 
pewter artisans did not stop at mere imitation. Through combining and appropriating different 
techniques and forms, pewter artisans in Guangdong created their distinctive style and fashion. 
The local ecology and the craft community further provided the material and technical support 
for pewter artisans to realize their new styles. 
The case of Guangdong pewter artisans provides a good example to rethink what is 
technology and its mobility. This chapter shows that the pewter making technology in 
Guangdong is organically embedded in the networks of trade, migration, local ecology, and the 
craft community. However, it does not necessarily mean that technology cannot move out of its 
specific social and ecological embeddedness. Technology can move across different media, 
different fields, and different geographical regions. The mining technology can move from China 
to Southeast Asia, and the techniques of silversmith can be applied to pewter objects. On the 
other hand, the story of stone molding tells us that some techniques can only move within certain 
boundaries. The lack of Shoushan stone can quickly lead to the extinction of stone molding. 
Technology can be considered as an assemblage of social, economic, material and ecological 
networks, and the mobility of technology is conditioned by the boundary of this assemblage.  
The mobility of technology leads us back to the idiom “Suzhou style, Guangdong artisans.” 
As an assemblage of local ecology, craftsman networks, China diaspora, and Eurasian trade 
network, the craft of Guangdong artisans had a much larger mobility than Suzhou style pewter 
teapots in terms in the social and geographical dimensions in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries. The Guangdong style pewter objects were owned by commoners and emperors, 
Chinese and Americans, and they travelled to the end of the trade network. Meanwhile, the 
Suzhou style pewter teapots enjoyed more mobility over time. As a material manifestation of the 
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craft of wen and the marker of the literati identity, Suzhou style pewter teapots are what Dorothy 
Ko called “material-emotional complex”.60 The production and the reproduction of texts that 
evolved around the craft, exchange, collection, and the connoisseurship of the Suzhou style 
pewter teapots prolonged the life of Suzhou style pewter objects, and extended the mobility of 
Suzhou style pewter over time. Therefore, although Suzhou style pewter teapots were only 
cherished by a small circle of literati and collectors in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, 
their status in the art market became more and more important up through the present. When the 
once popular Guangdong style pewter objects and the artisans who created them were forgotten 
in the storage spaces of museums, the Suzhou style pewter teapots are currently enjoying their 
glory in the antique market. The growing number of antique collectors and dealers who try to 
identify themselves with the nostalgic literati culture continued to contribute to the cultural 
hegemony of Suzhou style, just like the Qing literati did hundreds of years ago. 
 
                                               
60 Doroth Ko, “Itineraries of Inkstones in Early Modern China,” in Smith ed. Entangled Itineraries. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Thinking like Artisans, Thinking like Merchants 
On the sixth day of the seventh lunar month of 1738, Nasutu Τ̬Ñ (?-1749), the 
governor-general of Jiangsu, Jiangxi, and Anhui provinces, wrote to the Qianlong emperor, 
proposing a change in the alloy content of the copper coinage by adding tin.1 In this court 
memorial, Nasutu wrote: 
I observed that the coins used in the Jiangnan area are mostly green money 
(qingqian ϵξ) issued in the Kangxi period (1661-1722); sometimes there is 
green money mint in the Shunzhi period (1642-1661). The yellow money cast in 
this year is rarely seen. I investigated carefully to know that the physical 
property of the green copper (qingtong ϵζ) is brittle. It cannot be used to 
produce other vessels except from mirrors. As a consequence, no one melts 
down green money, so it keeps circulating. Yellow copper (huangtong Џζ) is 
easy to melt down, so there is a huge demand on the market…Those people 
don’t buy the copper metal, they all melt down copper coins to make [copper 
objects]. I heard that money exchange shops in Jiangsu and Zhejiang only 
exchange silver with green money. If they encounter yellow money, they pick 
the coins out and sell them to copper shops…I secretly ordered Zhang Qu ŉȞ, 
the commissioner of Suzhou, to consult smelters and copper artisans. [From 
them] I learned that green copper is also made from red copper (pure copper) 
and zinc. Once tin from Guangdong is added, the alloy becomes green copper...I 
humbly think the circulation of copper coins is meant to be convenient for 
everyday use, and [the state] expects the coins to last for a long time. If yellow 
money disappears as soon as [we] issue it, then it is not as long-lasting and 
durable for circulation as the green money.2  
 
                                               
1 In previous scholarship, copper coins and coinage were referred to as copper money or copper cash. Here I use the 





ÐĒȖΚ.RǿƯɥ.ǉ-Ö)'Π̐Ўξϩσϩη.͒̐ϵξ)Ȃ'ΚɥNasutu’s court memorial 
to the Qianlong Emperor, QL 3/7/6, The First Historical Archives, Beijing, No. 04-01-35-1228-013. 
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In this court memorial, Nasutu suggested changing the alloy content of copper coinage 
from yellow to green copper to prevent the recycling of copper from copper coins. The yellow 
copper Nasutu mentioned was a copper-zinc alloy, or modern brass. The green copper was a 
copper-zinc-tin alloy, now known as naval brass.3 Nasutu explained that based on his 
observations of the circulation in the market, and according to his inquiries to money exchange 
shops and smelters, the green money was more difficult to be illegally melted down and was thus 
more durable than brass cash. Therefore, by issuing green money, the Qing government could 
resolve the monetary crisis by ensuring that a sufficient amount of copper cash was in 
circulation.  
Nasutu’s suggestion was just one of many that the Qing court considered to maintain a 
stable exchange ratio between copper coins and silver. The Qing empire used a bimetallic 
system: silver for wholesale transactions and tax payments and copper coins in the retail market 
and to pay wages.4 The Qing government issued copper cash; the market supplied the silver.5 
People could exchange copper cash for silver in private silver shops owned and operated by 
merchants (figure 5.1).  
The official exchange rate was fixed at 1 Treasury tael of silver ľķε (kuping tael, 
approximately 37.3 g) to 1,000 coins of legally cast standard money (zhiqian ξ).6 However, 
in reality, the market exchange rate changed daily in response to monetary conditions. From the 
late seventeenth century, the Qing empire suffered from a high exchange rate between silver and 
                                               
3 Joseph R. Davis, Copper and Copper Alloys (ASM International, 2001), 8. 
4 Vogel, “Chinese Central Monetary Policy, 1644-1800.” 4. 
5 Lin, China Upside Down, 2. 
6 Vogel, “Chinese Central Monetary Policy 1644-1800,” 5. 
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copper. In 1739, when Zhang composed this court memorial, the copper-silver exchange ratio 
had risen to 830:1.7 The Qing officials called this problem “high cash value” (qiangui ξͭ). To 
control the exchange rate and to solve this problem, officials in the Qing court held a series of 
discussions to identify the reasons for the monetary crisis and to propose solutions. In 1740, the 
Qianlong emperor accepted Zhang’s suggestion to change the alloy content of copper cash.8 
Thereafter, tin was not only important in everyday life but also to the monetary system of the 
Qing state.  
In this chapter, I examine the monetary reform of 1740 and its implications. Many 
economic historians have used the monetary crisis and the responses of the Qing court in order to 
understand the fiscal system of the Qing empire and the economic philosophy of Qing scholars.9 
Instead of analyzing the data and the policy as an economic historian would, I follow the flow of 
court memorials to investigate the mentality and the knowledge culture behind the problem-
solving methods of Qing bureaucrats. I argue that copper coinage created a “contact zone” 
between craft and statecraft, and between the market and the state. I will start with an 
introduction to the coinage system and its affiliated institutions to contextualize the space of 
knowledge exchange between the craftsmen and bureaucrats. Then I juxtapose the approaches of 
                                               
7 Ibid, 19. 
8 Qinding daqing huidian zeli Ǵĉêȝ、sP, SKQS edition,  juan 129, 24a. 
9 For example, von Glahn studies the understanding of monetary theory in late imperial China and uses late Ming’s 
attempt to reimpose the dominance of copper coin to demonstrate the limits of the Ming state and the power of the 
market to influence state policy. Lin Man-Houng’s book uses the nineteenth-century monetary crisis to discuss the 
economic philosophy among different schools of statecraft reformers. Vogel’s paper discusses the fluctuation before 
the nineteenth century and the monetary policies that the Qing state used to increase the circulation of copper coins. 
Zheng Yongchang’s dissertation studies the policies of the Qing state to eliminate counterfeiting cash from 1736 to 
1775. Zheng argues that at the beginning of Qianlong’s rule, the Qing state had to rely on the “small money” or 
counterfeits to supplement the shortage of cash. Zheng Yongchang ΪȂƲ, “Qingdai qianlong chao qiangui shiqi 
zhi siqian wenti ji qi duice (1736-1775)” ȝ>+ϨǈξͭƺǉȉʠξÆϿ¢qĘʸ (Taipei: National Taiwan 
Normal University, Ph.D. dissertation, 2004), 23-4. 
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Ming and Qing scholar-officials to the monetary crisis to show the “craft turn” in statecraft in the 
eighteenth century. Through a case study of the monetary reform of 1740, I demonstrate that the 
Qing bureaucrats abandoned classical political theories derived from Confucian classics and 
turned to artisanal knowledge and experiments to resolve the monetary crisis.  
The monetary reform changed the sourcing of metal. The last part of this chapter is a case 
study of an anti-corruption case regarding the procurement of tin for coinage. Following the 
investigation, I examine how Qing bureaucrats mobilized the knowledge of trade and accounting 
in their work as they worked closely with merchants in the sourcing of tin to mint copper coins 
for the empire. 
The two case studies of the monetary administration show the technocratic culture of Qing 
bureaucrats and shed light on operation of the bureaucratic system of the Qing empire. Scholars 
of Qing history have shown that the Qing rulers innovatively created institutions such as the 
Imperial Household Department to manage sourcing and production.10 The imperial workshops 
and other state-owned industries formed a nationwide network of knowledge transmission and 
collaborative material production. The Manchus, especially the bondservants, developed a 
technocratic epistemology while serving as the managers and supervisors of those institutions.11 
The two case studies shows that the technocratic epistemology was not limited to the Manchus. 
As subordinates and colleagues of Manchu officials, the Han bureaucrats also acquired this 
epistemology. Moreover, the Qing state replicated the technology networks of the Imperial 
Household Department, using models, artifacts, or even personnel to transmit the craft 
                                               
10 Palace Museum and Max-Plank Society for the History of Science, Gongting Yu Difang. Torbert, The Chʻing 
Imperial Household Department. Lai, Qianlong Huangdi de hebao. 
11 Chen, “The Rise of Technocratic Culture in High-Qing China.” 
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knowledge. In the anti-corruption case, the Qing government developed a sophisticated 
accounting and auditing system that became the hallmark of impersonal bureaucratic rule. 
Ironically, the impersonal rule was carried out through personal ties. The Qing government 
mobilized the distributed knowledge of the craftsmen and traders in a highly personalized 
manner. The personal rule within the highly rational, institutionalized bureaucratic system 
mirrored the operation of the Imperial Household Department where bondservants and princes 
participated in financial and political activities on behalf of the emperor. The policy-making and 
everyday administrative process show that materials, artisanal knowledge, and technocratic 
culture imbued the Qing bureaucrats with a distinctive vision of statecraft.  
 
Mintage as a Form of Craft: The Mints as Contact Zones 
Economic historians tend to treat the coinage of money as part of the state’s fiscal system, 
so they view the monetary system through the lens of institutional history and economic policies. 
But the minting of coins entailed an intense exchange of materials, information, and knowledge. 
To cast copper coins, the Qing government had to source, prepare, and ship monetary metals to 
mints. Merchants, smelters, and bureaucrats had to work together to ensure the proper casting 
process. The coinage system required a network that connected the mines, the market, and the 
logistical management of monetary metals, while the mints created a space for bureaucrats and 
artisans to exchange information and knowledge. In this sense, mintage—which lies at the heart 
of statecraft—is a craft, and a highly sophisticated one. 
Mary Louise Pratt has defined contact zones as spaces “in which peoples geographically 
and historically separated come into contact with each other and establish ongoing relations… It 
treats the relations among colonizers and colonized, or travelers and travelees, not in terms of 
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separateness, but in terms of co-presence, interaction, interlocking understandings and practices, 
and often within radically asymmetrical relations of power.”12 The contact zone is a perfect 
model to conceptualize knowledge exchange and cultural change involved in mintage. Although 
scholar-officials and artisans lived in the same time and space, their knowledge systems and 
mentalities seldom came together before the Qing dynasty. Ming bureaucrats never mentioned 
the actual craft process in coinage when discussing fiscal and monetary policy. However, in the 
eighteenth century, although still very confused about the technical details, Qing bureaucrats felt 
the urge to bring artisanal knowledge to their policy-making process. In other words, the coinage 
system and mints created a contact zone where craft met statecraft. 
The Qing empire cast its copper coins in some thirty mints located around the empire. The 
central court had two mints in Beijing called baoquanju Ēȋĝ (under the supervision of the 
Board of Revenue) and baoyuanju Ēȡĝ (under the supervision of the Board of Works).13 
From 1726, the two capital mints were split into seven separate mints in the east city of Beijing 
(figure 5.2).14 In addition to the two capital mints, the Qing empire had several provincial mints 
across the Qing empire. These provincial mints were supervised by the financial commissioner 
of the province to which they belonged (figure 5.3). During the Qianlong reign, the two capital 
mints cast 48 percent of all copper coins in the Qing empire; the provincial mints cast the 
remaining 52 percent.15 The copper coins issued by the capital mints were used to pay soldiers 
                                               
12 Mary Louise Pratt, Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation (New York: Routledge, 2008), 8. 
13 Lin, China Upside Down, 6. 
14 Werner Burger, Ch’ing Cash (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2016), 66. 
15 Lin, China Upside Down, 31. 
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and provide for all public works around Beijing.16 The copper coins issued by the provincial 
mints funded the soldiers’ and subordinate officials’ salaries, public works, and other provincial 
expenses.17 
The two capital mints sourced the monetary metals through three major channels: taxation, 
internal tribute, and procurement as commodities. Each year, tin, copper, zinc, and lead arrived in 
Beijing from all corners of the empire and a high volume of memorials were sent to the court 
describing the productivity of mines, the quality of the metal, the cost of mining, and the market 
price of the metal. The provincial mints were supplied through taxation and the procurement 
from the market, and the origin of metals varied in different provinces.18 The circulation of the 
information as well as the metal itself shows the exchange of information between the central 
court, governors, and the local metal market. In this way, the sourcing, preparation, and shipping 
of the metals created a knowledge system that connected the center and the local, bureaucrats 
and merchants, the state and the market.  
Copper coinage was more than a token of exchange; it was also an artifact that required 
technical knowledge and skilled craftsmanship to cast. China has used sand casting to mass-
produce at least 20 identical coins simultaneously since the Qin dynasty (255-194 BC) and the 
basic idea remain unchanged until the twentieth century.19 According to Song Yingxing’s 
Tiankong kaiwu (published in 1637), artisans used the mother coin (muqian ǻξ) and sand mold 
                                               
16 Ibid, 5. 
17 Ibid, 5. 
18 For example, provincial mints on the east coast and the two capital mints used Japanese copper in the early 
eighteenth century, while provincial mints in Yunnan and Sichuan used Yunnan copper. Imported tin from Southeast 
Asia and Guangdong province fueled the capital mints and provincial mints on the east coast, while mints in Yunnan 
and Sichuan used tin from Yunnan. 
19 Burger, Ch’ing Cash, 18. 
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to cast copper coins (figure 5.4). The mother coin was made of pewter, and artisans carved the 
patterns on it. The sand was a mixture of extremely fine earth and charcoal powder and was 
packed into the wooden frame. The artisan spread cedar or charcoal ash over the sand mold or 
smoked the wood using resin or clear oil so that the mother coin could be detached easily from 
the sand. The artisans then pressed 100 mother coins into the sand to make impressions for the 
obverse side. Channels were created to connect each impression to let the melted metal run into 
the impression. The artisan turned the frame over quickly so all the mother coins could fall on 
the second frame to create the reverse impression. The two frames were tied together tightly with 
a string. After creating ten pairs of frames, the artisans would pour the melted copper alloy into 
the frame (figure 5.4). When cool, the copper formed a cash tree (figure 5.5). The artisans broke 
the cash off the tree and filed the edges of the cash (figure 5.6). The alloy content determined the 
quality of the cash.20 
  Mintage in the Qing dynasty required a complex division of labor. The government 
recruited artisans from the local market to work in the mints and registered their household 
information for supervision.21 Each furnace had one smelter headman (lutou ɆϾ) who oversaw 
eight types of artisans: the fire watcher (kanhuo jiang ʂȰ), the sand mold maker 
(fanshajiang ˩ʋ), the ash spreader (shuahuijiang ȱ) who put the ash on the sand mold 
so that the mold would separate easily from the mother coins, the miscellaneous assistant (zazuo 
ϮL), the edge filer (cuobianjiang θΣ), the edge polisher (gunbianjiang ȤΣ), the cash 
polisher (moqianjiang ʔξ), and the artisan who polished the central hole in the cash 
                                               
20 Song, Tiangong kaiwu, 224. 
21 Zheng, “Qingdai qianlong chao qiangui shiqi zhi siqian wenti ji qi duice (1736-1775),” 121-130. 
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(xiyanjiang ȑʄ).22 In this way, the mint incorporated several branches of craft knowledge, 
such as smelting, alloying, sand mold casting, and filing. As the Board of Revenue, the Board of 
Works, and provincial commissioners had to take responsibility for the coinage process and 
finance the cost of the coinage in each mint, I argue that the mint became a contact zone for 
bureaucrats to acquire knowledge about casting techniques, alloying, metallurgy, and cost control 
from artisans. What happened in the mints was very similar to the knowledge exchange that 
happened in the state-owned workshops across the empire in the Ming and the Qing dynasties.23 
In the Qing dynasty, the coinage system formed a network of information and material 
exchanges between the capital mints and provincial mints. The Qing court reformed the casting 
technique in 1728 and invented the system of master coin (zuqian ʘξ) to standardize the forms 
of coins.24 The master coin, carved in pure copper, was the model used to cast the mother coin. 
The mother coin was then used as the model to cast sample standard coins, which used the 
standardized formula of copper alloy.25 The capital mints produced master coins, mother coins, 
and sample coins, and sent a copy of each to every provincial mint as the standard of production-
-the mother coin, which was made from a more durable alloy, was used as the model for casting, 
while the sample standard coin provided the reference of the alloy content to the artisans in the 
provincial mints. 
                                               
22 Qinding huangchao wenxian tongkao, juan 16, 30a. 
23 Palace Museum and Max-Plank Society for the History of Science, Gongting yu difang. Dagmar Schäfer, “Silken 
“Strands: Making Technology Work in China,” in Cultures of Knowledge, 45-74. 
24 Burger, Ch’ing Cash, 20. 
25 Qinding uangchao wenxian tongkao, juan 16, 30b. 
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To sum up, the coinage system formed a network that connected the center and local, the 
bureaucrats and artisans, the state and, as will be seen below, the market. Moreover, the workings 
of the monetary system reveal a network which offered another dimension of information 
exchange in addition to the well-known memorial system: to transmit the tacit knowledge about 
the material and visual forms, the Qing court used non-textual media such as models and samples 
to connect the artisans in the capital and provincial mints, the emperor and his officials.  
Furthermore, the mints served as a space of knowledge exchange and production. As we 
can see from the institutional structure and the operation of the mintage system, the Qing 
bureaucrats gained knowledge about metalworking, the cost of the metals, and the physical 
property of the alloy from artisans and craftsmen. In the course of their administrative work, the 
scholar-officials in the Qing dynasty acquired the mindset of artisans and tried to solve the 
monetary crisis in a very different manner from their predecessors who served in the Ming and 
the early Qing court. Using the monetary reform of 1740 as a case study, I will show that the 
Qing bureaucrats identified and solved the monetary crisis through empirical observation and 
experiments, utilizing artisanal knowledge in their decision-making process. But before we get to 
the monetary reform, it is necessary to explain the chronic monetary crisis from late seventeenth 
to the early eighteenth century and the previous attempts to resolve it. 
 
The Monetary Crisis: The Copper Dearth 
The Qing empire’s shortage of copper coins lasted from the end of the seventeenth century 
to the end of the eighteenth.26 The shortage of copper coins resulted in a high exchange rate 
between the copper coins and silver, which caused many problems. For example, it increased the 
                                               
26 Lin, China Upside Down, 86. 
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peasants’ tax burden. The grain was sold in copper coins while the tax was paid in silver. When 
the peasant paid the tax, he had to exchange the copper coins according to the fixed official rate, 
and thus ended up paying more in taxes.  
The shortage of copper coinage caused deflation and greatly hindered intra-provincial 
trade. The shortage of official copper coins also led to rampant counterfeiting and private 
coinage. Private mints illegally melted down copper coins to cast “small money” (xiaoqian ę
ξ), which were small coins with less copper content. In classical Chinese monetary theory, the 
ruler regulated the monetary supply and controlled the amount of money in circulation.27 
Following the same thread of thought, rulers of the Qing empire considered the maintenance of 
the official exchange rate and the monopoly of coinage to be central to financial administration. 
Therefore, the high exchange rate and the private coinage were unacceptable. Consequently, the 
Qing emperors and bureaucrats, struggled to solve the problem caused by the shortage of 
coinage. 
There were three reasons for the shortage. The first was the increased demand for cash in 
the wake of the economic and population growth in the late seventeenth century.28 As China 
became integrated into the global economy, more silver from Latin America entered the Chinese 
market. Compared to the rapid growth of silver circulating in the Chinese market, the official 
coinage was in short supply. Most importantly, Japan began to restrict its copper exports to China 
after 1715, causing a dearth of copper (tonghuang ζ̙) and exacerbating the problem.29 
                                               
27 von Glahn, Fountain of Fortune. 
28 Vogel, “Chinese Central Monetary Policy, 1644-1800,” 6. 
29 Ibid, 7. 
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The vulnerability of the Qing empire also contributed to the monetary crisis. As Lin Man-
houng has pointed out, the Qing empire had no notion of monetary sovereignty.30 The Qing court 
was not interested in controlling the circulation of silver and had no efficient means of extracting 
natural resources to cast copper coins. The Qing empire had to rely on global trade to supply 
Japanese copper for coinage before 1715. From 1662 to 1715, Chinese merchants and Dutch 
traders supplied the Chinese mints with Japanese copper.31 Although Japan restricted its copper 
exports to China when its copper mines were depleted, Japan copper still accounted for more 
than sixty percent of copper for coinage in China during the Yongzheng period (1723-1736).32  
In sum, the monetary crisis that the Qing court faced was a mixture of a high exchange 
rate, a shortage of official copper coins, and rampant counterfeiting. Although the monetary 
crisis seems at first to have been caused by a shortage of copper, it was actually due to the 
vulnerability and the limitations of the Chinese state. The decline of copper supply from Japan 
caused the “copper dearth” in China, and the exchange rate between copper to silver once rose to 
780 to 1 in 1722 from 1400-1500 to 1 in 1705.33 
Although China had its copper mines in Yunnan, Yunnan copper supplied the coinage only 
in some provinces in southwestern China. The densely populated east coast and the capital mint 
in Beijing still relied on copper from Japan.34 The monetary system of the Qing empire relied on 
                                               
30 Lin, China Upside Down, 33. 
31 Helen Dunstan, “Safely Supping with the Devil: the Qing State and Its Merchant Suppliers of Copper,” in Late 
Imperial China 13, no. 2 (1992): 45. Vogel, “Chinese Central Monetary Policy, 1644-1800,” 6. 
32 According to Kaihaku goshi shinrei Ț̇/ıƩP promulgated in 1715, Japan implemented an annual ceiling of 
3,000,000 catties on copper exports to China. Dunstan, “Safely Supping with the Devil: the Qing State and Its 
Merchant Suppliers of Copper,” 52; Sun Xiaoying ÿƻ̝, “Qing Yongzheng shidai riben tong jinkou 
zhuangkuang” ȝϭǶƱ>ƯǍωΔ¨ɏx, in Wakumon, 2009 (17), 70. 
33 Vogel, “Chinese Central Monetary Policy, 1644-1800,” 18. 
34 Court memorial by Tan Xingyi ̯͜˧ (-1753), Chief Commander of Zhen’gan ϑʹ, Hunan province, QL 
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trade, and the Qing empire was neither interested in nor capable of fully monopolizing the 
domestic copper supply even though it was crucial to its monetary policy.35 Before the 1740 
monetary reform, the Qing court tried to solve the copper shortage administratively: they banned 
the production and the consumption of brass and tried to recycle copper from the market. This 
administrative approach followed the traditional approach of Ming bureaucrats and contrasted 
with the technical nature of the 1740 reform.  
 
The “Brass Ban” in Early Qing: An Administrative Approach 
China experienced a shortage of copper and counterfeiting as early as the Ming dynasty 
(1368-1644). Ming bureaucrats used three strategies to resolve the crisis. The first was to ban the 
use of brass vessels and private coinage so that the government could recycle from the market to 
mint copper coins.36 The second was to change the weight of copper coins to increase the copper 
content, hoping that money issued by the government would drive out bad money cast by private 
mints.37 The third was to open more official mints.38 The vulnerability of the Ming state doomed 
the first method. The second method, which went against Gresham’s law, only worsened the 
situation. According to Gresham’s law, if two forms of commodity money are in circulation, and 
those two forms of money have the same nominal value, the more valuable commodity will 
                                               
3/10/18, The First Historical Archives, Beijing, No. 4-1-35-1229-002. 
35 The monopoly over copper mining and trade was a state policy of the Qing empire, however, scholars have shown 
that in reality, much of copper was traded by merchants in private markets. For example, Hankou was a trading 
center of Yunnan copper. See Yang Yuda, “Diantong, hantong, yu Qingdai zhongqi de Hankou tong shichang” ȣ
ω.のω.ȝ>#ǉɷの¨ωıÔ, in Qingshi yanjiu, 2013 (2): 88-100. 
36 Sun Chengze ÿżȏ, Chun ming meng yu lu ƶƳéЄμ, SKQS edition, juan 38, 5 a-b. 
37 Zheng, “Qingdai qianlong chao qiangui shiqi zhi siqian wenti ji qi duice (1736-1775),” 40-1. 
38 Sun, Chun ming meng yu lu, 6 a-b. 
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gradually disappear from circulation.39 The third method seemed effective but had to be 
suspended due to a shortage of copper.40 By the end of the Ming dynasty, the monetary system 
had become chaotic—people lost trust in official copper coins and turned to silver and private 
money instead. The chaotic monetary system caused more economic problems, and finally 
contributed to the fall of the Ming empire.41 
The rulers of the Qing dynasty followed the monetary system of the Ming dynasty and 
adopted similar solutions to the monetary crisis. As early as 1679, the Kangxi court had already 
noticed the shortage of copper and banned the production of brass vessels in the market and the 
illegal melting of copper cash.42 The Yongzheng emperor continued his father’s policy and 
intensified the ban on brass as his empire was feeling the effects of the decreasing supply of 
copper from Japan. Blaming the copper dearth on “wicked profit-searching bastards [who] 
illegally melted down copper coins” to produce brass, in 1726 the Yongzheng emperor prohibited 
both the production of brass vessels and the use of brass in all households and shops.43  
In the first lunar month of 1727, the Yongzheng emperor issued an imperial edict to 
Manchu soldiers, ordering them to hand brass vessels in their households over to the 
government.44 Eight months later, when he discovered there was still a shortage of money and 
brass vessels were still being cast in local shops, the furious emperor blamed the incompetence 
                                               
39 “Gresham's law,” Encyclopedia Britannica, https://www.britannica.com/topic/Greshams-law. 
40 Sun, Chun ming meng yu lu, 6 a-b. 
41 Zheng, “Qingdai qianlong chao qiangui shiqi zhi siqian wenti ji qi duice (1736-1775),” 45-9. 
42 Shengzu ren huangdi shilu ˮʘ;ɹĳđμ, (Xinjing: Da Manzhou diguo guowuyuan, 1937), juan 85, 5b-6a. 
43 “÷ǣͬͪĖ.ʳėĮŴ)ξ.Ŗ̯ηǺ.” Shizong xianhuangdi shilu ćűɹĳđμ (Xinjing: Da 
Manzhou diguo guowuyuan, 1937), juan 61, 2b, juan 40, 29b-30a. 
44 Shizong xian huangdi shi lu, juan 52, 4a-b. 
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of his bureaucrats and threatened retaliation. The emperor also added new restrictions on the use 
of brass: “To ban the usage of brass is a fundamental solution to prevent illegal melting down of 
copper cash… In the past, I considered allowing bureaucrats above the third rank to use brass 
vessels. Now I find there are too many people abusing this regulation. From now on, only 
bureaucrats of the first rank are allowed to use brass.”45 Unfortunately, regardless of the diligent 
work of the Yongzheng emperor and his bureaucrats, the “brass ban” was barely effective.  
Previous attempts to prevent counterfeiting had relied on administrative decrees to end 
the monetary crisis. The rationale was that counterfeiting and the high exchange rate were caused 
by the shortage of money, which was due to the shortage of copper. Once people stopped using 
brass, the government could recycle copper from the market to issue more copper coins to reduce 
the value of official copper money. In other words, however ridiculous the “brass ban” appeared 
to modern economists, it was an administrative attempt to solve the monetary crisis on the supply 
side. However, because of the inefficiency of the Qing government, administrative orders failed 
to ban the use of brass, not to mention the fact that the copper output in the Qing empire never 
caught up with the increasing demand for copper coins.  
When the Qianlong emperor ascended the throne, he and his bureaucrats took a technical 
approach: in addition to administrative control over the usage of brass and counterfeiting, they 
changed the alloy content of copper coinage to make copper coins harder to melt. Through an 
analysis of Nasutu’s court memorial, I will demonstrate the methodological and epistemological 
changes behind this technical solution. 
 
Nasutu: A Machu General’s Technical Approach to the Monetary Crisis  
                                               
45 Ibid, juan 61, 2b. 
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Nasutu was not the only bureaucrat to propose a solution. In the Qianlong’s court, various 
solutions were proposed to stop the illegal melting down of copper cash. Some officials 
suggesting lifting the ban on the copper trade to encourage merchants to import more Japanese 
copper. At the same time, the Qing court started to appoint officials (weiyuan õÀ) to oversee 
the purchase of Japanese copper.46 Some suggested lifting the mining ban on the east coast of 
China and opening more mints to issue more copper coins.47 Among these reform proposals was 
one by a group of bureaucrats that proposed changing the alloy content of the copper cash. This 
proposal, which won the approval of the Qianlong emperor, hinged upon the physical property of 
the metal. In adopting this reform, the Qing court changed the alloy content of copper money 
from a copper-zinc alloy to a copper-zinc-tin alloy, thus making it both more expensive and 
harder to melt down. What distinguished this reform from earlier ones was the decision-making 
process, which was based on empirical observation, information exchange between artisans and 
bureaucrats, and experiments in local mints. This leads us back to Nasutu, the Manchu official 
that we met at the beginning of this chapter. 
In Nasutu’s court memorial, his idea of casting green money had two sources of 
inspiration. The first was his own observation. Seeing that the green money issued in the past 
few decades was more durable than the present yellow money, he studied the difference in the 
metal. The second source of inspiration was what merchants and artisans had told him. Nasutu 
learned from exchange shops that local money shops sold yellow money to smelters and copper 
artisans who were recycling copper, while the green money remained in circulation. Knowing 
                                               
46 Haiwang ȚǇ (?-1755), Minster of the Board of Revenue and the Grand Ministers Supervisors-in-chief of the 
Imperial Household Department, court memorial, QL1/2/7, The First Historical Archives, Beijing, No. 04-01-35-
1226-029. 
47 Tan Xingyi, court memorial, QL 3/10/18, The First Historical Archives, Beijing, No. 4-1-35-1229-002. 
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that green money was not preferred for recycling, Nasutu asked the smelters about the alloy 
content of green money. In this way, Nasutu learned that the green money was made from green 
copper, an alloy of copper, zinc, and tin.48 
His empirical observations and experts’ opinion, however, were not a sufficient basis for 
Nasutu’s proposal. He needed more convincing evidence from experiments and more detailed 
data about the alloy formula. Nasutu consulted experienced coppersmiths with tacit knowledge 
(shu’an tongjiang Ƀ͖ζ) to duplicate the green money issued in the early Qing. According 
to his memorial, he made at least two attempts at alloying experiments in the provincial mint in 
Suzhou. The second attempt, which contained 75% copper, 25% zinc, and 5% tin was considered 
a success. When the sample coins arrived in his office in Nanjing, Nasutu examined them and 
found the physical property of the coin was “green and smooth ϵȪ.” When the coin was struck, 
the sound was “loud and clear Ϻ9”, just like the green money cast in the early Qing.49  
Yet Nasutu was not entirely confident about this formula and decided to do more 
experiments to test the resilience of the green money. He ordered the coppersmith in Nanjing to 
beat the green copper ingots, which came with the sample coins. The green copper “broke into 
pieces when it met the hammer Ξνʐ.” Then he asked the smelters to separate the tin from 
the copper in the green copper. As expected, the smelters were unable to do this. According to 
Nasutu, the smelters had to use a specialized metal-separating furnace (fenjin lu }ΰɆ) for the 
task. This furnace was so large that the government could easily discover an illegal recycling 
                                               
48 Nasutu’s court memorial to the Qianlong Emperor, QL 3/7/6, The First Historical Archives, Beijing, No. 04-01-
35-1228-013. 
49 Ibid. 
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facility. Moreover, since market price of copper was several times more than the cost of charcoal 
and the smelters’ wages, there was no money to be made from recycling.  
Convinced that the green money was technically harder to produce and that melting it was 
unprofitable, Nasutu calculated the cost of minting it. He concluded that casting green money 
was no more expensive than casting yellow money. As the governor-general of Jiangsu, Jiangxi, 
and Anhui province, Nasutu ordered the Jiangxi provincial mint in Nanchang to replicate his 
experiment. Smelters in Jiangxi found out that adding 5% of tin to the current formula for yellow 
money could achieve the same effect.50 Finally, Nasutu sent two alloying formulas produced by 
provincial mints in Nanchang and Suzhou with two cases of sample coins cast by provincial 
mints in Suzhou and Nanchang to Beijing discuss his proposal and the alloy formula.51 
Although the Qianlong emperor did not respond to Nasutu’s proposal, it revealed a 
tendency of technocratic culture: the use of practical knowledge learnt from artisans and 
merchants to solve problems in governmental administration. This characteristic differentiated 
Nasutu from officials of the Ming dynasty and early Qing scholar-officials who tried to solve the 
monetary crisis through administrative methods and a macroeconomic strategy. 
In its rhetorical format, Nasutu’s court memorial abandoned Confucian rhetoric in favor of 
empirical descriptions to identify the problem. In contrast, bureaucrats in the Ming dynasty who 
wrote about monetary policy often started with a thorough review of the monetary policies from 
the legendary Confucian sage kings in the Xia dynasty (before 1600 BCE) to the present. They 
based their theoretical framework on classical texts like Guanzi ʽü, from 26 BCE, and applied 
                                               
50 The provincial mint of Jiangxi province, Baochang ju ĒƲĝ, was located in Nanchang. 
51 Nasutu’s court memorial to the Qianlong Emperor, QL 3/7/6, The First Historical Archives, Beijing, No. 04-01-
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a Confucian moral standard to past monetary policies.52 Nasutu, in contrast, based his argument 
purely on his own empirical observation and advice from artisans. For the Ming dynasty scholar-
officials, the authority of their economic theory came from the sage kings and classical texts. For 
Nasutu, although previous Manchu emperors like the Shunzhi and Kangxi emperor might lend 
some authority, the real knowledge came from expert advice and empirical observation. In 
addition, what made his proposal even more convincing was not the words of the Confucian 
sages, but the experiments conducted by artisans in the mints. In other words, for Nasutu, there 
was no political or economic theory from the past; the validity of economic and political 
decisions was based on the knowledge and the experiments of the present. 
Furthermore, Nasutu’s memorial demonstrates a new mode of knowledge production. 
While earlier bureaucrats had used political theories from the idealized past to solve problems, 
Nasutu’s knowledge was generated from empirical observation based on his own senses and on 
experiments conducted in mints. In addition to collecting knowledge from smelters, Nasutu 
acquired knowledge about the physical character of the green copper from its appearance and its 
sound. He learned about the characteristic of the alloy from the smelting experiment, which 
failed to recycle pure copper from the alloy. The emphasis on observation and experiments was 
similar to the methodology used by today’s engineers and scientists. 
Nasutu used the information from exchange shops, smelters, merchants, artisans and 
experiments in two mints to make his decision. In the process, he created an information network 
that connected the local market and the court. He sent more than information to the emperor. The 
two boxes of sample coins that Nasutu sent to Beijing show that the Qing state has adopted a 
new means of transmitting technology and technical information from the Imperial Household 
                                               
52 Sun, Chun ming meng yu lu, juan 38. 
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Workshop. As many scholars have pointed out, the Imperial Household Workshop used designs, 
paintings, three-dimensional models, and texts to relay technical information between the 
imperial patron and local workshops.53 Nasutu’s activity shows that the use of models to transfer 
technical information was neither exclusive to the bannermen nor limited to the system of the 
Imperial Household Department. It was also adopted by the Qing government and Qing 
bureaucrats to serve the interest of the state. 
It would be an overstatement to assert that Nasutu possessed the “spirit” of modern 
science, but his court memorial indeed reflected a change in statecraft culture. Nasutu’s 
background may have contributed to the particularity of his approach to statecraft. As a Manchu 
from an aristocratic military family, he joined the Qing court as an Imperial Guard and made his 
way to governor-general instead of taking the civil service exam.54 Unlike most of Han Chinese 
bureaucrats who had to be trained in Confucian classics to pass the exam, it is very likely that 
Confucian learning did not play a crucial role in Nasutu’s early life. His practical and technical 
approach to financial problems may have been related to his experience as a military 
commander. In addition, as a Manchu aristocrat who had marriage connections with the imperial 
family, Nasutu may have been very familiar with the operation of the Imperial Household 
Department, which gave him the advantage of being able to conduct experiments and share 
technical information through material models.55  
                                               
53 For example, see Palace Museum and Max-Plank Society for the History of Science, Gongting yu difang. Also 
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It is hard to identify the origin of this new mode of knowledge production and policy-
making. The Manchu emperors might have a huge influence in the formation of such 
technocratic epistemology since they established the institutional structure and the physical place 
for the production and transmission of practical knowledge. However, the emperor did not even 
respond to Nasutu’s proposal. It is more likely that this technocratic culture was formed through 
everyday administrative practice and shared by both Manchu and Han bureaucrats. As I will 
show, when the monetary reform was actually carried out, both Manchu and Han bureaucrats 
relied on empirical observation and experiments to make their arguments.  
 
The Rise of Technocratic Culture among Officials 
Although Nasutu's proposal failed, it set the direction for the monetary reform. One year 
after Nasutu’s submission of his court memorial, a Han bureaucrat, Zhang Ruozhen ŉ̐ϳ (?-
1755), sent another court memorial proposing to change the alloy content. This report caught the 
emperor’s attention. In this court memorial, Zhang wrote,56  
 I investigated the issue with intense personal attention. I interviewed old smelters; 
they all said that “For every picul57 of copper and zinc, if [one] adds three catties of 
tin (diantong Бζ, aka high-quality tin), it will become green money. If one does 
not add tin, then it will be yellow money. Diantong is the mother of copper and 
zinc; once added, even though one puts the alloy into the smelter, copper and zinc 
cannot be separated…That is why no one melts down green money. Yellow money, 
which does not contain tin, can be melted down to cast other objects.” I did not 
wholly believe in [this claim], so I secretly commissioned a smelter to come to our 






4˽ƫƯͭ” Zhang Ruozhen’s court memorial, QL4/9/22, The First Historical Archives, Beijing, No. 04-01-
35-1229-27. 
57 1 picul=100 catties. 
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office to cast several coins as an experiment. Once tin was added, the coins became 
green in appearance, and their quality was similar to those [green money] issued in 
the Shunzhi and Kangxi period, which could last longer. I calculated the cost, and it 
was almost equal to the cost [of casting yellow money] in capital mints. If the 
capital mints cast green money, then the long-lasting problem of illegal melting 
down can be solved. The value of copper coins will thus stop increasing day by 
day.  
 
Historians tend to credit Zhang Ruozhen with the monetary reform because the Qianlong 
emperor responded to his proposal.58 However, even the most casual reader will notice that 
Zhang copied Nasutu’s proposal almost verbatim. Like Nasutu, Zhang first blamed illegal 
melting for the lack of copper and proposed the issuing of green money which was harder to 
recycle into vessels. Zhang theorized the smelters’ claim that “tin is the mother of copper and 
zinc,” so when tin was added to brass, copper and zinc could not be easily separated.59 Like 
Nasutu, Zhang also ordered experiments in provincial mints and confirmed the physical quality 
of sample coins through an empirical examination of the color and sound. In this court memorial, 
Zhang proposed adding 3% tin to the brass formula, which would not tremendously increase the 
cost of mintage.60 To confirm whether or not this formula was effective in preventing recycling, 
Zhang ordered experiments in the provincial mint just as Nasutu did. The experiment showed 
that melting down four strings of green money (equivalent to four taels of silver at the official 
exchange rate) could only yield five catties and eight taels of pure copper, worth one tael six 
mace of silver at market price. Moreover, the labor and charcoal cost more than one tael of silver, 
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making the attempt to recover copper from green money completely unprofitable.61 Finally, 
Zhang sent sample coins with older coins to the Qianlong emperor so that he could compare 
them.62 
Zhang’s court memorial shows that like Nasutu, he aquired knowledge about the physical 
property of the alloy and the smelting techniques from artisans. His careful calculation of the 
cost of melting the metal demonstrates that he had profound knowledge about the market price of 
the metals, the cost of labor, and the cost of smelting. It is hard to identify the origin of Zhang’s 
obsession with technical details and his technocratic mentality. As a Han scholar who had been 
trained in Confucian classics, Zhang’s interest in observation and materiality may be related to 
the trend of evidential scholarship, which emphasized the study of things (gewu ǚɍ) to obtain 
true knowledge. He may have been influenced by his Manchu superior like Nasutu, who shared 
his interest in practical knowledge. Perhaps Zhang had to conform to such a technocratic culture 
to earn the favor of Manchu officials. Regardless of the origins of Zhang’s technocratic mindset, 
the responses to Zhang’s proposal in the imperial court and among other provincial officials 
show that the bureaucratic system in the Qianlong’s court had adopted this technocratic culture 
of governance. 
After receiving Zhang’s memorial, the Qianlong emperor forwarded it to ministers for 
discussion.63 The ministers approved Zhang’s proposal. Wang Xianguo points out that the most 
important reason for its acceptance was its low cost.64 When Zhang’s proposal was forwarded to 
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ministers, their conclusion was: “the cost of casting green money was similar to the cost [of 
casting yellow money] in the capital mints.” In contrast, Nasutu’s formula, 75% copper, 25% 
zinc, and 5% tin, used far more copper than its contemporary yellow money formula, which only 
had 50% copper. Copper and tin were much more expensive than zinc, so Nasutu’s formula cost 
more than the yellow money formula.65 Zhang’s formula, based on the original yellow money 
formula, used the same amount of copper and therefore controlled the cost of mintage.  
The Qing court ordered the capital mints to start a series of experiments to finalize the 
alloy formula based on the information in Zhang’s memorial. However, smelters in the capital 
mints failed to reproduce the green money that was comparable to the samples Zhang sent to 
Beijing. Casting entailed a complicated collaboration among smelters, mold makers, and 
polishers. The tacit knowledge of smelters was necessary for the formula to work. Fully aware of 
the importance of artisans and their tacit skills, the Board of Revenue thus ordered Zhang 
Ruozhen to send two to three smelters who had participated in the production of sample coins to 
Beijing, where they would teach the smelters in the capital mints how to cast the green money.66 
Four days after receiving the request from Beijing, Zhang Ruozhen sent three smelters, 
four skilled assistants, and their tools to Beijing at his own expense.67 Thanks to his prompt 
action, the capital mint quickly worked out a new alloy formula: 50% copper, 41.5% zinc, 6.5% 
lead, and 2% tin.  
                                               
65 According to Wang Xianguo’s research, the copper from Yunnan was 9 taels 2 mace per picul, the Japanese 
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“Qianlong wunian gaizhu qingqian yuanyin chutan,” 13. 
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The new alloy formula was highly cost-effective even by today’s standards. The alloy 
content of green money developed by the capital was very close to contemporary naval brass 
(60% copper, 37.5% zinc, 0.75% tin, and a trace amount of lead.)68 As its name implies, naval 
brass is designed to withstand seawater. It is harder and stronger than typical brass and the tin 
included in the alloy improves the resistance to corrosion. At the same time, naval brass has a 
lower elongation percentage than average brass, making it harder.69 Thus, green copper was more 
durable as cash coinage but more difficult to beat into vessels. The 2% tin content in the green 
copper alloy worked out by the artisans in the capital mints was also highly economical. Tin was 
more expensive than zinc and lead, and its solubility was less than 2% below 200°C.70 The final 
formula of the capital mints, which reduced the tin content from 3% to 2%, reducing the cost of 
mintage without altering the physical property of the green copper.  
The addition of tin also makes the recovery of pure copper from the alloy more difficult.71 
With most copper-zinc brass, the zinc content can be easily removed at a rather low temperature 
because zinc evaporates at 907°C, leaving pure molten copper behind. Tin, however, has a much 
higher boiling point at 2602°C, even higher than the boiling point of copper, at 2562°C.72 Copper 
will therefore evaporate before tin does. Therefore, retrieving copper from an alloy required 
more sophisticated metallurgic technology, better equipment, and more fuel. Just as Zhang 
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72 For a pyrometallurgical method of separating copper from brass, see Shi Hanxiang, “Method for Extracting Pure 
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Ruozhen suggested, the cost of separating copper from the alloy far exceeded the value of pure 
copper that would be recovered. 
In 1740, the Qing court started its monetary reform. The alloy formula worked out in 
capital mints and samples of green money were sent to provincial mints to promote the mintage 
of green money throughout the empire. Based on the standard formula and sample money, 
different provincial mints developed their own local formulas and sources of metals. For 
example, the standard formula used tin from Guangdong province, but the governor-general of 
Yunnan province Qingfu ůŖ (?-1749) decided that tin from Guangdong was expensive, 
because of the cost of shipping. Therefore he ordered the artisans to try using cheaper local tin 
from Gejiu. After this experiment was successful, Qingfu proposed using Yunnan tin to cast 
green money in Yunnan province. The Qianlong emperor approved his proposal and even praised 
his adaptation of the standard formula as “exceedingly appropriate Ÿ΍ɢó.”73  
 
Mobilizing Practical Knowledge for the Sake of Fiscal Reform 
From 1740, the monetary reform was carried out across the Qing empire and lasted fifty-
four years. This reform may seem pointless to modern economists, since changing the alloy 
content did not solve the monetary crisis. Economic historians have pointed out that the real 
cause of the monetary crisis was the overflow of silver from America, a global economic 
phenomenon that the Qing court failed to identify.74 Nor did the new alloy formula stop rampant 
counterfeiting. Copper artisans never wanted to recycle pure copper from copper coins because 
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they could also work with copper alloys. For average users, the alloy content of coins was not a 
big issue as long as the money was accepted in their transactions. Therefore, private mints 
continued to produce small cash using different copper alloys to fulfill the demand for 
circulation. Scholars have shown that the Qing court’s war against counterfeiting continued 
through the eighteenth century.75 The monetary crisis finally ended in the last years of the 
eighteenth century when there was a decline in the global supply of silver.  
However, the way that Qing bureaucrats arrived at a solution showed gradual but 
distinctive changes in the culture of statecraft. The bureaucrats solved the monetary crisis by 
using what they had learned from artisans in court memorials, and they incorporated the 
mentality of artisans into their policy making process. Empirical observation, experimentations, 
trial and error became important problem-solving methodologies for bureaucrats. At the same 
time, the bureaucrats adopted the mentality of the merchants. Cost control became a cornerstone 
of monetary policy. The Board of Revenue approved Zhang Ruozhen's green money formula 
because it was inexpensive, and the emperor complimented Qingfu's local adaptation of the  
alloy formula because it reduced the cost of mintage. In other words, everyone in the 
bureaucratic system attempted to solve the problem by thinking like merchants and artisans.  
The monetary reform shows that the Qing court developed a network that connected and 
mobilized the knowledge of artisans, traders, and bureaucrats for administrative ends. In addition 
to the well-known court memorial system, the center and the local were connected through the 
movement of objects and artisans. In addition to textual transmission, the alloy formula was 
communicated through the movement of materials and personnel. The reform of coinage 
required more than the correct alloy; it depended on tacit knowledge about alloying, smelting, 
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  201 
temperature control, casting, and polishing. Qing bureaucrats transferred the tacit knowledge of 
artisans through moving artisans around the empire.  
When the Qing court carried out the new monetary policy, it had to do more than merely 
send the alloy formula from the capital mints to local mints. The communication of the alloy 
formula between the center and the local involved the transmission of artisanal knowledge as 
well as the localization of the monetary metal, which was based on knowledge of the local 
market. The monetary reform led to the collaboration between the Qing government and the 
local tin market. The Qing government functioned like a corporation which had to work 
seamlessly with the domestic market and global traders to secure its metal supply. As local 
bureaucrats were responsible for the sourcing, purchasing, and the shipping of monetary metals, 
Qing officials and their assistants increased the knowledge about the trade, purification, and 
shipping of the metal. In the same process, the bureaucrats gained the knowledge and mentality 
of accountants and auditors either to prevent corruption for the sake of the state or to become 
corrupted themselves. In the following section, I examine the sourcing of tin for coinage and 
present the implications of the monetary reform for other sectors of the economy. 
 
Sourcing the Tin for the Green Money 
To end the money dearth, in addition to changing the alloy formula, the Qing court opened 
more provincial mints to cast more coins. Consequently, this monetary reform brought new 
demand for tin, as well as increasing demand other kinds of monetary metals like copper, lead, 
and zinc. To increase the metal supply, the Qing government lifted the mining ban in China 
proper after the 1740s. However, as mining output remained insufficient, the Qing government 
still had to rely on domestic and international traders to supply its mintage. 
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The Qing court supplied the provincial mints and capital mints in two ways. The capital 
mints under the Board of Revenue and the Board of Works received the monetary metals under 
the name of taxation, irregular procurement (caiban Ɖ΍), or domestic tribute (tugong Òͫ) 
from several provinces. For example, the Qing court required the Guangdong government to 
supply 150,000 catties of tin to Beijing annually from 1741.76 Meanwhile, the court 
commissioned other provinces, such as Jiangsu province, to purchase tin among other kinds of 
goods to send to Beijing.77 The provincial mints were entirely dependent on the market for 
monetary metal. In this way, the coinage system functioned like a manufacturing process and the 
Qing empire acted like a corporation. It purchased raw materials—the monetary metal--from the 
market and used the to produce coins. I will now explain how the bureaucrats learned to act like 
merchants when they engaged in commercial activities such as procurement, shipping, and 
bookkeeping to conduct the “business” of the empire. 
 
Bureaucrats as Merchants, the Empire as a Corporation 
Ideally, the Qing governments taxed 20 percent of the mining output to supply the mintage, 
but in reality, the international and the domestic traders supplied most of the monetary metals. 
Each provincial government had to appoint officials, or weiyuan to purchase the monetary metals 
from the metal market. The purchase of metals was a highly specialized operation, which 
involved lengthy trips to distant trading hubs, connections with metal traders and shops, and the 
management of secure packaging and shipping. In eighteenth-century China, several cities 
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became centers of the metal market. Hankou, the major port in central China on the Yangtze 
River, became a trading hub for copper, zinc, lead, tin from Yunnan province and supplied both 
the provincial mints and private markets in north and east China.78 Canton became the trading 
hub for tin, as European traders supplied a large amount of tin from Southeast Asia to 
supplement China’s domestic tin.79 Each year, appointed officials from different provinces 
travelled to these hubs to purchase the metals. Immersed in commercial activities, these 
bureaucrats gained tremendous knowledge about the trade and the logistical management of the 
metals though their close collaboration with merchants and carriers.  
At the same time, like all government procurement, the sourcing of the monetary metal 
involved private interests and corruption. As the biggest buyer of metals, the Qing government 
developed a system of accounting and auditing to minimize state expenditure and prevent the 
officials from lining their own pockets with the money of the empire. The Qing government 
adopted the zouxiao process in the purchase of the metal. The term zouxiao, which means 
reporting financial matters to the imperial throne for approval, is better known among economic 
historians studying the fiscal system of Qing China. It was widely used in the accounting system 
of the Imperial Household Department as well as the fiscal system of the Qing empire. Before 
the actual procurement, the price of the metal, which was based on market price, had to be 
reported to the Board of Revenue for approval. After the procurement, the expenditures and the 
accounting documents were sent to the Board of Revenue on a regular basis, usually once a 
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year.80 After the reports had passed the audit of the Board of Revenue, they were forwarded to 
the emperor. In case the reports did not pass the audit, they would be sent back to the submitters 
for correction or interrogation. Even worse, the conductor of the procurement would be punished 
for exaggerating the cost of procurement. As the investigation of the corruption case reveals, the 
Qing bureaucrats, from the minister of the Board of Revenue to the grass-root bureaucrats who 
conduct the procurement, all manifested their profound knowledge of accounting, bookkeeping, 
cost estimation, and logistical management. In other words, the sourcing of monetary metal made 
the Qing bureaucrats act as merchants and the Qing government function like a corporation. 
 
A Tiny Corruption Case in 1770 
A minor corruption case in 1770 illustrates how the Qing empire acted like a corporation, 
with its employees specialized in accounting, bookkeeping, cost estimation, and logistical 
management. In the fall of 1770, the governor of Jiangsu Province, Sazai ̡΋ (?-1786), 
received an interrogation from the Board of Revenue, asking why Jiangsu Province purchased tin 
at a higher price than Fujian province in 1769. Knowing that officials from Fujian and Jiangsu 
Province purchased tin from the same location--Wu County in Suzhou prefecture—the Board of 
Revenue suspected the officials who were in charge of the procurement reported a false quote to 
defraud the government and ordered Sazai to carry out a thorough investigation of the 
procurement of tin in the previous year. The auditing process in the zouxiao system allowed 
Beijing to discover the suspicious elements in government procurement in different provinces. 
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Based on the annual accounting records and reports sent by provincial governments, the Board of 
Revenue could easily find the actual market price in different parts of the empire. 
Upon receiving the interrogation from Beijing, Sazai was petrified ŪŤ.He promptly 
ordered the Provincial Commissioner Li Hu Ǐȟ (1713-1781) and the Provincial Surveillance 
Commissioner Wu Tan ·ä (?-1780) to investigate.81 As the investigation unfolded, the Qing 
bureaucrats showed their close connection with metal traders, their profound knowledge of 
accounting, the fluctuation of the market, cost estimation, and discrepancies in measurements 
between different regions and trades. The practical knowledge and the bookkeeping technology 
they learned from merchants and traders were a double-edged sword: they enabled the state to 
fight corruption, while helping some bureaucrats embezzle government funds and cover up their 
corruption with paperwork. 
Thanks to the zouxiao system, the provincial government kept detailed ledgers and journals 
of the procurement, which enabled the investigators to locate the responsible personnel and their 
activities.82 The 1769 procurement by the Jiangsu government was conducted by two appointed 
officials, Li Xuan Ǐι, the Assistant Magistrate of Jintan ΰä County, and Kang Ling ŀλ, 
the Vice Magistrate of Qingpu ϵȘ County. Their purchase price of tin in 1769 looked 
reasonable at first glance: the price was based on the precedent of previous years, and the Board 
of Revenue approved the quote in 1769.83 If the Board of Revenue had not compared the 
procurement between Jiangsu and Fujian Province, they would never have discovered the 
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embezzlement. A further investigation into the accounting documents revealed potential 
wrongdoing: both the Jiangsu government and the Fujian government purchased tin from the 
same shop: Qi Zhengchang ʗǶƲ in Wu County. Having located the shop, Li Hu and Wu Tan 
secretly ordered local officials who were not involved in the commission, the Prefect of Suzhou 
Zhong Guangyu ςeͨ and the Magistrate of the Wu County Chu Bangli ̵Υʟ to go to Wu 
County in person (qinfu ̼ͼ) to collect and examine the accounting journals and ledgers of all 
shops that traded in tin in Wu County, including Qi Zhengchang.84 
The investigation of accounting documents has two purposes. The first was to find the 
actual sales price and volume of Qi Zhengchang to see if Li Xuan and Kang Ling had inflated the 
procurement price. The second was to compare the price of Qi Zhengchang with other regional 
traders to see if Qi Zhengchang had falsified its accounting records. As the court memorial 
demonstrates, officials who participated in the investigation were fully aware that traders might 
collude with the officials (huwei biaoli /ȵ̲̳) and create false accounting in anticipation of 
any future investigation. After a thorough comparison, the investigators confirmed the credibility 
of the market price offered by Qi Zhengchang and reassessed the procurement price provided by 
Li Xuan and Kang Ling.85 However, this was not the end of the investigation.  
 
Mastering the Knowledge of Accounting and Trade 
As the investigation went on, the officials showed their mastery of accounting and trade. 
The bureaucrats had extensive knowledge of shipping, material refinement, and the subtle 
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differences in measurements in different locations—information possessed by merchants 
involved in long-distance trade. The differences in price between Jiangsu and Fujian might 
attributable to fluctuations in market price, the cost of refinement and packaging, and losses 
during shipping and refinement. To be impartial, the investigators worked like accountants who 
took all these factors into consideration. The journals of Qi Zhengchang show Li Xuan and Kang 
Ling purchasing tin in 1769 at an average price of 14 taels 7 mace and 1 candareens of silver per 
picul.86 The investigators also learned through a close reading of the accounting records of Qi 
Zhengchang that the merchants only supplied foreign tin in the market of Wu County, which had 
to be purified or refined to achieve the desired quality for the Board of Revenue. The refining 
process led to a loss of 3% in weight.87  
The accounting records also show that the discrepancy between the official measurement 
and the customary measurement used in tin shops; this accounted for another 7% of weight loss. 
The steelyard used by tin shops only had 14 taels, which means that according to the customary 
measurement, one catty only weighed 14 taels.88 In contrast, the official measurement 
(guancheng Ĉʤ) regulated that one catty was supposed to weigh 15 taels.89 So a picul of tin 
purchased from the market only weighed 93.3 “official catties” according to the standard of the 
Board of Revenue. Consequently, the appointed officials who were responsible for the 
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procurement had to add seven catties for every picul of tin to compensate for the difference.90 
Not believing the one-sided story presented by the merchants, Provincial Governor Sazai ordered 
Provincial Commissioner Li Hu and Provincial Surveillance Commissioner Wu Tan to examine 
the counterweight and the steelyard in tin shops in person and to carry out a smelting experiment 
to confirm the weight loss during refinement. The refining experiment and empirical 
examination of the steelyard conducted by the two provincial officials confirmed that due to the 
3% loss in the refining process and the 7% loss caused by the measurement difference, the cost 
of tin rose 10% to 16 taels, 1 mace and 1 candereen.  
In addition to the loss in weight, the investigators factored in the cost of refinement, 
packaging, and shipping. Based on the accounting records of the Qi Zhengchang shop, the 
investigators reconstructed the cost of refinement and packaging in 1769. After adding the cost 
of refining (5 mace of silver per picul) and packaging (2 mace of silver per picul), they found the 
purchasing cost of one picul of tin to be 16 taels 8 mace and 8 candereens, very close to the 
procurement price of 17 taels 1 mace provided by the suspected embezzlers Li Xuan and Kang 
Ling.91 
However, the small discrepancy in the paperwork did not save the two corrupt officials. 
The investigators discovered their trick by pointing out that the difference in the accounting units 
for silver. In the Qing empire, the silver circulating in different regional markets varied in weight 
and purity. When used as an accounting unit, the measurements also differed. The Treasury tael 
of the Board of Revenue was the standard weight and was used as a unit of account in the ledgers 
to record the income and the expenditure of the government. The accounting unit for the tribute 
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grain was Tribute tael (caoping yin Ȧķε).92 Different provincial markets provinces had their 
own standard for Transfer tael (shiping yin ıķε) and used it as the accounting unit. In Wu 
County, the conversion rate between the Transfer tael and Treasury tael was 100:93.93 The 
estimated cost of 16 taels 8 mace 8 candareens was calculated in Transfer tael, while the 
procurement price of 17 taels 1 mace was recorded in Treasury tael. Once converted to Treasury 
tael, the actual cost was no more than 15 taels 7 mace, much lower than the procurement price 
reported by Li Xuan and Kang Ling. When they delivered 16,238 catties of tin to the Board of 
Revenue in 1769, they increased the expenditure by 227 taels and 3 mace of silver in total.94  
The investigators also identified in the ledgers of Qi Zhengchang that in 1769, Li Xuan and 
Kang Ling purchased 20,006 catties of unrefined foreign tin, which could make 180,005 catties 
of refined tin for delivery to the Board of Revenue. As the Board of Revenue had ordered only 
16,238 catties for delivery, 1,767 catties of tin was missing.95  
Convinced that the evidence was enough to convict Li Xuan and Kang Ling, Sazai ordered 
their arrest. Kang Ling was imprisoned. In the eleventh lunar month of 1770, Li Xuan, who had 
already retired and returned to his hometown in Zhili Province, was arrested and sent to Jiangsu 
Province by the Governor-General of Zhili. When interrogated, the two bureaucrats insisted that 
it was customary for appointed officials to bring the extra tin to Beijing to compensate for the 
short weight, but the investigators rejected their appeal by noting that the 10% weight loss due to 
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refinement and measurement differences have already been added to their procurement 
expenditure.96 One month later, they were each sentenced to “one hundred strokes with the heavy 
bamboo and exile to 2000 li” based on Article 264 “Supervisors or Guardians Who Themselves 
Steal Money or Supplies from Granaries or Treasuries” in The Great Qing Code.97 
However, this is not the end of the story. When the officials of Jiangsu province 
investigated the case of tin procurement in 1769, they reviewed all the zouxiao records related to 
the procurement from 1764 to 1770 and found even more cases of corruption and embezzlement. 
Following the same pattern, the provincial governors sent county magistrates to collect all the 
journals and ledgers of private shops which contracted the procurement and cross-referenced the 
merchants’ accounting records with the official zouxiao records. In addition to the paperwork, 
these county magistrates visited shops in person to examine the physical quality of the material 
and to confirm the cost of refinement.98 At the beginning of 1771, the “anti-corruption” 
campaign came to an end, with eight more bureaucrats (besides Li Xuan and Kang Ling) 
removed from office and punished for corruption.99 
 
Conclusion: Utilizing Practical Knowledge in Everyday Administration (and Corruption) 
Compared to the famous corruption case of Heshen, a favorite of the Qianlong emperor 
who was accused of embezzling 1,100 million taels of silver, the anti-corruption campaign that 
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ended in 1771 was a minor matter. However, the crime of Li Xuan and Kang Ling and the 
ensuing investigation offer us a glimpse of the ways in which the Qing government functioned at 
the lower levels, and how county administrators applied their knowledge of bookkeeping, 
auditing, and trade to their administrative practice.  
The zouxiao routine of the Qing government trained the scholar-officials to expertise in 
bookkeeping and auditing. The investigation demonstrates that the first instinct among the Qing 
bureaucrats was to review the accounting records. Their accounting literacy was not limited to 
governmental records; the investigators in Jiangsu province proved themselves adept at reading 
and interpreting arcane journals and commercial ledgers. The two criminals, Li Xuan and Kang 
Ling, nearly outwitted them: they were so proficient in false accounting that their supervisors 
and the officials in the Board of Revenue had trouble pinpointing the fraudulent entries in the 
zouxiao documents.  
The craft of these bureaucrats entailed much more than producing standardized and 
routinized paperwork. The crimes Li Xuan and Kang Ling committed arose from their 
engagement with de facto procurement and logistical management activities. Everyday practices 
such as government procurement enabled low-level bureaucrats like them to work closely with 
merchants and acquire knowledge of commercial activities. In addition to possessing extensive 
knowledge of the cost of shipping, refinement, and the physical quality of tin, they were fully 
aware of the regional differences in measurements and currency units and official standards, 
which could not be easily identified simply by reading the documents. Li Xuan and Kang Ling 
learned the art of trade from the merchants who handled long-distance trade across the Qing 
empire. Unfortunately, the bureaucrats investigating their crimes knew as much about the long 
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distance trade as they did. The investigators used their practical knowledge to bring their 
colleagues to justice. 
Scholars of the British Empire and the East India Company have shown that the East India 
Company evolved into a modern rational-legal authority in the mid-eighteenth century.100 The 
East India Company acquired the requisite administrative skills and developed institutions of 
modern rational bureaucracy through its non-commercial activities in its colonies.101 As Kapil 
Raj has shown, the employees of the company had a rudimentary commercial and state 
bureaucracy, and the training for merchants later also became standard for British bureaucrats.102 
Like their British colleagues, the grassroot bureaucrats who served the Qing empire had to 
master both commercial and non-commercial knowledge to conduct their administrative work. 
But their professional trajectory was the opposite of that of their British colleagues—Qing 
bureaucrats were familiar with non-commercial duties at the start of their career, but to serve the 
empire (and their private interest) better, they had to acquire knowledge of commercial activities. 
At the same time, the Qing bureaucrats expanded their craft knowledge. This case study of 
monetary reform has shown us that the Qing bureaucrats acquired the artisanal epistemology and 
used empirical observation and experiments to make political and administrative decisions. In 
their everyday administrative work, the Qing bureaucrats acted less like Confucian scholars and 
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more like engineers and merchants who worked in the gigantic corporation known as the Qing 
empire. 
The Qing bureaucrats had to expand their knowledge to craft and trade because the Qing 
empire had begun to act like a corporation. Recent scholarship on state and bureaucracy has 
moved the focus from viewing the bureaucracy and the state as coherent institutions to the 
analysis of statecraft as a social practice.103 When we turn our attention from the institutional and 
constitutional structures of the Qing empire and to the actual actions of the bureaucrats of the 
Qing empire, we find that the empire acquired many characteristics of a large corporation that 
produced copper cash. It was obsessed with the technical details of its products, it had a highly 
rational and impersonal bookkeeping and auditing system, it was interested in cost control, and 
its employers were passionate about transmitting practical knowledge about craft and trade.  
However, the Qing empire and the East India Company evolved in opposite directions. The 
Company extended its activities from commerce to administration, while the Qing empire 
extended its administrative realm to commerce and trade. This expansion to the realm of 
commerce was partially due to the characteristics of the Manchu court, and partially to the 
vulnerability of the Qing empire. As scholars have shown us, the Manchu emperor intentionally 
appointed his bondservants to important positions, and used merchants with connections to the 
Imperial Household Department to manage the salt monopoly and to expand economic 
influence.104 The close collaboration between the Manchu monarch and the merchants situation 
was not limited to the salt monopoly. Scholars have shown that even though the Qing court 
                                               
103 Juan Carlos Garavaglia, M.J. Braddick, and Christian Lamouroux eds., Serve the Power(s), Serve the State: 
America and Eurasia (Newcastle upon Tyne, UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2016), ix. 
104 The earliest observation was made by Jonathan D. Spence. See Spence, Tsʻao Yin and the Kʻang-His Emperor. 
The latest monograph on this topic is by Wu, Luxurious Networks. 
  214 
claimed to monopolize copper mining and trade, the copper merchants who had close 
connections with the bondservants and the Imperial Household Department played the major role 
in supplying copper for coinage.105 The Manchu monarch developed a very efficient supply 
network through merchants: the Imperial Household could obtain natural resources from across 
the empire through merchant networks, and this close collaboration between merchants and the 
court expanded from the Imperial Household Department to the Qing bureaucracy.  
In the same manner, the Qing state mirrored the Imperial Household Department to 
produce and transmit practical knowledge. As the monetary reform has shown us, the Qing state 
utilized models, personnel, and artifacts to transmit practical knowledge between the capital mint 
and local mints in order to produce copper coins. The way that the Qing state made its monetary 
policy work was the same way that the Imperial Household Department ran its imperial 
workshops. In this sense, the fine line between the Qing state and the imperial household was 
blurred: the state and the court were just two sides of the Qing empire coin. 
This analysis shows that the Qing empire depended on its commercial networks for its 
resources and on personal connections to conduct large projects. The Qing court never had to 
develop the institutional capacity to monopolize its natural resources, nor were the Qing 
bureaucrats interested in controlling and extracting the empire’s natural resources. Instead, they 
were more interested in managerial technologies such as how to conduct the procurement, or 
how to attract merchants to invest in mining. In the case of national projects such as coinage and 
canal management, the Qing empire relied on bureaucrats’ personal collaboration with the 
private sector. Therefore, the bureaucrats were more interested in the management of personnel 
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and labor than in making structural changes. The bureaucratic system of the Qing empire was a 
combination of personal and impersonal rules, and the highly effective impersonal rule could be 
achieved only through personal interactions and transactions with merchants and artisans. 
The close collaboration between the state, merchants, and artisans allowed Qing 
bureaucrats to absorb practical knowledge from artisans and managerial technologies from 
merchants. As a consequence, in the second half of the nineteenth century, when the Qing court 
finally decided to industrialize, it was not difficult for Qing bureaucrats to recycle this acquired 
practical knowledge and reorganize it under the rubric of jingshi, or statecraft in the modern 
sense of the word.
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CONCLUSION 
Wu Qijun published the Tools of Mines at a crucial transitioning moment in Chinese 
history. Two years before the publication of the mining treatise, the Qing empire lost the First 
Opium War (1839-1842) and was forced to face the power and threat from Western imperialism 
directly. Meanwhile, the Qing empire had already suffered from military turbulence caused by 
Muslim rebels at its western frontier,  the crisis of the Grand Canal, and the economic decline 
due to the global decline of silver supply. The publication of the Tools of Mines can be 
considered as a response of the Qing bureaucrats who were trying to deal with these domestic 
and international challenges. Wu’s attempt to revive practical learning could be aligned with 
reformists like Lin Zexu and Wei Yuan. However, he did not necessarily share the same vision 
with later reformists like Li Hongzhang, who initiated the adoption of western technology and 
science to strengthen the state and learned to associate state sovereignty with the ability to 
extract natural resources from the discourse of western imperial power.1  
Wu’s vision of technology and statecraft was still, to a large extent, an eighteenth-century 
one. This dissertation examines the meaning of craft and technology before the Chinese adopted 
the western/modern discourse about technology and science. Chapter One shows that with the 
increasing demand for developing the Southwest frontiers and nourishing the people, the Qing 
scholars started to codify and systemize miners’ vernacular knowledge of mining from the 
eighteenth century. The Qing scholar-officials knowledge about mining was largely based on 
miners’ bodily engagement with nature in the mining practice and the local bureaucrats’ 
administrative work. The structure of Wu’s mining treatise demonstrates that in the eyes of Qing 
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bureaucrats, mining was more than just tools and machines. They considered the embodied skills 
and the social organization of miners as important as the equipment to increase productivity and 
efficiency.  
The social technology of mining is the central theme of Chapters Two and Three. Chapter 
Two illustrates how the semi-autonomous social organization of miners facilitated the 
fundraising and labor management in mining, contributing to the development of this capital- 
and labor- intensive industry when there were little legal regulations and large capital for 
investment. Chapter Three further reveals that it was the social organization of mining that 
enabled the movement of mining technology across borders, and contributed to the success of 
Chinese migrant miners in Bangka. The shareholding, fundraising, and labor management 
technology in the kongsi system allowed the Chinese miners to operate large-scale mining 
industry, thus dominating the mining industry in Southeast Asia. It created a seemingly 
egalitarian system that motivated the miners to pool as many resources as possible to exploit the 
nature and to exploit themselves.  
The emphasis on the social technology over tools and machines was by no means a 
phenomenon that was particular in Chinese history. It was more likely to be a global 
phenomenon before the 1850s. As I have demonstrated in Chapter Three, both European 
colonizers and Chinese bureaucrats prioritized the reform in financial and management 
technology when they tried to increase productivity.  
The formation of (semi-)autonomous mining communities was not limited to the Qing 
empire either. As I have demonstrated in Chapter Three, similar organizations could be widely 
found across China and Southeast Asia. As the population growth increased the pressure on the 
arable land, more and more people chose to be mining normads that followed the underground 
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resources. As they moved following the veins of mines and engaged in the industry, they 
voluntarily transformed themselves from farmers to labor forces that contributed to the global 
expansion of capitalism. 
The travel of the miners and merchants challenges the traditional geographical boundaries, 
which were largely based on the territorial boundaries of modern nation-states. The movement of 
the people and technology between south China and Southeast Asia show that south China was 
more closely connected to Southeast Asia rather than the political center of Beijing. This 
dissertation reveals a new geographic macro-region around the South China Sea that was 
connected by trade, migration, and natural resources in the early modern period. When the Dutch 
and the British came to this region, they were not connection builders, but new participants who 
gradually changed the rules of the game. 
This dissertation deepens the understanding of the Chinese society as well. First, it shows 
that the Chinese society was not a homogeneous one but a heterogeneous one. Even the local 
society in a small geographical area was formed by different communities and social 
organizations. As Chapter Two has demonstrated, the local community in Gejiu was made of 
migrants from different provinces, Yi-ethnic people, and Chinese Muslims. Each community had 
its own social structure and forms of authority. Chapter Three shows that the local society of 
northern Guangdong was made of communites speaking Hakka, Hoklo, and Teochew dialects. 
Without the connection of Hoklo speaking Hakkas miners, the Chaozhou pewter artisans would 
not be able to adapt to Bangka tin easily. Without the local craft community, the pewter artisans 
would not be able to apply stone casting in their work. The interactions, conections, and 
competitions between different communities shaped the landscape of craft and industry in 
Yunnan, Guangdong, and Bangka. 
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Moreover, this dissertation reveals that the Chinese culture, also, was not a homogenous 
one. As Chapter Four shows, Guangdong artisans were able to create their own style and fashion, 
which won the favor of both the domestic and international consumers. They successfully 
overthrew the cultural hegemony of Jiangnan literati, turning the so-called Suzhou style to a 
nostalgia before it was revived by the nineteenth-century antique collectors.  
The compilation of the mining treatise and the monetary reform shows that the Qing 
bureaucrats gained practical knowledge and expertise through their close interactions with 
miners, artisans, and merchants. As Chapter Five has demonstrated, Qing bureaucrats’ 
acquisition and application of practical knowledge in accounting, trade, and metalwork have 
transformed the Confucian scholars to technocrats with different expertises and formed the 
technocratic culture in the Qing empire.  
Although Qing bureaucrats shared a collective technocratic culture, their interest in 
practical knowledge diverged from the trajectory of their European colleagues. Yu Qingchang’s 
ethnographic approach in his travelogue and his interview with mining administrators might be 
similar to European natural philosophers, but the Chinese bureaucrats’ attempt to systemize 
practical knowledge did not lead to modern science or technology. Instead, their interest led to 
the formation of a new vision of statecraft, or jingshi. To them, statecraft was about managing 
human and non-human actors. It was about the transformation of materials, the production of 
social relations, and the proper management of skilled labor, resources, and capital. All of these 
above could be translated as technology, economics, and politics.  
Chapter Five also shows that Qing bureaucrats had a different concept about natural 
resources. Before they started to associate natural resources with sovereignty and modernity, the 
Qing bureaucrats never worried about taking absolute control over natural resources. The 
  220 
monetary and mining administration show that the Qing state tended to get all the resources 
through the merchants and the market. As many economic historians have shown, economic 
institutions enjoyed a lot of freedom in late imperial China and the Qing empire was a laissez-
faire state.2 The bureaucrats of the Qing empire truly believed in the power of the market 
economy and minimized the intervention of the state. When the state needed resources, instead 
of directly extracting natural resources, the bureaucrats relied on the market to supply the 
resources. When the state needed to develop the mining industry, they “recruited merchant 
capital” (zhaoshang ƂÅ) to raise funds and relied on local leaders to manage the actual 
operation of the mining industry. This approach left a legacy in the nineteenth century when the 
Qing state initiated the industrialization and modernization project. 3 During the self-
strengthening movement, the Qing state continued to use the model of “merchant management 
under bureaucratic supervision” (guandu shangban ĈʆÅ΍) to found the modern industry in 
China.4 
The close reliance and dependence on the private sectors led to an interesting character of 
the Qing bureaucratic system. With countless regulations, precedents, the civil service exam, and 
the regular evaluation system, the Qing bureaucratic system could be considered as an ideal 
                                               
2 Madeleine Zelin, “Economic Freedom in Late Imperial China,” William C. Kirby, ed., Realms of Freedom in 
Modern China, The Making of Modern Freedom (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 2004), 57-83. 
 
3 E-tu Zen Sun, “The Finance Ministry (Hubu) and Its Relationship to the Private Economy in Qing Times,” in Jane 
Kate Leonard and John R. Watt ed., To Achieve Security and Wealth: The Qing Imperial State and the Economy 
1644-1911 (Ithaca: Cornell University East Asia Program, 1992), 9-19. 
 
4 For the industrialization project, see Albert Feuerwerker, China’s Early Industrialization: Sheng Hsuan-Huai 
(1844-1916) and Mandarin Enterprise (New York: Atheneum, 1970). Wellington K. K. Chan, Merchants, 
Mandarins, and Modern Enterprise in Late Chʻing China (Cambridge: East Asian Research Center, Harvard 
University: distributed by Harvard University Press, 1977).  
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version of modern bureaucracy.5 However, the routinized impersonal rule could only be achieved 
through highly personal interactions. The local security was achieved through personal ties and 
between county magistrates and local community leaders. The accounting and auditing were 
highly routinized but the actual procurement was carried out through personal transactions. At 
the institutional level, in order to rule the vast empire efficiently, the Qing rulers intentionally 
created an institution--the Imperial Household Department--to carry out their irregular, personal 
commission to supplement the highly routinized impersonal rule of the Qing state. The tension 
between the personal rule and impersonal rule could be identified in the sorcery scare in 1768 
when the Qianlong emperor struggled to fight the routinized bureaucratic system and to prevent 
himself from being “the first servant” of the state.6  
The combination of personal and impersonal rule, together with its strong belief in market 
economy, distinguished the Qing state from its predecessors. The Qing state was not completely 
modelled on the Ming state, but was a strange combination of early modern corporations and a 
neo-liberalist monarchy. The personal rule within the impersonal rule proved to be effective and 
efficient for a long time. As the approach to the Grand Canal crisis in 1820s has shown, it 
enabled the Qing empire to fix large-scale projects through piecemeal reforms at the local level.7 
However, it also prevented the Qing rulers from identifying larger structural defects and 
responding to the challenges in the modern world.   
                                               
5 Max Weber, “Bureaucracy,” in Max Weber and Hans Gerth, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1958), 196-244. 
 
6 Philip A. Kuhn, Soulstealers: The Chinese Sorcery Scare of 1768  (Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard University Press, 
1990). For the notion of “first servant,” see Max Weber, “Bureacracy,” 198. 
 
7 Leonard, Controlling from Afar. 
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